|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||1801 To 2400|
|Locale Reference||intersection : gramm|
|Altitude||msl single value : 19000|
|Controlling Facilities||artcc : zla.artcc|
tracon : sct.tracon
|Operator||common carrier : air carrier|
|Make Model Name||A320|
|Operating Under FAR Part||Part 121|
|Navigation In Use||other|
|Flight Phase||descent : intermediate altitude|
|Route In Use||arrival star : civet 5|
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : first officer|
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 200|
flight time total : 9000
flight time type : 4500
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : captain|
oversight : pic
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 23|
flight time total : 15000
flight time type : 3800
|Anomaly||aircraft equipment problem : less severe|
|Independent Detector||other flight crewa|
other flight crewb
|Resolutory Action||flight crew : overcame equipment problem|
After being cleared direct to gramm intersection by ZLA; we appeared to lose and then recover both FMGC's. After being handed off to socal (124.05) we lost the FMGC's a second time; and then recovered them. We asked for vectors to the ILS just in case we lost the FMGC's again -- which we did. We were given a vector to intercept the lax 068 degree radial for the ILS runway 25L. During this time we were trying to determine the exact nature of our failure (we initially lost both autoplts; autothrust; landing elevation and partial tuning of the radios). During this; socal asked if we could take a direct to somewhere and intercept runway 24R. We replied no; that we had lost our main navigation system and had just switched to our back-up. They sounded a bit perturbed that we really wanted to stay with runway 25L; but they did end up leaving us on the approach and moving someone else over to runway 24R. We elected not to declare an emergency because the WX was well above what we needed for a raw data ILS and we had been comfortably established on the localizer. In retrospect; it might have jut been easier to declare an emergency and 'force' the issue of runway assignment; but we really didn't feel we needed to because socal was very helpful and we were totally comfortable with how the situation was progressing. Upon landing; maintenance determined it was an FMGC #1 failure with no reason for FMGC #2 not assuming the navigation functions. Supplemental information from acn 701206: after we explained that if we did not continue for my runway 25L that we would have to declare an emergency and break off the approach socal was very helpful from that point on. The rest of the approach and landing was uneventful using raw data on the captain's side. Upon maintenance troubleshooting; it was confirmed that FMGC #1 failed but no explanation why FMGC #2 did not back up FMGC #1. Unit was replaced and checked ok. After landing; I was given a phone number of socal to call. After explaining of the situation to socal. They were very sympathetic to our dilemma. It was a bit confusing to socal during the situation as why we could not switch runways. There was a marine layer moving in and we could not see runways 24 for a visual approach.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: THE CREW OF AN A320 EXPERIENCED A DUAL FMGC FAILURE WHILE APCHING LAX ON THE CIVET 5.
Narrative: AFTER BEING CLRED DIRECT TO GRAMM INTXN BY ZLA; WE APPEARED TO LOSE AND THEN RECOVER BOTH FMGC'S. AFTER BEING HANDED OFF TO SOCAL (124.05) WE LOST THE FMGC'S A SECOND TIME; AND THEN RECOVERED THEM. WE ASKED FOR VECTORS TO THE ILS JUST IN CASE WE LOST THE FMGC'S AGAIN -- WHICH WE DID. WE WERE GIVEN A VECTOR TO INTERCEPT THE LAX 068 DEG RADIAL FOR THE ILS RWY 25L. DURING THIS TIME WE WERE TRYING TO DETERMINE THE EXACT NATURE OF OUR FAILURE (WE INITIALLY LOST BOTH AUTOPLTS; AUTOTHRUST; LNDG ELEVATION AND PARTIAL TUNING OF THE RADIOS). DURING THIS; SOCAL ASKED IF WE COULD TAKE A DIRECT TO SOMEWHERE AND INTERCEPT RWY 24R. WE REPLIED NO; THAT WE HAD LOST OUR MAIN NAV SYS AND HAD JUST SWITCHED TO OUR BACK-UP. THEY SOUNDED A BIT PERTURBED THAT WE REALLY WANTED TO STAY WITH RWY 25L; BUT THEY DID END UP LEAVING US ON THE APCH AND MOVING SOMEONE ELSE OVER TO RWY 24R. WE ELECTED NOT TO DECLARE AN EMER BECAUSE THE WX WAS WELL ABOVE WHAT WE NEEDED FOR A RAW DATA ILS AND WE HAD BEEN COMFORTABLY ESTABLISHED ON THE LOC. IN RETROSPECT; IT MIGHT HAVE JUT BEEN EASIER TO DECLARE AN EMER AND 'FORCE' THE ISSUE OF RWY ASSIGNMENT; BUT WE REALLY DIDN'T FEEL WE NEEDED TO BECAUSE SOCAL WAS VERY HELPFUL AND WE WERE TOTALLY COMFORTABLE WITH HOW THE SIT WAS PROGRESSING. UPON LNDG; MAINT DETERMINED IT WAS AN FMGC #1 FAILURE WITH NO REASON FOR FMGC #2 NOT ASSUMING THE NAV FUNCTIONS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 701206: AFTER WE EXPLAINED THAT IF WE DID NOT CONTINUE FOR MY RWY 25L THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO DECLARE AN EMER AND BREAK OFF THE APCH SOCAL WAS VERY HELPFUL FROM THAT POINT ON. THE REST OF THE APCH AND LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL USING RAW DATA ON THE CAPT'S SIDE. UPON MAINT TROUBLESHOOTING; IT WAS CONFIRMED THAT FMGC #1 FAILED BUT NO EXPLANATION WHY FMGC #2 DID NOT BACK UP FMGC #1. UNIT WAS REPLACED AND CHKED OK. AFTER LNDG; I WAS GIVEN A PHONE NUMBER OF SOCAL TO CALL. AFTER EXPLAINING OF THE SIT TO SOCAL. THEY WERE VERY SYMPATHETIC TO OUR DILEMMA. IT WAS A BIT CONFUSING TO SOCAL DURING THE SIT AS WHY WE COULD NOT SWITCH RWYS. THERE WAS A MARINE LAYER MOVING IN AND WE COULD NOT SEE RWYS 24 FOR A VISUAL APCH.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.