Narrative:

I experienced a runway incursion at runway 22L at bos this morning. I was the first officer. We taxied out to runway 22R from gate. We followed a B737 to the runway. B737 proceeded to take off runway 22R. We then were cleared to cross runway 22R and what I thought was a clearance to taxi into position and hold on runway 22L. We taxied into position and hold on runway 22L and waited for our takeoff clearance. About 10 seconds after we were cleared into position and hold; a BE1900D verified if they were cleared to land on runway 22L tower then asked us who told us to go into position and hold and I said that we thought that they did. Tower proceeded to tell 1900 to go around and asked us to turn right onto the first taxiway; exit the runway and to hold short runway 22L. After 1900 landed; we were cleared to take off. Looking back on the event it appeared that we were cleared to taxi into position and hold on runway 22L. The last clearance we were given was to cross runway 22R and monitor tower on 132.22. The first tower controller never told us to contact tower 132.22. The first controller also never told us to cross runway 22L and hold short runway 22R. The procedure/language I have always been used is to cross one runway for taking off from another and being told to hold short of the runway we were going to take off from. As well the second controller never contacted us and we monitored the frequency to tell us to hold short runway 22L. I feel that these factors would have helped prevent this incursion from happening. Supplemental information from acn 690654: I experienced a runway incursion at bos; an airport I have only flown into 3 times in the last 10+ yrs. I feel that there were several mitigating factors that caused this event. First; I was very rushed just prior to pushback. I had several MEL's to deal with. I had tried to contact maintenance control on company radio about 30 mins before pushback; but was unable to reach them; so I sent 3 ACARS messages: 2 to maintenance control and 1 to operations. Maintenance control called back less than 10 mins prior to push. I copied all the information for the MEL's; and was able to push back on time. We taxied to a different runway than I had expected to go to; because of a change in the ATIS. It had been many yrs since I had taxied to this end of the airport. Another aircraft was departing runway 22R; which surprised me; because I thought all the departures were on runway 22L; since it was the long runway. Tower told us to cross runway 22R; and I thought; position and hold on runway 22L; so that is what I did. While we were on the runway; tower asked us who told us to taxi into position on the runway. We responded that we thought he did. We exited the runway for landing traffic; and then were told to taxi back into position and hold. Then we departed. As I think back; the first tower controller must have just told us to cross runway 22R and monitor the other tower frequency. I feel that if the first tower controller had told us to cross runway 22R; hold short of runway 22L; and monitor the other tower frequency; I never would have taxied on the runway. Also; if he would have told us to cross runway 22R; and contact the other tower frequency; I would not have taxied on the runway -- because he would have acknowledged us; and he would have told us to hold short of runway 22L. In the end; no one told us to hold short of runway 22L. In fact; the controller of runway 22L seemed unaware of our position; until an arriving aircraft questioned his landing clearance to him. In retrospect; I feel that concise; clear communication is essential; and that the controllers should make sure that the pilots have full understanding of what is expected of them -- instead of giving just the minimum information required per the controller handbook. In addition; consideration must be given to the facts that: that night's layover hotel room was inadequate; in that I had to switch rooms due to cigarette smoke odor; then even the second room had someone smoking right next door; which made it difficult to go to sleep. Secondly; I had to wake up early for an early show. Thirdly; this was the fifth consecutive day of flying; putting me close to my maximum flying time in 7 days.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 FLT CREW HAS A RWY INCURSION AT BOS.

Narrative: I EXPERIENCED A RWY INCURSION AT RWY 22L AT BOS THIS MORNING. I WAS THE FO. WE TAXIED OUT TO RWY 22R FROM GATE. WE FOLLOWED A B737 TO THE RWY. B737 PROCEEDED TO TAKE OFF RWY 22R. WE THEN WERE CLRED TO CROSS RWY 22R AND WHAT I THOUGHT WAS A CLRNC TO TAXI INTO POS AND HOLD ON RWY 22L. WE TAXIED INTO POS AND HOLD ON RWY 22L AND WAITED FOR OUR TKOF CLRNC. ABOUT 10 SECONDS AFTER WE WERE CLRED INTO POS AND HOLD; A BE1900D VERIFIED IF THEY WERE CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 22L TWR THEN ASKED US WHO TOLD US TO GO INTO POS AND HOLD AND I SAID THAT WE THOUGHT THAT THEY DID. TWR PROCEEDED TO TELL 1900 TO GO AROUND AND ASKED US TO TURN R ONTO THE FIRST TXWY; EXIT THE RWY AND TO HOLD SHORT RWY 22L. AFTER 1900 LANDED; WE WERE CLRED TO TAKE OFF. LOOKING BACK ON THE EVENT IT APPEARED THAT WE WERE CLRED TO TAXI INTO POS AND HOLD ON RWY 22L. THE LAST CLRNC WE WERE GIVEN WAS TO CROSS RWY 22R AND MONITOR TWR ON 132.22. THE FIRST TWR CTLR NEVER TOLD US TO CONTACT TWR 132.22. THE FIRST CTLR ALSO NEVER TOLD US TO CROSS RWY 22L AND HOLD SHORT RWY 22R. THE PROC/LANGUAGE I HAVE ALWAYS BEEN USED IS TO CROSS ONE RWY FOR TAKING OFF FROM ANOTHER AND BEING TOLD TO HOLD SHORT OF THE RWY WE WERE GOING TO TAKE OFF FROM. AS WELL THE SECOND CTLR NEVER CONTACTED US AND WE MONITORED THE FREQ TO TELL US TO HOLD SHORT RWY 22L. I FEEL THAT THESE FACTORS WOULD HAVE HELPED PREVENT THIS INCURSION FROM HAPPENING. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 690654: I EXPERIENCED A RWY INCURSION AT BOS; AN ARPT I HAVE ONLY FLOWN INTO 3 TIMES IN THE LAST 10+ YRS. I FEEL THAT THERE WERE SEVERAL MITIGATING FACTORS THAT CAUSED THIS EVENT. FIRST; I WAS VERY RUSHED JUST PRIOR TO PUSHBACK. I HAD SEVERAL MEL'S TO DEAL WITH. I HAD TRIED TO CONTACT MAINT CTL ON COMPANY RADIO ABOUT 30 MINS BEFORE PUSHBACK; BUT WAS UNABLE TO REACH THEM; SO I SENT 3 ACARS MESSAGES: 2 TO MAINT CTL AND 1 TO OPS. MAINT CTL CALLED BACK LESS THAN 10 MINS PRIOR TO PUSH. I COPIED ALL THE INFO FOR THE MEL'S; AND WAS ABLE TO PUSH BACK ON TIME. WE TAXIED TO A DIFFERENT RWY THAN I HAD EXPECTED TO GO TO; BECAUSE OF A CHANGE IN THE ATIS. IT HAD BEEN MANY YRS SINCE I HAD TAXIED TO THIS END OF THE ARPT. ANOTHER ACFT WAS DEPARTING RWY 22R; WHICH SURPRISED ME; BECAUSE I THOUGHT ALL THE DEPS WERE ON RWY 22L; SINCE IT WAS THE LONG RWY. TWR TOLD US TO CROSS RWY 22R; AND I THOUGHT; POS AND HOLD ON RWY 22L; SO THAT IS WHAT I DID. WHILE WE WERE ON THE RWY; TWR ASKED US WHO TOLD US TO TAXI INTO POS ON THE RWY. WE RESPONDED THAT WE THOUGHT HE DID. WE EXITED THE RWY FOR LNDG TFC; AND THEN WERE TOLD TO TAXI BACK INTO POS AND HOLD. THEN WE DEPARTED. AS I THINK BACK; THE FIRST TWR CTLR MUST HAVE JUST TOLD US TO CROSS RWY 22R AND MONITOR THE OTHER TWR FREQ. I FEEL THAT IF THE FIRST TWR CTLR HAD TOLD US TO CROSS RWY 22R; HOLD SHORT OF RWY 22L; AND MONITOR THE OTHER TWR FREQ; I NEVER WOULD HAVE TAXIED ON THE RWY. ALSO; IF HE WOULD HAVE TOLD US TO CROSS RWY 22R; AND CONTACT THE OTHER TWR FREQ; I WOULD NOT HAVE TAXIED ON THE RWY -- BECAUSE HE WOULD HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED US; AND HE WOULD HAVE TOLD US TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 22L. IN THE END; NO ONE TOLD US TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 22L. IN FACT; THE CTLR OF RWY 22L SEEMED UNAWARE OF OUR POS; UNTIL AN ARRIVING ACFT QUESTIONED HIS LNDG CLRNC TO HIM. IN RETROSPECT; I FEEL THAT CONCISE; CLR COM IS ESSENTIAL; AND THAT THE CTLRS SHOULD MAKE SURE THAT THE PLTS HAVE FULL UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT IS EXPECTED OF THEM -- INSTEAD OF GIVING JUST THE MINIMUM INFO REQUIRED PER THE CTLR HANDBOOK. IN ADDITION; CONSIDERATION MUST BE GIVEN TO THE FACTS THAT: THAT NIGHT'S LAYOVER HOTEL ROOM WAS INADEQUATE; IN THAT I HAD TO SWITCH ROOMS DUE TO CIGARETTE SMOKE ODOR; THEN EVEN THE SECOND ROOM HAD SOMEONE SMOKING RIGHT NEXT DOOR; WHICH MADE IT DIFFICULT TO GO TO SLEEP. SECONDLY; I HAD TO WAKE UP EARLY FOR AN EARLY SHOW. THIRDLY; THIS WAS THE FIFTH CONSECUTIVE DAY OF FLYING; PUTTING ME CLOSE TO MY MAX FLYING TIME IN 7 DAYS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.