Narrative:

Working dkk (dunkirk sector 32; now sector 70); there were moderate levels of traffic ultimately becoming heavy and complex at the time of the operational error. At one time there were as many as 25 data blocks and approximately 18 aircraft actually in airspace. Air carrier X was given a clearance to climb to FL270 sbound to mia. Air carrier Y; a buf arrival; 1 of 6 at the time; checked onto the frequency descending out of FL290 to FL280 at 250 KTS on a 050 degree heading. Air carrier Y was descended to FL270. I realized that separation was lost between the 2 aircraft and asked air carrier Y to expedite descent to FL270 to which air carrier Y replied 'already level at FL270.' air carrier Y was then asked to expedite descent further to FL240. Air carrier X was receiving a TCAS resolution alert and advised that they were climbing. I acknowledged and instructed air carrier X to climb to FL290. Factors: 1) this sector was xferred to our area recently. There was almost no one who was qualified at the sector before it was xferred which would have given the area valuable experience to draw from especially during periods of heavy traffic. 2) at that time; I would estimate that maybe 30%-35% of all the people in our area had begun training or are qualified in some capacity at this new sector. 3) I had limited experience of approximately 1.5 months certified at the sector on the r-side and d-side. I only saw moderate traffic and complexity but never saw heavy traffic and complexity until the time of the occurrence. 4) my d-side was not r-side qualified at the time and had minimal experience at the sector on the d-side. Manual coordination/reading of entire flight plan with toronto center. We are required to do this for every flight into and out of toronto center. The d-side spends valuable time on the landline doing this. This takes away a pair of eyes at the scope. An automated system is needed as soon as possible. Computer system alerts that were in place to advise the supervisor/tmu that a sector was 'going red' (getting busy) did not take into account all the traffic that would be in the sector. Also due to the numerous bodies in the area there was an increased noise level. I also was not physically feeling well. I came to work due to pressure; real or otherwise; to not use sick leave.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZOB CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT FL270 BTWN CLBING AND DSNDING ACFT DURING BUSY TFC PERIOD.

Narrative: WORKING DKK (DUNKIRK SECTOR 32; NOW SECTOR 70); THERE WERE MODERATE LEVELS OF TFC ULTIMATELY BECOMING HVY AND COMPLEX AT THE TIME OF THE OPERATIONAL ERROR. AT ONE TIME THERE WERE AS MANY AS 25 DATA BLOCKS AND APPROX 18 ACFT ACTUALLY IN AIRSPACE. ACR X WAS GIVEN A CLRNC TO CLB TO FL270 SBOUND TO MIA. ACR Y; A BUF ARR; 1 OF 6 AT THE TIME; CHKED ONTO THE FREQ DSNDING OUT OF FL290 TO FL280 AT 250 KTS ON A 050 DEG HDG. ACR Y WAS DSNDED TO FL270. I REALIZED THAT SEPARATION WAS LOST BTWN THE 2 ACFT AND ASKED ACR Y TO EXPEDITE DSCNT TO FL270 TO WHICH ACR Y REPLIED 'ALREADY LEVEL AT FL270.' ACR Y WAS THEN ASKED TO EXPEDITE DSCNT FURTHER TO FL240. ACR X WAS RECEIVING A TCAS RESOLUTION ALERT AND ADVISED THAT THEY WERE CLBING. I ACKNOWLEDGED AND INSTRUCTED ACR X TO CLB TO FL290. FACTORS: 1) THIS SECTOR WAS XFERRED TO OUR AREA RECENTLY. THERE WAS ALMOST NO ONE WHO WAS QUALIFIED AT THE SECTOR BEFORE IT WAS XFERRED WHICH WOULD HAVE GIVEN THE AREA VALUABLE EXPERIENCE TO DRAW FROM ESPECIALLY DURING PERIODS OF HVY TFC. 2) AT THAT TIME; I WOULD ESTIMATE THAT MAYBE 30%-35% OF ALL THE PEOPLE IN OUR AREA HAD BEGUN TRAINING OR ARE QUALIFIED IN SOME CAPACITY AT THIS NEW SECTOR. 3) I HAD LIMITED EXPERIENCE OF APPROX 1.5 MONTHS CERTIFIED AT THE SECTOR ON THE R-SIDE AND D-SIDE. I ONLY SAW MODERATE TFC AND COMPLEXITY BUT NEVER SAW HVY TFC AND COMPLEXITY UNTIL THE TIME OF THE OCCURRENCE. 4) MY D-SIDE WAS NOT R-SIDE QUALIFIED AT THE TIME AND HAD MINIMAL EXPERIENCE AT THE SECTOR ON THE D-SIDE. MANUAL COORD/READING OF ENTIRE FLT PLAN WITH TORONTO CTR. WE ARE REQUIRED TO DO THIS FOR EVERY FLT INTO AND OUT OF TORONTO CTR. THE D-SIDE SPENDS VALUABLE TIME ON THE LANDLINE DOING THIS. THIS TAKES AWAY A PAIR OF EYES AT THE SCOPE. AN AUTOMATED SYS IS NEEDED ASAP. COMPUTER SYS ALERTS THAT WERE IN PLACE TO ADVISE THE SUPVR/TMU THAT A SECTOR WAS 'GOING RED' (GETTING BUSY) DID NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ALL THE TFC THAT WOULD BE IN THE SECTOR. ALSO DUE TO THE NUMEROUS BODIES IN THE AREA THERE WAS AN INCREASED NOISE LEVEL. I ALSO WAS NOT PHYSICALLY FEELING WELL. I CAME TO WORK DUE TO PRESSURE; REAL OR OTHERWISE; TO NOT USE SICK LEAVE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.