Narrative:

I was the radar controller at sector 74 in new york ARTCC. There was no high altitude position assigned to the sector. Sector 74 owns 13000-17000 ft. There was training at sector 92. There was no high altitude position assigned to the sector. Sector 92 owns 9000-12000 ft. Sector 75 owns FL180 and above. There was a high altitude position assigned to the sector. Event description: sector 92 climbed aircraft #1 to 12000 ft (departed avp). Sector 92 called me for a pointout in order to climb aircraft #1 to 17000 ft. I (sector 74) approved the pointout with reference to traffic at 15000 ft sebound; but failing to reference northbound traffic at 16000 ft (air carrier). After clearing traffic at 15000 ft; sector 92 climbed aircraft #1 to 17000 ft. Sector 92 flashed aircraft #1 to sector 75 for further climb to flight levels. Sector 75 accepted handoff. Sector 92 xferred communications of aircraft #1 to sector 75. Conflict alert activated with traffic at 16000 ft northbound (air carrier flight) that I had failed to reference on the initial approval of the pointout. Sector 75 radar controller stopped aircraft #1 at 15000 ft; but too late for aircraft #1 to stop the climb and it climbed through 15000 ft before descending back to it. Operational error occurred the moment aircraft #1 left 15000 ft climbing. Reason for the loss of standard separation: sector 74 controller (me) failed to issue traffic at 16000 ft that was a factor for aircraft #1. I am an experienced ATC controller with 18 yrs of FAA service. All 18 yrs of my career have been at the same area on ZNY. This error occurred a few mins after relieving the previous controller. I feel the likelihood of averting this mistake would have been much higher had I been working the position for a longer period of time. I feel that I should have spent more time observing the sector before taking over. I did spend approximately 1-2 mins in this process and overall; I felt at the time it was an adequate time; but in retrospect; clearly I could have benefited from some additional time to observe the track and speed of the air carrier flight that eventually became part of the incident. Recommendations: mandate 5 min observation periods before starting a relief briefing.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A RADAR CTLR ALLOWS ANOTHER CTLR TO CLB AN IFR CRP ACFT THROUGH HIS AIRSPACE; BUT FAILS TO POINT OUT A CONFLICTING ACR COMMUTER AT 16000 FT. LOSS OF SEPARATION OCCURRED WHEN THE CRP ACFT CLBS ABOVE 15000 FT.

Narrative: I WAS THE RADAR CTLR AT SECTOR 74 IN NEW YORK ARTCC. THERE WAS NO HIGH ALT POS ASSIGNED TO THE SECTOR. SECTOR 74 OWNS 13000-17000 FT. THERE WAS TRAINING AT SECTOR 92. THERE WAS NO HIGH ALT POS ASSIGNED TO THE SECTOR. SECTOR 92 OWNS 9000-12000 FT. SECTOR 75 OWNS FL180 AND ABOVE. THERE WAS A HIGH ALT POS ASSIGNED TO THE SECTOR. EVENT DESCRIPTION: SECTOR 92 CLBED ACFT #1 TO 12000 FT (DEPARTED AVP). SECTOR 92 CALLED ME FOR A POINTOUT IN ORDER TO CLB ACFT #1 TO 17000 FT. I (SECTOR 74) APPROVED THE POINTOUT WITH REF TO TFC AT 15000 FT SEBOUND; BUT FAILING TO REF NBOUND TFC AT 16000 FT (ACR). AFTER CLRING TFC AT 15000 FT; SECTOR 92 CLBED ACFT #1 TO 17000 FT. SECTOR 92 FLASHED ACFT #1 TO SECTOR 75 FOR FURTHER CLB TO FLT LEVELS. SECTOR 75 ACCEPTED HDOF. SECTOR 92 XFERRED COMS OF ACFT #1 TO SECTOR 75. CONFLICT ALERT ACTIVATED WITH TFC AT 16000 FT NBOUND (ACR FLT) THAT I HAD FAILED TO REF ON THE INITIAL APPROVAL OF THE POINTOUT. SECTOR 75 RADAR CTLR STOPPED ACFT #1 AT 15000 FT; BUT TOO LATE FOR ACFT #1 TO STOP THE CLB AND IT CLBED THROUGH 15000 FT BEFORE DSNDING BACK TO IT. OPERROR OCCURRED THE MOMENT ACFT #1 LEFT 15000 FT CLBING. REASON FOR THE LOSS OF STANDARD SEPARATION: SECTOR 74 CTLR (ME) FAILED TO ISSUE TFC AT 16000 FT THAT WAS A FACTOR FOR ACFT #1. I AM AN EXPERIENCED ATC CTLR WITH 18 YRS OF FAA SVC. ALL 18 YRS OF MY CAREER HAVE BEEN AT THE SAME AREA ON ZNY. THIS ERROR OCCURRED A FEW MINS AFTER RELIEVING THE PREVIOUS CTLR. I FEEL THE LIKELIHOOD OF AVERTING THIS MISTAKE WOULD HAVE BEEN MUCH HIGHER HAD I BEEN WORKING THE POS FOR A LONGER PERIOD OF TIME. I FEEL THAT I SHOULD HAVE SPENT MORE TIME OBSERVING THE SECTOR BEFORE TAKING OVER. I DID SPEND APPROX 1-2 MINS IN THIS PROCESS AND OVERALL; I FELT AT THE TIME IT WAS AN ADEQUATE TIME; BUT IN RETROSPECT; CLRLY I COULD HAVE BENEFITED FROM SOME ADDITIONAL TIME TO OBSERVE THE TRACK AND SPD OF THE ACR FLT THAT EVENTUALLY BECAME PART OF THE INCIDENT. RECOMMENDATIONS: MANDATE 5 MIN OBSERVATION PERIODS BEFORE STARTING A RELIEF BRIEFING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.