Narrative:

During the event in question, simultaneous parallel ILS approachs were being conducted to runways 22L/right at iln (wilmington, oh). During our base leg vector we were cleared to 3000 ft and told to join the localizer for runway 22L (irhx). Shortly after joining the localizer, the controller told us to make 'an immediate left turn to heading 190 degrees' (there was anxiety in his voice and the traffic alert alarm could be heard in the background). The controller thought we had been restr to 4000 ft when in fact we had been cleared to 3000 ft (as had the opposing traffic to the parallel runway 22R). I later called the day TRACON duty supervisor to follow up. He confirmed that the traffic conflict originated on their end, standard procedure would have been to restrict us to 4000 ft until parallel traffic separation was assured. We had in fact been prematurely cleared to 3000 ft (subsequently confirmed by the tower tapes). Apparently there was a shift change in progress at the time and the restricting altitudes were miscommunicated during the changeover. Recommendations: since this flight was flown under supplemental part 121, cargo only operations, TCASII is not required equipment, and therefore is not installed on any of our aircraft. This is clearly a case for the FAA mandating TCASII for part 121 cargo carriers. Had this equipment been installed, it would have afforded the flight crew of both aircraft with timely traffic positional awareness and conflict resolution.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AFTER INTERCEPTING ILN ILS RWY 22L, ATC ISSUED AN IMMEDIATE TURN OFF THE LOC TO AN HVT ACFT WHEN THE CTLR REALIZES THE ACFT WAS AT THE WRONG ALT AND CONFLICTING WITH ANOTHER ACFT ON VECTOR TO ILS RWY 22R. PIC EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT HIS ACFT WAS NOT TCASII EQUIPPED.

Narrative: DURING THE EVENT IN QUESTION, SIMULTANEOUS PARALLEL ILS APCHS WERE BEING CONDUCTED TO RWYS 22L/R AT ILN (WILMINGTON, OH). DURING OUR BASE LEG VECTOR WE WERE CLRED TO 3000 FT AND TOLD TO JOIN THE LOC FOR RWY 22L (IRHX). SHORTLY AFTER JOINING THE LOC, THE CTLR TOLD US TO MAKE 'AN IMMEDIATE L TURN TO HDG 190 DEGS' (THERE WAS ANXIETY IN HIS VOICE AND THE TFC ALERT ALARM COULD BE HEARD IN THE BACKGROUND). THE CTLR THOUGHT WE HAD BEEN RESTR TO 4000 FT WHEN IN FACT WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO 3000 FT (AS HAD THE OPPOSING TFC TO THE PARALLEL RWY 22R). I LATER CALLED THE DAY TRACON DUTY SUPVR TO FOLLOW UP. HE CONFIRMED THAT THE TFC CONFLICT ORIGINATED ON THEIR END, STANDARD PROC WOULD HAVE BEEN TO RESTRICT US TO 4000 FT UNTIL PARALLEL TFC SEPARATION WAS ASSURED. WE HAD IN FACT BEEN PREMATURELY CLRED TO 3000 FT (SUBSEQUENTLY CONFIRMED BY THE TWR TAPES). APPARENTLY THERE WAS A SHIFT CHANGE IN PROGRESS AT THE TIME AND THE RESTRICTING ALTS WERE MISCOMMUNICATED DURING THE CHANGEOVER. RECOMMENDATIONS: SINCE THIS FLT WAS FLOWN UNDER SUPPLEMENTAL PART 121, CARGO ONLY OPS, TCASII IS NOT REQUIRED EQUIP, AND THEREFORE IS NOT INSTALLED ON ANY OF OUR ACFT. THIS IS CLEARLY A CASE FOR THE FAA MANDATING TCASII FOR PART 121 CARGO CARRIERS. HAD THIS EQUIP BEEN INSTALLED, IT WOULD HAVE AFFORDED THE FLC OF BOTH ACFT WITH TIMELY TFC POSITIONAL AWARENESS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.