|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||1801 To 2400|
|Locale Reference||airport : dca.airport|
|Altitude||agl single value : 0|
|Operator||common carrier : air carrier|
|Make Model Name||B737-700|
|Operating Under FAR Part||Part 121|
|Flight Phase||ground : taxi|
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : first officer|
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : captain|
oversight : pic
|Anomaly||incursion : runway|
non adherence : published procedure
non adherence : clearance
|Independent Detector||other flight crewa|
other flight crewb
|Resolutory Action||none taken : anomaly accepted|
none taken : detected after the fact
Flight Crew Human Performance
|Primary Problem||Flight Crew Human Performance|
|Air Traffic Incident||Pilot Deviation|
I was the first officer on air carrier flight outbound from dca en route to sea. This was my 4TH time to dca and only my second time at our new gates. The inbound flight was approximately 1/2 hour late into dca due to WX in sea. We pushed about 1/2 hour after our scheduled departure due to the late inbound flight. The WX in dca was IMC with rain and reduced visibility. At approximately XA05 we pushed back from the gate. While pushing back, the captain instructed the pushback crew to push us back perpendicular to terminal with our tail north of taxiway K. After completing the 'after start checklist' I called national ground and we were given clearance to join taxiway J, precede sbound and hold short of runway 4. I acknowledged the instructions and read back our hold short instructions. Both the captain and I had our airport diagrams and referenced them prior to taxiing. The captain asked me if we needed to turn left onto taxiway M and then turn right onto taxiway J. I looked at my airport diagram and concurred with his directions. The captain then taxied forward and started a left turn on taxiway M forward towards what we thought was taxiway J. I then proceeded to complete my portion of the items on the taxi checklist. After completing the flight control check, I looked out the right window and saw that we were passing over the hold short lines for runway 1. At that moment the captain realized that we had incurred onto runway 1 and he made an immediate r-hand turn onto taxiway G to clear runway 1 and rejoin taxiway J. Neither ground control nor tower noticed the incursion. We proceeded south down taxiway J and departed in sequence normally. I believe that darkness and the reduced visibility due to rain was a factor in this occurrence and our lack of familiarity with the airport. Both the captain and I reviewed our airport diagrams prior to commencing our taxi, but our push crew had pushed us back onto taxiway J instead of pushing us just off of terminal as instructed. This gave us a false sense of where we were on the airport diagram. Ground control's instructions to join taxiway J only added to our false belief that we needed to make a left turn at taxiway M and then turn right onto the parallel taxiway J, when in fact we were all ready on taxiway J. I also believe a thorough review of runway incursion hot spots on the back of the airport diagram might have prevented this occurrence. This is especially true at unfamiliar airports. The incident that happened to us was specifically addressed on the back of the airport diagram as a runway incursion hot spot. Supplemental information from acn 637075: restr visibility and darkness contributed to this incident.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B737-700 CREW HAD A RWY INCURSION ON RWY 1 AT DCA.
Narrative: I WAS THE FO ON ACR FLT OUTBOUND FROM DCA ENRTE TO SEA. THIS WAS MY 4TH TIME TO DCA AND ONLY MY SECOND TIME AT OUR NEW GATES. THE INBOUND FLT WAS APPROX 1/2 HR LATE INTO DCA DUE TO WX IN SEA. WE PUSHED ABOUT 1/2 HR AFTER OUR SCHEDULED DEP DUE TO THE LATE INBOUND FLT. THE WX IN DCA WAS IMC WITH RAIN AND REDUCED VISIBILITY. AT APPROX XA05 WE PUSHED BACK FROM THE GATE. WHILE PUSHING BACK, THE CAPT INSTRUCTED THE PUSHBACK CREW TO PUSH US BACK PERPENDICULAR TO TERMINAL WITH OUR TAIL N OF TXWY K. AFTER COMPLETING THE 'AFTER START CHKLIST' I CALLED NATIONAL GND AND WE WERE GIVEN CLRNC TO JOIN TXWY J, PRECEDE SBOUND AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 4. I ACKNOWLEDGED THE INSTRUCTIONS AND READ BACK OUR HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTIONS. BOTH THE CAPT AND I HAD OUR ARPT DIAGRAMS AND REFED THEM PRIOR TO TAXIING. THE CAPT ASKED ME IF WE NEEDED TO TURN L ONTO TXWY M AND THEN TURN R ONTO TXWY J. I LOOKED AT MY ARPT DIAGRAM AND CONCURRED WITH HIS DIRECTIONS. THE CAPT THEN TAXIED FORWARD AND STARTED A L TURN ON TXWY M FORWARD TOWARDS WHAT WE THOUGHT WAS TXWY J. I THEN PROCEEDED TO COMPLETE MY PORTION OF THE ITEMS ON THE TAXI CHKLIST. AFTER COMPLETING THE FLT CTL CHK, I LOOKED OUT THE R WINDOW AND SAW THAT WE WERE PASSING OVER THE HOLD SHORT LINES FOR RWY 1. AT THAT MOMENT THE CAPT REALIZED THAT WE HAD INCURRED ONTO RWY 1 AND HE MADE AN IMMEDIATE R-HAND TURN ONTO TXWY G TO CLR RWY 1 AND REJOIN TXWY J. NEITHER GND CTL NOR TWR NOTICED THE INCURSION. WE PROCEEDED S DOWN TXWY J AND DEPARTED IN SEQUENCE NORMALLY. I BELIEVE THAT DARKNESS AND THE REDUCED VISIBILITY DUE TO RAIN WAS A FACTOR IN THIS OCCURRENCE AND OUR LACK OF FAMILIARITY WITH THE ARPT. BOTH THE CAPT AND I REVIEWED OUR ARPT DIAGRAMS PRIOR TO COMMENCING OUR TAXI, BUT OUR PUSH CREW HAD PUSHED US BACK ONTO TXWY J INSTEAD OF PUSHING US JUST OFF OF TERMINAL AS INSTRUCTED. THIS GAVE US A FALSE SENSE OF WHERE WE WERE ON THE ARPT DIAGRAM. GND CTL'S INSTRUCTIONS TO JOIN TXWY J ONLY ADDED TO OUR FALSE BELIEF THAT WE NEEDED TO MAKE A L TURN AT TXWY M AND THEN TURN R ONTO THE PARALLEL TXWY J, WHEN IN FACT WE WERE ALL READY ON TXWY J. I ALSO BELIEVE A THOROUGH REVIEW OF RWY INCURSION HOT SPOTS ON THE BACK OF THE ARPT DIAGRAM MIGHT HAVE PREVENTED THIS OCCURRENCE. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE AT UNFAMILIAR ARPTS. THE INCIDENT THAT HAPPENED TO US WAS SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED ON THE BACK OF THE ARPT DIAGRAM AS A RWY INCURSION HOT SPOT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 637075: RESTR VISIBILITY AND DARKNESS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCIDENT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.