Narrative:

Flight request came into our ZZZ1 base for a pick-up going to ZZZ2. I called FSS on oct/sun/04, call sign ambulance XXX. The briefer saw no ceilings for the flight. As we were crossing the second ridge line approximately 2000 ft MSL, at 1000 ft AGL the lights ahead began disappearing. I began a left turn and conditions did not improve. So much that in the 180 degree turn I lost ground contact. I recall announcing to the crew we were going to climb. Quickly we were VFR on top 2500 ft MSL. I continued to climb to about 3000 ft MSL to maintain VFR. At this point, I began looking for a center frequency and I squawked 7700 being that I was on top of a solid layer of clouds. I also tried 121.5 and approach and back to 121.5. Receiving no reply, I tuned in ZZZ1 to our GPS. By this time there were no clouds under us and we could see ZZZ1. I called the company data link to see what he thought I should do since I was no longer VFR on top -- just VFR making a normal VFR approach to the airport. He advised to squawk 1200 and write a letter to the chief pilot, which I did. I thought I had made an abort decision soon enough, the nurse commented about making a good decision. In the turn back, we encountered lower clouds and because it happened so quickly, my reaction was climb. As for actions -- had I slowed the helicopter once the decision was made to abort the flight, I might have had more time for a different decision. We had just come over the valley with +1500 ft AGL ceiling, so the thought of going into a cloud wasn't part of the thinking. I have run into WX before and turned around, about the same location. At night, if conditions are less than clear, I would take the long route around the ridge lines. With no WX reporting stations in that area at night, I feel it would be better to go around.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A BELL 206 INADVERTENTLY ENTERED IMC WHILE VFR. FLT WAS ABORTED TO A VFR LNDG.

Narrative: FLT REQUEST CAME INTO OUR ZZZ1 BASE FOR A PICK-UP GOING TO ZZZ2. I CALLED FSS ON OCT/SUN/04, CALL SIGN AMBULANCE XXX. THE BRIEFER SAW NO CEILINGS FOR THE FLT. AS WE WERE XING THE SECOND RIDGE LINE APPROX 2000 FT MSL, AT 1000 FT AGL THE LIGHTS AHEAD BEGAN DISAPPEARING. I BEGAN A L TURN AND CONDITIONS DID NOT IMPROVE. SO MUCH THAT IN THE 180 DEG TURN I LOST GND CONTACT. I RECALL ANNOUNCING TO THE CREW WE WERE GOING TO CLB. QUICKLY WE WERE VFR ON TOP 2500 FT MSL. I CONTINUED TO CLB TO ABOUT 3000 FT MSL TO MAINTAIN VFR. AT THIS POINT, I BEGAN LOOKING FOR A CTR FREQ AND I SQUAWKED 7700 BEING THAT I WAS ON TOP OF A SOLID LAYER OF CLOUDS. I ALSO TRIED 121.5 AND APCH AND BACK TO 121.5. RECEIVING NO REPLY, I TUNED IN ZZZ1 TO OUR GPS. BY THIS TIME THERE WERE NO CLOUDS UNDER US AND WE COULD SEE ZZZ1. I CALLED THE COMPANY DATA LINK TO SEE WHAT HE THOUGHT I SHOULD DO SINCE I WAS NO LONGER VFR ON TOP -- JUST VFR MAKING A NORMAL VFR APCH TO THE ARPT. HE ADVISED TO SQUAWK 1200 AND WRITE A LETTER TO THE CHIEF PLT, WHICH I DID. I THOUGHT I HAD MADE AN ABORT DECISION SOON ENOUGH, THE NURSE COMMENTED ABOUT MAKING A GOOD DECISION. IN THE TURN BACK, WE ENCOUNTERED LOWER CLOUDS AND BECAUSE IT HAPPENED SO QUICKLY, MY REACTION WAS CLB. AS FOR ACTIONS -- HAD I SLOWED THE HELI ONCE THE DECISION WAS MADE TO ABORT THE FLT, I MIGHT HAVE HAD MORE TIME FOR A DIFFERENT DECISION. WE HAD JUST COME OVER THE VALLEY WITH +1500 FT AGL CEILING, SO THE THOUGHT OF GOING INTO A CLOUD WASN'T PART OF THE THINKING. I HAVE RUN INTO WX BEFORE AND TURNED AROUND, ABOUT THE SAME LOCATION. AT NIGHT, IF CONDITIONS ARE LESS THAN CLR, I WOULD TAKE THE LONG RTE AROUND THE RIDGE LINES. WITH NO WX RPTING STATIONS IN THAT AREA AT NIGHT, I FEEL IT WOULD BE BETTER TO GO AROUND.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.