Narrative:

After reviewing the ATIS and FBO's location on the field, we elected to set up for the ILS runway 35 approach. The approach controller did not issue an expected approach. We were cleared to cross runway 15 south of ffu at 15000 ft and 250 KTS. After crossing the fix, we were then given a heading to intercept the runway 34R localizer. I immediately put in the runway 34R localizer frequency and course into my side raw data, while asking the approach controller for the ILS runway 23R. The controller responded with 'tower has your request.' I was momentarily confused as to how tower would be able to change our approach, as generally we would have been inside the FAF at the time of contacting the tower. I put the FMS course guidance into first officer's flight director for the intercept. We proceeded to set up and rebrief the approach. While setting up the approach and loading the FMS, the controller assigned us 210 KTS to scoer, then 170 KTS to FAF (besbe). We were indicating 214 KTS at the time of the speed assignment. After verifying that we were on speed (merely noting the 214 KTS), I continued to load the FMS. The first 2 fixes of the approach did not load, as I did not load any transition for the approach. One of these fixes was scoer. We already had the DME displayed and our stepdowns for the ILS were based on DME as well. First officer asked me for the FMS for scoer and I pointed out the DME instead. We began our stepdowns and first officer called for flaps 12 degrees and then for flaps 20 degrees. Again, he/she queried for the FMS fixes. I made an attempt to load the transition, but did not complete the attempt due to our proximity to commencing the approach. This certainly did not help first officer situational awareness. He/she did not have the plate in front of him/her nor had we briefed the DME for each stepdown other than a quick review, and my promise to step him/her down through it. The stepdowns went as charted. However, during my failed attempt to load the transition, first officer had called for and I had configured for flaps 12 degrees then 20 degrees. We slowed to 170 KTS at 5 mi prior to scoer (at approximately plage). As I came back 'heads up,' I was dialing in the next stepdown altitude into the altitude selector when ATC handed us off to slc tower. Upon contacting tower, I queried the controller about runway 35. Their only answer was that the field was IFR. Again I was momentarily confused as there was a working ILS to runway 35 that the ATIS indicated was also in use. After the tower controller told us the field was IFR, the training controller queried our speed. I responded with 170 KTS, and we were told to accelerate to 210 KTS. We were now 2 mi from scoer. After crossing scoer, I mistakenly told first officer that we could resume 170 KTS, but after his/her prompting, we decided to maintain 210 KTS until told otherwise, even though that put us within 5 mi of a FAF. We decided that ATC's speed assignment was to regain separation. The aim allows for speed reduction prior to FAF without clearance.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GLF2 FLT CREW SLOWS BELOW ASSIGNED SPD ON APCH TO SLC.

Narrative: AFTER REVIEWING THE ATIS AND FBO'S LOCATION ON THE FIELD, WE ELECTED TO SET UP FOR THE ILS RWY 35 APCH. THE APCH CTLR DID NOT ISSUE AN EXPECTED APCH. WE WERE CLRED TO CROSS RWY 15 S OF FFU AT 15000 FT AND 250 KTS. AFTER XING THE FIX, WE WERE THEN GIVEN A HDG TO INTERCEPT THE RWY 34R LOC. I IMMEDIATELY PUT IN THE RWY 34R LOC FREQ AND COURSE INTO MY SIDE RAW DATA, WHILE ASKING THE APCH CTLR FOR THE ILS RWY 23R. THE CTLR RESPONDED WITH 'TWR HAS YOUR REQUEST.' I WAS MOMENTARILY CONFUSED AS TO HOW TWR WOULD BE ABLE TO CHANGE OUR APCH, AS GENERALLY WE WOULD HAVE BEEN INSIDE THE FAF AT THE TIME OF CONTACTING THE TWR. I PUT THE FMS COURSE GUIDANCE INTO FO'S FLT DIRECTOR FOR THE INTERCEPT. WE PROCEEDED TO SET UP AND REBRIEF THE APCH. WHILE SETTING UP THE APCH AND LOADING THE FMS, THE CTLR ASSIGNED US 210 KTS TO SCOER, THEN 170 KTS TO FAF (BESBE). WE WERE INDICATING 214 KTS AT THE TIME OF THE SPD ASSIGNMENT. AFTER VERIFYING THAT WE WERE ON SPD (MERELY NOTING THE 214 KTS), I CONTINUED TO LOAD THE FMS. THE FIRST 2 FIXES OF THE APCH DID NOT LOAD, AS I DID NOT LOAD ANY TRANSITION FOR THE APCH. ONE OF THESE FIXES WAS SCOER. WE ALREADY HAD THE DME DISPLAYED AND OUR STEPDOWNS FOR THE ILS WERE BASED ON DME AS WELL. FO ASKED ME FOR THE FMS FOR SCOER AND I POINTED OUT THE DME INSTEAD. WE BEGAN OUR STEPDOWNS AND FO CALLED FOR FLAPS 12 DEGS AND THEN FOR FLAPS 20 DEGS. AGAIN, HE/SHE QUERIED FOR THE FMS FIXES. I MADE AN ATTEMPT TO LOAD THE TRANSITION, BUT DID NOT COMPLETE THE ATTEMPT DUE TO OUR PROX TO COMMENCING THE APCH. THIS CERTAINLY DID NOT HELP FO SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. HE/SHE DID NOT HAVE THE PLATE IN FRONT OF HIM/HER NOR HAD WE BRIEFED THE DME FOR EACH STEPDOWN OTHER THAN A QUICK REVIEW, AND MY PROMISE TO STEP HIM/HER DOWN THROUGH IT. THE STEPDOWNS WENT AS CHARTED. HOWEVER, DURING MY FAILED ATTEMPT TO LOAD THE TRANSITION, FO HAD CALLED FOR AND I HAD CONFIGURED FOR FLAPS 12 DEGS THEN 20 DEGS. WE SLOWED TO 170 KTS AT 5 MI PRIOR TO SCOER (AT APPROX PLAGE). AS I CAME BACK 'HEADS UP,' I WAS DIALING IN THE NEXT STEPDOWN ALT INTO THE ALT SELECTOR WHEN ATC HANDED US OFF TO SLC TWR. UPON CONTACTING TWR, I QUERIED THE CTLR ABOUT RWY 35. THEIR ONLY ANSWER WAS THAT THE FIELD WAS IFR. AGAIN I WAS MOMENTARILY CONFUSED AS THERE WAS A WORKING ILS TO RWY 35 THAT THE ATIS INDICATED WAS ALSO IN USE. AFTER THE TWR CTLR TOLD US THE FIELD WAS IFR, THE TRAINING CTLR QUERIED OUR SPD. I RESPONDED WITH 170 KTS, AND WE WERE TOLD TO ACCELERATE TO 210 KTS. WE WERE NOW 2 MI FROM SCOER. AFTER XING SCOER, I MISTAKENLY TOLD FO THAT WE COULD RESUME 170 KTS, BUT AFTER HIS/HER PROMPTING, WE DECIDED TO MAINTAIN 210 KTS UNTIL TOLD OTHERWISE, EVEN THOUGH THAT PUT US WITHIN 5 MI OF A FAF. WE DECIDED THAT ATC'S SPD ASSIGNMENT WAS TO REGAIN SEPARATION. THE AIM ALLOWS FOR SPD REDUCTION PRIOR TO FAF WITHOUT CLRNC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.