Narrative:

We had just shot the CAT III approach into slc. The WX called for low visibility and freezing fog. It was one of those days. We changed aircraft and were making ready for the last leg home when a chief pilot entered the cockpit to chat. We discussed the airline's problems, etc, and concluded the discussion just about the time the final paperwork showed up. The first officer and I completed our checks and pushed back from the gate stopping by the deice pad prior to heading for the takeoff runway. Taking the north departure on the salt lake 8 (TCH8.tch), we began to accelerate passing 10000 ft. Shortly, we were cleared to a 'heading of 110 degrees and intercept the airway.' as we approached 110 degrees, a new clearance to a heading of 130 degrees was issued and complied with. A frequency change occurred and I asked center if they wanted us to intercept the airway or remain on the 130 degree heading. Center responded by asking us to remain on the 103 degree heading for a while so we could get some additional separation on the traffic ahead of us on the airway. I looked at my first officer and said 'did they give us a speed restr or something? I don't remember seeing any restr on the departure plate, did you?' the controller then gave us direct to a fix 300 mi down our route of flight and we complied. Upon further inspection, we found a 250 KT restr not on the departure plate (where you normally find them) but on the pre departure clearance. In the heat of battle, both the first officer and I had missed seeing it and failed to put it in the FMS. No harm, no foul, but it shows yet again when the pace of operation accelerates and events come up to get you out of your normal habit pattern, it is time to slow down and doublechk everything again. Supplemental information from acn 601644: we received a pre departure clearance. A note on the bottom of the pre departure clearance said 'maintain 250 KIAS until further advised.' I loaded the flight information in the FMC without the 250 KT restr figuring I would remember it on takeoff. I left the cockpit to get something to eat. When I returned, the slc chief pilot was on the jumpseat talking with the captain. I joined the conversation. Some of the comments he made got me extremely agitated. After the chief pilot left, we continued talking about some of the things he had said. We pushed back 7 mins late. We taxied to runway 34R and were #7 in line for takeoff. We took off and at about 9000 ft got a turn eastbound to join the departure radial. Leaving 10000 ft, I accelerated to climb speed (about 330 KIAS). Shortly thereafter we got the clearance from departure 'resume normal speed.' that's when we realized we'd made a mistake.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767 FO BECOMES DISTR, FORGETTING TO ALERT CAPT OF 250 KT RESTR 'UNTIL FURTHER ADVISED' ON DEP FROM SLC, BEING ALERTED BY S56 DEP CTLR AS CREW ACCELERATES AFTER REACHING 10000 FT.

Narrative: WE HAD JUST SHOT THE CAT III APCH INTO SLC. THE WX CALLED FOR LOW VISIBILITY AND FREEZING FOG. IT WAS ONE OF THOSE DAYS. WE CHANGED ACFT AND WERE MAKING READY FOR THE LAST LEG HOME WHEN A CHIEF PLT ENTERED THE COCKPIT TO CHAT. WE DISCUSSED THE AIRLINE'S PROBS, ETC, AND CONCLUDED THE DISCUSSION JUST ABOUT THE TIME THE FINAL PAPERWORK SHOWED UP. THE FO AND I COMPLETED OUR CHKS AND PUSHED BACK FROM THE GATE STOPPING BY THE DEICE PAD PRIOR TO HDG FOR THE TKOF RWY. TAKING THE N DEP ON THE SALT LAKE 8 (TCH8.TCH), WE BEGAN TO ACCELERATE PASSING 10000 FT. SHORTLY, WE WERE CLRED TO A 'HDG OF 110 DEGS AND INTERCEPT THE AIRWAY.' AS WE APCHED 110 DEGS, A NEW CLRNC TO A HDG OF 130 DEGS WAS ISSUED AND COMPLIED WITH. A FREQ CHANGE OCCURRED AND I ASKED CTR IF THEY WANTED US TO INTERCEPT THE AIRWAY OR REMAIN ON THE 130 DEG HDG. CTR RESPONDED BY ASKING US TO REMAIN ON THE 103 DEG HDG FOR A WHILE SO WE COULD GET SOME ADDITIONAL SEPARATION ON THE TFC AHEAD OF US ON THE AIRWAY. I LOOKED AT MY FO AND SAID 'DID THEY GIVE US A SPD RESTR OR SOMETHING? I DON'T REMEMBER SEEING ANY RESTR ON THE DEP PLATE, DID YOU?' THE CTLR THEN GAVE US DIRECT TO A FIX 300 MI DOWN OUR RTE OF FLT AND WE COMPLIED. UPON FURTHER INSPECTION, WE FOUND A 250 KT RESTR NOT ON THE DEP PLATE (WHERE YOU NORMALLY FIND THEM) BUT ON THE PDC. IN THE HEAT OF BATTLE, BOTH THE FO AND I HAD MISSED SEEING IT AND FAILED TO PUT IT IN THE FMS. NO HARM, NO FOUL, BUT IT SHOWS YET AGAIN WHEN THE PACE OF OP ACCELERATES AND EVENTS COME UP TO GET YOU OUT OF YOUR NORMAL HABIT PATTERN, IT IS TIME TO SLOW DOWN AND DOUBLECHK EVERYTHING AGAIN. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 601644: WE RECEIVED A PDC. A NOTE ON THE BOTTOM OF THE PDC SAID 'MAINTAIN 250 KIAS UNTIL FURTHER ADVISED.' I LOADED THE FLT INFO IN THE FMC WITHOUT THE 250 KT RESTR FIGURING I WOULD REMEMBER IT ON TKOF. I LEFT THE COCKPIT TO GET SOMETHING TO EAT. WHEN I RETURNED, THE SLC CHIEF PLT WAS ON THE JUMPSEAT TALKING WITH THE CAPT. I JOINED THE CONVERSATION. SOME OF THE COMMENTS HE MADE GOT ME EXTREMELY AGITATED. AFTER THE CHIEF PLT LEFT, WE CONTINUED TALKING ABOUT SOME OF THE THINGS HE HAD SAID. WE PUSHED BACK 7 MINS LATE. WE TAXIED TO RWY 34R AND WERE #7 IN LINE FOR TKOF. WE TOOK OFF AND AT ABOUT 9000 FT GOT A TURN EBOUND TO JOIN THE DEP RADIAL. LEAVING 10000 FT, I ACCELERATED TO CLB SPD (ABOUT 330 KIAS). SHORTLY THEREAFTER WE GOT THE CLRNC FROM DEP 'RESUME NORMAL SPD.' THAT'S WHEN WE REALIZED WE'D MADE A MISTAKE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.