Narrative:

At approximately XA10 I was called back to the operations area and advised that northern california TRACON had made declaration indicating a closure of that facility. In fact only the old airspace known as bay approach had lost their radar feed. Nct xferred control of this airspace to ZOA. This caused ZOA to work approach for sfo, oak, sjc. Nct still had peripheral, radar, radios, charts, and controllers certified in this airspace. The xfer was not only unnecessary, it compromised safety and degraded service greatly. ZOA does not even depict the mapping (to include final approach courses) for the airspace. Additionally, the minimum IFR altitudes required for the center are much higher than those for the approach. There was limited notification given to the surrounding control facilities and numerous aircraft were put into holding or forced to divert to alternate airports. The contingency plan needs to be reevaluated and a system for the internal absorption of airspace and function at combined facilities due to partial loss of capability needs to be developed. Even if the nct controllers were forced to work a portion of the approach non radar, the service would have been much more efficient and safety would have been enhanced. The center's need to have the electronic mapping for underlying airspace available, and the center controller's need to be familiar with the operations contained within that airspace.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZOA CTLR EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION WITH LACK OF CONTINGENCY PROCS FOR APCH CTLR RADAR FAILURE EVENTS.

Narrative: AT APPROX XA10 I WAS CALLED BACK TO THE OPS AREA AND ADVISED THAT NORTHERN CALIFORNIA TRACON HAD MADE DECLARATION INDICATING A CLOSURE OF THAT FACILITY. IN FACT ONLY THE OLD AIRSPACE KNOWN AS BAY APCH HAD LOST THEIR RADAR FEED. NCT XFERRED CTL OF THIS AIRSPACE TO ZOA. THIS CAUSED ZOA TO WORK APCH FOR SFO, OAK, SJC. NCT STILL HAD PERIPHERAL, RADAR, RADIOS, CHARTS, AND CTLRS CERTIFIED IN THIS AIRSPACE. THE XFER WAS NOT ONLY UNNECESSARY, IT COMPROMISED SAFETY AND DEGRADED SVC GREATLY. ZOA DOES NOT EVEN DEPICT THE MAPPING (TO INCLUDE FINAL APCH COURSES) FOR THE AIRSPACE. ADDITIONALLY, THE MINIMUM IFR ALTS REQUIRED FOR THE CTR ARE MUCH HIGHER THAN THOSE FOR THE APCH. THERE WAS LIMITED NOTIFICATION GIVEN TO THE SURROUNDING CTL FACILITIES AND NUMEROUS ACFT WERE PUT INTO HOLDING OR FORCED TO DIVERT TO ALTERNATE ARPTS. THE CONTINGENCY PLAN NEEDS TO BE REEVALUATED AND A SYS FOR THE INTERNAL ABSORPTION OF AIRSPACE AND FUNCTION AT COMBINED FACILITIES DUE TO PARTIAL LOSS OF CAPABILITY NEEDS TO BE DEVELOPED. EVEN IF THE NCT CTLRS WERE FORCED TO WORK A PORTION OF THE APCH NON RADAR, THE SVC WOULD HAVE BEEN MUCH MORE EFFICIENT AND SAFETY WOULD HAVE BEEN ENHANCED. THE CTR'S NEED TO HAVE THE ELECTRONIC MAPPING FOR UNDERLYING AIRSPACE AVAILABLE, AND THE CTR CTLR'S NEED TO BE FAMILIAR WITH THE OPS CONTAINED WITHIN THAT AIRSPACE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.