Narrative:

Captain flying. Prior to landing, studied airport diagram carefully, due to landing on other than usual runway, including potential route from runway to gate. Somewhat familiar with airport (40-50 lndgs over 20 yrs) assigned runway 6R as expected. For unknown reason, when I was done reviewing the taxi diagram, I was mentally picturing a center parallel taxiway between runway 6R and runway 6L. That taxiway does not actually exist. Landed runway 6R normally, exited on D3 with a clearly heard clearance to hold short of runway 6L. I was convinced that the first intersection was the non existent center taxiway, and was focused on holding short of the following intersection. The first officer recognized the impending situation, and decisively and assertively applied brakes and said 'hold short.' I recognized the error at that point. The aircraft stopped with the nose just over the hold short line. Notified tower immediately that we had rolled slightly past the line, no apparent conflict, received clearance to continue. This was a positive case of the first officer actively monitoring the taxi, which is, unfortunately not always the case. He has received training from the airline in assertiveness, and his assertiveness and decisiveness were exactly appropriate to the situation, and clearly prevented a full-blown incursion onto the active runway. Another positive factor was the airline's policy of not reading the 'after landing' checklist until all active runways have been crossed inbound. I clearly could have avoided the situation by stating that I was planning on holding short of the second intersection, which would have allowed the first officer to catch my error of perception sooner.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AFTER LNDG CYYZ, AN ACR PLT CAPT STARTS TO CROSS HOLD LINE OF PARALLEL RWY BUT IS STOPPED BY THE FO WITH NOSE OF ACFT SLIGHTLY OVER LINE.

Narrative: CAPT FLYING. PRIOR TO LNDG, STUDIED ARPT DIAGRAM CAREFULLY, DUE TO LNDG ON OTHER THAN USUAL RWY, INCLUDING POTENTIAL RTE FROM RWY TO GATE. SOMEWHAT FAMILIAR WITH ARPT (40-50 LNDGS OVER 20 YRS) ASSIGNED RWY 6R AS EXPECTED. FOR UNKNOWN REASON, WHEN I WAS DONE REVIEWING THE TAXI DIAGRAM, I WAS MENTALLY PICTURING A CTR PARALLEL TXWY BTWN RWY 6R AND RWY 6L. THAT TXWY DOES NOT ACTUALLY EXIST. LANDED RWY 6R NORMALLY, EXITED ON D3 WITH A CLRLY HEARD CLRNC TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 6L. I WAS CONVINCED THAT THE FIRST INTXN WAS THE NON EXISTENT CTR TXWY, AND WAS FOCUSED ON HOLDING SHORT OF THE FOLLOWING INTXN. THE FO RECOGNIZED THE IMPENDING SIT, AND DECISIVELY AND ASSERTIVELY APPLIED BRAKES AND SAID 'HOLD SHORT.' I RECOGNIZED THE ERROR AT THAT POINT. THE ACFT STOPPED WITH THE NOSE JUST OVER THE HOLD SHORT LINE. NOTIFIED TWR IMMEDIATELY THAT WE HAD ROLLED SLIGHTLY PAST THE LINE, NO APPARENT CONFLICT, RECEIVED CLRNC TO CONTINUE. THIS WAS A POSITIVE CASE OF THE FO ACTIVELY MONITORING THE TAXI, WHICH IS, UNFORTUNATELY NOT ALWAYS THE CASE. HE HAS RECEIVED TRAINING FROM THE AIRLINE IN ASSERTIVENESS, AND HIS ASSERTIVENESS AND DECISIVENESS WERE EXACTLY APPROPRIATE TO THE SIT, AND CLRLY PREVENTED A FULL-BLOWN INCURSION ONTO THE ACTIVE RWY. ANOTHER POSITIVE FACTOR WAS THE AIRLINE'S POLICY OF NOT READING THE 'AFTER LNDG' CHKLIST UNTIL ALL ACTIVE RWYS HAVE BEEN CROSSED INBOUND. I CLRLY COULD HAVE AVOIDED THE SIT BY STATING THAT I WAS PLANNING ON HOLDING SHORT OF THE SECOND INTXN, WHICH WOULD HAVE ALLOWED THE FO TO CATCH MY ERROR OF PERCEPTION SOONER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.