Narrative:

The event in question occurred on feb/fri/2002, XA30 zulu, at mcgee-tyson airport (tys), knoxville, tn, during improving instrument meteorological conditions: ceiling 1400 ft, visibility 7 miles, winds 250 at 6 knots, during the previous hour the airport had a ceiling of 100 ft and 1/4 mi visibility. The airport had been effectively closed to arrival during the previous hour and had a number of aircraft approaching to land, approximately 4-6 commercial and general aviation. I had been vectored for the ILS runway 23 right, cleared to land, and touched down in the first 2200 ft of the runway and continued my rollout awaiting turn-off instructions from the tower controller. After continuing my roll-out for approximately 500 ft the controller angrily told me to 'get off the runway-- do a 180 degree turn and get off at the nearest taxiway.' while complying with said instructions as rapidly as my aircraft would safely allow, approximately another 300-400 ft, the controller began yelling for me to 'exit the runway immediately' and also informing another aircraft that was landing behind that an 'aircraft was on the runway.' I taxied clear and the tower controller angrily informed me I should always take the first available taxiway in IMC conditions. I then contacted ground control and taxied to the general aviation parking apron without incident. I believe the controller had spaced landing aircraft too close in an effort to expedite arrivals, failed to provide turn-off instructions, then gave inappropriate/dangerous instructions for me to reverse course on an active runway during a roll-out after landing. The controller had been quite busy during the preceding 30 mins, due to the conditions. I should have notified the controller during final that I was unfamiliar with the airport and asked for taxi instructions in an effort to expedite the landing and clearance from the runway. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter said he broke out of the overcast at about 1000 ft and could clearly see the runways. He said there wasn't much activity on the airport although apches to the field had only started 45 mins earlier because of WX. He said he was not aware of traffic behind him on the approach and now wishes he had asked the controller where to turn off. He said after the incident, he believes there's a message on a pilot organization website describing what can happen at certain airports if a pilot does not exit the runway in a timely manner.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AFTER LNDG AT TYS ON RWY 23R, THE PLT OF A PA-28 CONTINUES TO ROLL DOWN THE RWY WAITING FOR TAXI INSTRUCTIONS AND IS STERNLY INSTRUCTED TO EXIT THE RWY IMMEDIATELY.

Narrative: THE EVENT IN QUESTION OCCURRED ON FEB/FRI/2002, XA30 ZULU, AT MCGEE-TYSON ARPT (TYS), KNOXVILLE, TN, DURING IMPROVING INSTRUMENT METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS: CEILING 1400 FT, VISIBILITY 7 MILES, WINDS 250 AT 6 KNOTS, DURING THE PREVIOUS HR THE ARPT HAD A CEILING OF 100 FT AND 1/4 MI VISIBILITY. THE ARPT HAD BEEN EFFECTIVELY CLOSED TO ARR DURING THE PREVIOUS HR AND HAD A NUMBER OF ACFT APCHING TO LAND, APPROX 4-6 COMMERCIAL AND GENERAL AVIATION. I HAD BEEN VECTORED FOR THE ILS RWY 23 RIGHT, CLRED TO LAND, AND TOUCHED DOWN IN THE FIRST 2200 FT OF THE RWY AND CONTINUED MY ROLLOUT AWAITING TURN-OFF INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE TWR CTLR. AFTER CONTINUING MY ROLL-OUT FOR APPROX 500 FT THE CTLR ANGRILY TOLD ME TO 'GET OFF THE RWY-- DO A 180 DEG TURN AND GET OFF AT THE NEAREST TXWY.' WHILE COMPLYING WITH SAID INSTRUCTIONS AS RAPIDLY AS MY ACFT WOULD SAFELY ALLOW, APPROX ANOTHER 300-400 FT, THE CTLR BEGAN YELLING FOR ME TO 'EXIT THE RWY IMMEDIATELY' AND ALSO INFORMING ANOTHER ACFT THAT WAS LNDG BEHIND THAT AN 'ACFT WAS ON THE RWY.' I TAXIED CLR AND THE TWR CTLR ANGRILY INFORMED ME I SHOULD ALWAYS TAKE THE FIRST AVAILABLE TXWY IN IMC CONDITIONS. I THEN CONTACTED GND CTL AND TAXIED TO THE GENERAL AVIATION PARKING APRON WITHOUT INCIDENT. I BELIEVE THE CTLR HAD SPACED LNDG ACFT TOO CLOSE IN AN EFFORT TO EXPEDITE ARRIVALS, FAILED TO PROVIDE TURN-OFF INSTRUCTIONS, THEN GAVE INAPPROPRIATE/DANGEROUS INSTRUCTIONS FOR ME TO REVERSE COURSE ON AN ACTIVE RWY DURING A ROLL-OUT AFTER LNDG. THE CTLR HAD BEEN QUITE BUSY DURING THE PRECEDING 30 MINS, DUE TO THE CONDITIONS. I SHOULD HAVE NOTIFIED THE CTLR DURING FINAL THAT I WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH THE ARPT AND ASKED FOR TAXI INSTRUCTIONS IN AN EFFORT TO EXPEDITE THE LNDG AND CLRNC FROM THE RWY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR SAID HE BROKE OUT OF THE OVERCAST AT ABOUT 1000 FT AND COULD CLRLY SEE THE RWYS. HE SAID THERE WASN'T MUCH ACTIVITY ON THE ARPT ALTHOUGH APCHES TO THE FIELD HAD ONLY STARTED 45 MINS EARLIER BECAUSE OF WX. HE SAID HE WAS NOT AWARE OF TFC BEHIND HIM ON THE APCH AND NOW WISHES HE HAD ASKED THE CTLR WHERE TO TURN OFF. HE SAID AFTER THE INCIDENT, HE BELIEVES THERE'S A MSG ON A PILOT ORGANIZATION WEBSITE DESCRIBING WHAT CAN HAPPEN AT CERTAIN ARPTS IF A PLT DOES NOT EXIT THE RWY IN A TIMELY MANNER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.