Narrative:

We were taking off from jfk on runway 31L and we were cleared the breezy point climb on the kennedy 8 departure. The first part of our takeoff was a normal one, but suddenly at high speed and approaching to V1 we had an unscheduled 'stabilizer' aural warning. The copilot was the pilot taking off. The aural warning stopped so I made as PIC the go decision to continue our takeoff. On the initial climb out I think that both were distraction by the warning. As PNF I was watching the stabilizer trim indicator and busy with ATC while the copilot was flying the departure then we were instructed by departure control to start our left turn to cri VOR. It was when both realized that we were starting our left turn to cri only with 15 degrees of bank angle the copilot set immediately 30 degrees of bank angle on the flight guidance computer. After that I told the copilot to engage navigation to fly direct cri VOR and leave it on the 223 degree radial. But at this point we made a mistake. During our preflight after cri VOR we were created a waypoint on the cri 223 degree radial at 2 DME with the purpose to cross that point at or above 2500 ft. After that point we had our next waypoint rbv VOR, so we were going after that point direct to rbv VOR. (Our company's procedures indicate that the PF must have his navigation display on map mode and the PNF must have his navigation display on rose or arc mode (raw data) to monitor the navigation.) after the acknowledgement of an altitude change thanks to that procedure, I noticed that we were right of course, so I told the copilot to change to rose or arc (raw data) and proceed to reintercept the cri 223 degree radial at this point was when we were advised by departure control that we were right of course and we were instructed to reintercept the SID. I believe that the non adherence to a published procedure was due in first instance by the aircraft equipment problem which caused a distraction during the initial climb out, secondly, I think that we need to make a more precise departure briefing and finally to fly this particular departure on raw data because it is easy to fly on rose or arc mode due to the interpretation of the instruments.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD88 CREW HAD A RWY STABILIZER AURAL WARNING AT HIGH SPD ON TKOF ROLL AT JFK.

Narrative: WE WERE TAKING OFF FROM JFK ON RWY 31L AND WE WERE CLRED THE BREEZY POINT CLB ON THE KENNEDY 8 DEP. THE FIRST PART OF OUR TKOF WAS A NORMAL ONE, BUT SUDDENLY AT HIGH SPD AND APCHING TO V1 WE HAD AN UNSCHEDULED 'STABILIZER' AURAL WARNING. THE COPLT WAS THE PLT TAKING OFF. THE AURAL WARNING STOPPED SO I MADE AS PIC THE GO DECISION TO CONTINUE OUR TKOF. ON THE INITIAL CLBOUT I THINK THAT BOTH WERE DISTR BY THE WARNING. AS PNF I WAS WATCHING THE STABILIZER TRIM INDICATOR AND BUSY WITH ATC WHILE THE COPLT WAS FLYING THE DEP THEN WE WERE INSTRUCTED BY DEP CTL TO START OUR L TURN TO CRI VOR. IT WAS WHEN BOTH REALIZED THAT WE WERE STARTING OUR L TURN TO CRI ONLY WITH 15 DEGS OF BANK ANGLE THE COPLT SET IMMEDIATELY 30 DEGS OF BANK ANGLE ON THE FLT GUIDANCE COMPUTER. AFTER THAT I TOLD THE COPLT TO ENGAGE NAV TO FLY DIRECT CRI VOR AND LEAVE IT ON THE 223 DEG RADIAL. BUT AT THIS POINT WE MADE A MISTAKE. DURING OUR PREFLT AFTER CRI VOR WE WERE CREATED A WAYPOINT ON THE CRI 223 DEG RADIAL AT 2 DME WITH THE PURPOSE TO CROSS THAT POINT AT OR ABOVE 2500 FT. AFTER THAT POINT WE HAD OUR NEXT WAYPOINT RBV VOR, SO WE WERE GOING AFTER THAT POINT DIRECT TO RBV VOR. (OUR COMPANY'S PROCS INDICATE THAT THE PF MUST HAVE HIS NAV DISPLAY ON MAP MODE AND THE PNF MUST HAVE HIS NAV DISPLAY ON ROSE OR ARC MODE (RAW DATA) TO MONITOR THE NAV.) AFTER THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF AN ALT CHANGE THANKS TO THAT PROC, I NOTICED THAT WE WERE R OF COURSE, SO I TOLD THE COPLT TO CHANGE TO ROSE OR ARC (RAW DATA) AND PROCEED TO REINTERCEPT THE CRI 223 DEG RADIAL AT THIS POINT WAS WHEN WE WERE ADVISED BY DEP CTL THAT WE WERE R OF COURSE AND WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO REINTERCEPT THE SID. I BELIEVE THAT THE NON ADHERENCE TO A PUBLISHED PROC WAS DUE IN FIRST INSTANCE BY THE ACFT EQUIP PROB WHICH CAUSED A DISTR DURING THE INITIAL CLBOUT, SECONDLY, I THINK THAT WE NEED TO MAKE A MORE PRECISE DEP BRIEFING AND FINALLY TO FLY THIS PARTICULAR DEP ON RAW DATA BECAUSE IT IS EASY TO FLY ON ROSE OR ARC MODE DUE TO THE INTERP OF THE INSTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.