Narrative:

We were en route to hyr after 4 hour 30 min flight with the understanding that it would be necessary to complete an NDB approach to near minimums. The WX as reported by ASOS had been improving about every 5 mins until it was 600-700 ft broken, 1400 ft overcast, 1.5 - 1.75 mi visibility, light snow and mist. About 45 mins out, prior to top of descent, I began an approach briefing with regard to how we would conduct the difficult procedure. My copilot, also the aircraft owner and my employer, had been flying together for several months. This would be my first arrival at hyr but for my boss this had been his former home base airport, and he had flown in many times including as copilot on his former company turboprop. As I began he told me verbally and with hand/body language that there wasn't really much that I could tell him about his airport and he really didn't need a discussion. I realized that he didn't understand the purpose of an approach brief, and so limited it to confign, speeds, altitude callouts, and missed approach procedures. About 15 mi from hyr, ZMP cleared us for an NDB. We crossed over the field, turned toward the beacon, crossed it outbound, configured, completed procedure turn inbound all in IMC for the last 50 mins, and with no further center contact crossed the beacon inbound for the airport. When we broke out, we were not in a position to vertically continue a straight-in and there was a little too much mist and snow to be comfortable with a circle-to-land, so I asked my sic to declare a miss. He became wrapped up telling unicom what we were to do. I thought about suggesting that he not get involved in worrying about the people on the ground that we needed to pick up, and that he stay in real time, ahead of the aircraft. I decided not to risk stressing the cockpit tone and simply repeated my request to change to center frequency and declare a missed approach. He stated firmly in a nonstandard phrasing 'they can't get you.' I wasn't sure that I understood what he meant and I began to wonder if I had missed something on the plate or a center comment. I asked him to transmit a missed call anyway. He repeated even more firmly, 'they can't get us.' at this point I was tasked, performing a missed approach turn and climb back to the beacon, and was even more firmly convinced that he knew something about his airport that I had failed to register. As we approached the missed approach hold, the same beacon only 5 mi from the airfield, I asked him to transmit to center 'in the blind' our intentions. My sic/PNF/boss repeated in an exasperated manner, once again said 'they can't get us, we can't get them.' in fact he was 100% certain and completely mistaken, but I had allowed his authority/authorized (informal) to infect both pilots. We were aviating, navigating, but had failed to communication our intent to center. The boss (copilot) had misinterped a center comment to the effect that they would lose radar contact only during the final approach segment. As PIC, I should have more rapidly reset to a single pilot cockpit operation as though my copilot was incapacitated. While this confusion did not result in any direct risk to the aircraft, it did complicate center's task requiring them to protect airspace. Related to such errors is the loss of situational awareness of altitude or lateral/course position which may or may not involve cockpit confusion.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMT CAPT HAD AN UNQUALIFIED ACFT OWNER ACT AS FO ON AN IMC FLT. COM PROBS WITH ZMP RESULTED.

Narrative: WE WERE ENRTE TO HYR AFTER 4 HR 30 MIN FLT WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO COMPLETE AN NDB APCH TO NEAR MINIMUMS. THE WX AS RPTED BY ASOS HAD BEEN IMPROVING ABOUT EVERY 5 MINS UNTIL IT WAS 600-700 FT BROKEN, 1400 FT OVCST, 1.5 - 1.75 MI VISIBILITY, LIGHT SNOW AND MIST. ABOUT 45 MINS OUT, PRIOR TO TOP OF DSCNT, I BEGAN AN APCH BRIEFING WITH REGARD TO HOW WE WOULD CONDUCT THE DIFFICULT PROC. MY COPLT, ALSO THE ACFT OWNER AND MY EMPLOYER, HAD BEEN FLYING TOGETHER FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. THIS WOULD BE MY FIRST ARR AT HYR BUT FOR MY BOSS THIS HAD BEEN HIS FORMER HOME BASE ARPT, AND HE HAD FLOWN IN MANY TIMES INCLUDING AS COPLT ON HIS FORMER COMPANY TURBOPROP. AS I BEGAN HE TOLD ME VERBALLY AND WITH HAND/BODY LANGUAGE THAT THERE WASN'T REALLY MUCH THAT I COULD TELL HIM ABOUT HIS ARPT AND HE REALLY DIDN'T NEED A DISCUSSION. I REALIZED THAT HE DIDN'T UNDERSTAND THE PURPOSE OF AN APCH BRIEF, AND SO LIMITED IT TO CONFIGN, SPDS, ALT CALLOUTS, AND MISSED APCH PROCS. ABOUT 15 MI FROM HYR, ZMP CLRED US FOR AN NDB. WE CROSSED OVER THE FIELD, TURNED TOWARD THE BEACON, CROSSED IT OUTBOUND, CONFIGURED, COMPLETED PROC TURN INBOUND ALL IN IMC FOR THE LAST 50 MINS, AND WITH NO FURTHER CTR CONTACT CROSSED THE BEACON INBOUND FOR THE ARPT. WHEN WE BROKE OUT, WE WERE NOT IN A POS TO VERTLY CONTINUE A STRAIGHT-IN AND THERE WAS A LITTLE TOO MUCH MIST AND SNOW TO BE COMFORTABLE WITH A CIRCLE-TO-LAND, SO I ASKED MY SIC TO DECLARE A MISS. HE BECAME WRAPPED UP TELLING UNICOM WHAT WE WERE TO DO. I THOUGHT ABOUT SUGGESTING THAT HE NOT GET INVOLVED IN WORRYING ABOUT THE PEOPLE ON THE GND THAT WE NEEDED TO PICK UP, AND THAT HE STAY IN REAL TIME, AHEAD OF THE ACFT. I DECIDED NOT TO RISK STRESSING THE COCKPIT TONE AND SIMPLY REPEATED MY REQUEST TO CHANGE TO CTR FREQ AND DECLARE A MISSED APCH. HE STATED FIRMLY IN A NONSTANDARD PHRASING 'THEY CAN'T GET YOU.' I WASN'T SURE THAT I UNDERSTOOD WHAT HE MEANT AND I BEGAN TO WONDER IF I HAD MISSED SOMETHING ON THE PLATE OR A CTR COMMENT. I ASKED HIM TO XMIT A MISSED CALL ANYWAY. HE REPEATED EVEN MORE FIRMLY, 'THEY CAN'T GET US.' AT THIS POINT I WAS TASKED, PERFORMING A MISSED APCH TURN AND CLB BACK TO THE BEACON, AND WAS EVEN MORE FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT HE KNEW SOMETHING ABOUT HIS ARPT THAT I HAD FAILED TO REGISTER. AS WE APCHED THE MISSED APCH HOLD, THE SAME BEACON ONLY 5 MI FROM THE AIRFIELD, I ASKED HIM TO XMIT TO CTR 'IN THE BLIND' OUR INTENTIONS. MY SIC/PNF/BOSS REPEATED IN AN EXASPERATED MANNER, ONCE AGAIN SAID 'THEY CAN'T GET US, WE CAN'T GET THEM.' IN FACT HE WAS 100% CERTAIN AND COMPLETELY MISTAKEN, BUT I HAD ALLOWED HIS AUTH (INFORMAL) TO INFECT BOTH PLTS. WE WERE AVIATING, NAVING, BUT HAD FAILED TO COM OUR INTENT TO CTR. THE BOSS (COPLT) HAD MISINTERPED A CTR COMMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THEY WOULD LOSE RADAR CONTACT ONLY DURING THE FINAL APCH SEGMENT. AS PIC, I SHOULD HAVE MORE RAPIDLY RESET TO A SINGLE PLT COCKPIT OP AS THOUGH MY COPLT WAS INCAPACITATED. WHILE THIS CONFUSION DID NOT RESULT IN ANY DIRECT RISK TO THE ACFT, IT DID COMPLICATE CTR'S TASK REQUIRING THEM TO PROTECT AIRSPACE. RELATED TO SUCH ERRORS IS THE LOSS OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS OF ALT OR LATERAL/COURSE POS WHICH MAY OR MAY NOT INVOLVE COCKPIT CONFUSION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.