Narrative:

10 mi out with the airport in sight, I reported 'field in sight' and canceled IFR with ZME. ZME reported 'no known traffic in the area.' I set myself up on a long final and reported '8 mi out on final for runway 18' on CTAF. I spotted an aircraft on a left downwind to runway 18 but I heard no radio calls or replies to mine. I did s-turns to make myself more visible along with already having every light illuminated. I reported a 5 mi and 2 mi final to runway 18 and got no reply from the other aircraft. The other aircraft turned base right at my aircraft and I had to lower the nose and increase power to avoid collision. The other aircraft turned final right behind me and continued on final at a distance of less than 2000 ft from my tail. I did some shallow banks on final to make myself more visible and I kept up my speed to keep the distance between myself and the other aircraft. This excess speed caused floating on landing and I had to use the entire runway to land and stop using normal braking. The other aircraft continued his approach and landed while my aircraft was still rolling out on the runway after landing. There were several contributing factors to this event. Both aircraft were commercially operated on tight schedules. This creates some get thereitis pressure for the pilots. It was early morning. Both pilots were somewhat fatigued and the light conditions were still quite low. Visibility was still very good but overall judgement may have been affected by these factors. My decision to make a long straight-in approach was based on my tight schedule and having to get on the ground and meet my customer. A normal pattern would have been in better taste. In addition, I should have aborted the approach when the other aircraft turned final so close. A go around might have been the better choice for me. In addition, the early hour gave me the misconception that the pattern would be empty. I was less prepared mentally for traffic than I should have been. Obviously the problem could also be contributed to the other pilot's failure to 'see and avoid' and failure to make any radio calls at all to announce his position or intentions. In summary, this incident could be attributed to get thereitis, complacency, fatigue, and failure to follow the uncontrolled field operations suggestions in the aim.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TFC CONFLICT AT AN UNCTLED ARPT FOLLOWED BY 2 ACFT LNDG ON THE RWY AT ONCE.

Narrative: 10 MI OUT WITH THE ARPT IN SIGHT, I RPTED 'FIELD IN SIGHT' AND CANCELED IFR WITH ZME. ZME RPTED 'NO KNOWN TFC IN THE AREA.' I SET MYSELF UP ON A LONG FINAL AND RPTED '8 MI OUT ON FINAL FOR RWY 18' ON CTAF. I SPOTTED AN ACFT ON A L DOWNWIND TO RWY 18 BUT I HEARD NO RADIO CALLS OR REPLIES TO MINE. I DID S-TURNS TO MAKE MYSELF MORE VISIBLE ALONG WITH ALREADY HAVING EVERY LIGHT ILLUMINATED. I RPTED A 5 MI AND 2 MI FINAL TO RWY 18 AND GOT NO REPLY FROM THE OTHER ACFT. THE OTHER ACFT TURNED BASE RIGHT AT MY ACFT AND I HAD TO LOWER THE NOSE AND INCREASE PWR TO AVOID COLLISION. THE OTHER ACFT TURNED FINAL RIGHT BEHIND ME AND CONTINUED ON FINAL AT A DISTANCE OF LESS THAN 2000 FT FROM MY TAIL. I DID SOME SHALLOW BANKS ON FINAL TO MAKE MYSELF MORE VISIBLE AND I KEPT UP MY SPD TO KEEP THE DISTANCE BTWN MYSELF AND THE OTHER ACFT. THIS EXCESS SPD CAUSED FLOATING ON LNDG AND I HAD TO USE THE ENTIRE RWY TO LAND AND STOP USING NORMAL BRAKING. THE OTHER ACFT CONTINUED HIS APCH AND LANDED WHILE MY ACFT WAS STILL ROLLING OUT ON THE RWY AFTER LNDG. THERE WERE SEVERAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS EVENT. BOTH ACFT WERE COMMERCIALLY OPERATED ON TIGHT SCHEDULES. THIS CREATES SOME GET THEREITIS PRESSURE FOR THE PLTS. IT WAS EARLY MORNING. BOTH PLTS WERE SOMEWHAT FATIGUED AND THE LIGHT CONDITIONS WERE STILL QUITE LOW. VISIBILITY WAS STILL VERY GOOD BUT OVERALL JUDGEMENT MAY HAVE BEEN AFFECTED BY THESE FACTORS. MY DECISION TO MAKE A LONG STRAIGHT-IN APCH WAS BASED ON MY TIGHT SCHEDULE AND HAVING TO GET ON THE GND AND MEET MY CUSTOMER. A NORMAL PATTERN WOULD HAVE BEEN IN BETTER TASTE. IN ADDITION, I SHOULD HAVE ABORTED THE APCH WHEN THE OTHER ACFT TURNED FINAL SO CLOSE. A GAR MIGHT HAVE BEEN THE BETTER CHOICE FOR ME. IN ADDITION, THE EARLY HR GAVE ME THE MISCONCEPTION THAT THE PATTERN WOULD BE EMPTY. I WAS LESS PREPARED MENTALLY FOR TFC THAN I SHOULD HAVE BEEN. OBVIOUSLY THE PROB COULD ALSO BE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OTHER PLT'S FAILURE TO 'SEE AND AVOID' AND FAILURE TO MAKE ANY RADIO CALLS AT ALL TO ANNOUNCE HIS POS OR INTENTIONS. IN SUMMARY, THIS INCIDENT COULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO GET THEREITIS, COMPLACENCY, FATIGUE, AND FAILURE TO FOLLOW THE UNCTLED FIELD OPS SUGGESTIONS IN THE AIM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.