Narrative:

Flight abc, tpa to bwi, B737-200, aircraft xyz, FL290. On J75 north of tay, approximately 40 NM west of jax, first officer PF, crew of 5, 118 passenger, 1 flight attendant on flight attendant jump seat, 1 non-company pilot on the cockpit jump seat. At this point all is normal. The left a hydraulic system low pressure light illuminated. I opened the QRH to the appropriate page, read and we accomplished the appropriate procedure and restowed the QRH. Immediately after this, the right a hydraulic system low pressure light illuminated. I once again opened the QRH to the appropriate page, read and we accomplished the appropriate procedure. At this time I sent an ACARS maintenance message advising the company of the situation and asking if they had any pertinent thoughts and restowed the QRH. Immediately after this both B hydraulic system low pressure lights illuminated, the autoplt disengaged and the a system hydraulic quantity gauge indicated zero. At this point I assumed control of the aircraft, the first officer assumed the QRH duties, we declared an emergency, briefed the lead flight attendant and advised ATC that we wanted to divert into jax. During the descent and while the cabin was being prepared, both myself and the first officer kept the passenger and flight attendants advised to the extent that our workload permitted. The pilot on the jump seat was asked to provide any and all input that he thought was appropriate and in fact he was an asset. ZJX handed us off to jax approach control and they advised us that only the short runway 13/31 was opened (7701 ft) but that they could reopen runway 7/25 (10000 ft) if we requested it. We requested it. As we descended, the first officer contacted the company in jax and advised them of our situation and told them that we would need a tug when we arrived. We explained the nature of our emergency to approach control and asked them for maneuvering vectors to a long final and advised them that everything we did would be very gradual. The entire ATC system, including jax air route traffic control center, jax approach control and jax tower were extremely helpful in the assistance they offered and in their handling of this emergency. As we lined up on about a 15 to 20 mi final, we confirmed that the ILS to runway 07 was operating and we did a visual approach with an ILS backup to an overweight manual reversion landing. Emergency equipment had been requested, was standing by and thankfully was not needed. After the landing and in short order, the tug connected to the aircraft and towed us to the gate. No injuries, no aircraft damage, all known procedures were followed and were adequate, and prior training for this situation is considered appropriate. The successful outcome of this emergency was due to the professional conduct of the entire crew. Appropriate logbook entries reference the hydraulic problem and the overweight landing were made. Examining the aircraft, maintenance personnel found two hydraulic lines in the attach pylon of the left engine had rubbed together and were the source of the leak. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the a hydraulic system failed first and the QRH procedures were followed. The reporter said in a short period of time the B hydraulic system also failed. The reporter said the airplane was flown with the standby pump only to operate the rudder and extend the leading edge devices. The reporter said on landing, maintenance reported finding two rubbed and chafed hydraulic metal lines in the left aft pylon area caused the loss of the two systems. The reporter stated maintenance also advised the standby system was almost completely depleted due to a leak in one of the leading edge device actuators. The reporter said the airplane flew and handled exactly like the simulator with a programmed total hydraulic failure.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-200 IN CRUISE AT FL290 DECLARED AN EMER AND DIVERTED DUE TO TOTAL LOSS OF HYD PRESSURE AND QUANTITY FROM A AND B SYSTEMS.

Narrative: FLT ABC, TPA TO BWI, B737-200, ACFT XYZ, FL290. ON J75 N OF TAY, APPROX 40 NM W OF JAX, FO PF, CREW OF 5, 118 PAX, 1 FLT ATTENDANT ON FLT ATTENDANT JUMP SEAT, 1 NON-COMPANY PLT ON THE COCKPIT JUMP SEAT. AT THIS POINT ALL IS NORMAL. THE L A HYD SYSTEM LOW PRESSURE LIGHT ILLUMINATED. I OPENED THE QRH TO THE APPROPRIATE PAGE, READ AND WE ACCOMPLISHED THE APPROPRIATE PROC AND RESTOWED THE QRH. IMMEDIATELY AFTER THIS, THE R A HYD SYSTEM LOW PRESSURE LIGHT ILLUMINATED. I ONCE AGAIN OPENED THE QRH TO THE APPROPRIATE PAGE, READ AND WE ACCOMPLISHED THE APPROPRIATE PROC. AT THIS TIME I SENT AN ACARS MAINT MESSAGE ADVISING THE COMPANY OF THE SIT AND ASKING IF THEY HAD ANY PERTINENT THOUGHTS AND RESTOWED THE QRH. IMMEDIATELY AFTER THIS BOTH B HYD SYSTEM LOW PRESSURE LIGHTS ILLUMINATED, THE AUTOPLT DISENGAGED AND THE A SYSTEM HYD QUANTITY GAUGE INDICATED ZERO. AT THIS POINT I ASSUMED CTL OF THE ACFT, THE FO ASSUMED THE QRH DUTIES, WE DECLARED AN EMER, BRIEFED THE LEAD FLT ATTENDANT AND ADVISED ATC THAT WE WANTED TO DIVERT INTO JAX. DURING THE DSCNT AND WHILE THE CABIN WAS BEING PREPARED, BOTH MYSELF AND THE FO KEPT THE PAX AND FLT ATTENDANTS ADVISED TO THE EXTENT THAT OUR WORKLOAD PERMITTED. THE PLT ON THE JUMP SEAT WAS ASKED TO PROVIDE ANY AND ALL INPUT THAT HE THOUGHT WAS APPROPRIATE AND IN FACT HE WAS AN ASSET. ZJX HANDED US OFF TO JAX APCH CTL AND THEY ADVISED US THAT ONLY THE SHORT RWY 13/31 WAS OPENED (7701 FT) BUT THAT THEY COULD REOPEN RWY 7/25 (10000 FT) IF WE REQUESTED IT. WE REQUESTED IT. AS WE DESCENDED, THE FO CONTACTED THE COMPANY IN JAX AND ADVISED THEM OF OUR SIT AND TOLD THEM THAT WE WOULD NEED A TUG WHEN WE ARRIVED. WE EXPLAINED THE NATURE OF OUR EMER TO APCH CTL AND ASKED THEM FOR MANEUVERING VECTORS TO A LONG FINAL AND ADVISED THEM THAT EVERYTHING WE DID WOULD BE VERY GRADUAL. THE ENTIRE ATC SYSTEM, INCLUDING JAX AIR ROUTE TFC CTL CTR, JAX APCH CTL AND JAX TWR WERE EXTREMELY HELPFUL IN THE ASSISTANCE THEY OFFERED AND IN THEIR HANDLING OF THIS EMER. AS WE LINED UP ON ABOUT A 15 TO 20 MI FINAL, WE CONFIRMED THAT THE ILS TO RWY 07 WAS OPERATING AND WE DID A VISUAL APCH WITH AN ILS BACKUP TO AN OVERWEIGHT MANUAL REVERSION LNDG. EMER EQUIP HAD BEEN REQUESTED, WAS STANDING BY AND THANKFULLY WAS NOT NEEDED. AFTER THE LNDG AND IN SHORT ORDER, THE TUG CONNECTED TO THE ACFT AND TOWED US TO THE GATE. NO INJURIES, NO ACFT DAMAGE, ALL KNOWN PROCS WERE FOLLOWED AND WERE ADEQUATE, AND PRIOR TRAINING FOR THIS SIT IS CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE. THE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THIS EMER WAS DUE TO THE PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE ENTIRE CREW. APPROPRIATE LOGBOOK ENTRIES REF THE HYD PROB AND THE OVERWEIGHT LNDG WERE MADE. EXAMINING THE ACFT, MAINT PERSONNEL FOUND TWO HYD LINES IN THE ATTACH PYLON OF THE L ENG HAD RUBBED TOGETHER AND WERE THE SOURCE OF THE LEAK. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE A HYD SYSTEM FAILED FIRST AND THE QRH PROCS WERE FOLLOWED. THE RPTR SAID IN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME THE B HYD SYSTEM ALSO FAILED. THE RPTR SAID THE AIRPLANE WAS FLOWN WITH THE STANDBY PUMP ONLY TO OPERATE THE RUDDER AND EXTEND THE LEADING EDGE DEVICES. THE RPTR SAID ON LNDG, MAINT RPTED FINDING TWO RUBBED AND CHAFED HYD METAL LINES IN THE L AFT PYLON AREA CAUSED THE LOSS OF THE TWO SYSTEMS. THE RPTR STATED MAINT ALSO ADVISED THE STANDBY SYSTEM WAS ALMOST COMPLETELY DEPLETED DUE TO A LEAK IN ONE OF THE LEADING EDGE DEVICE ACTUATORS. THE RPTR SAID THE AIRPLANE FLEW AND HANDLED EXACTLY LIKE THE SIMULATOR WITH A PROGRAMMED TOTAL HYD FAILURE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.