Narrative:

On the evening in oct/xa/99, I was landing at the tri-cities airport in pasco, wa. Conditions were VMC on a dark, clear night. A few mi out, I was cleared to land on runway 21R from a left base entry. This was the recommended runway for the prevailing winds. At the same time, an aircraft Y flight was cleared to land on a long straight-in approach to runway 12. (I was inbound from the east, aircraft Y was inbound from the west.) I could see the aircraft Y lights in the distance and in monitoring its progress it was evident we would be arriving at the airport very close to the same time. Runway 21R has a displaced threshold with less than 2000 ft from the displaced threshold to the intersection with runway 12. Runway 21R is not listed on IFR charts for lahso's. I made a normal landing on runway 21R and after I had touched down, the controller instructed, 'hold short of runway 12.' I repeated his instruction and braked heavily, but could not stop before the intersection. Additionally, the crossing runway is very difficult to see at ground level on a dark night. As I came to a stop, I was in the intersection with the aircraft Y on short final. The aircraft Y aborted their landing and executed a go around, circling to land on runway 21R. Assessing the situation, I immediately accelerated and cleared the intersection. Aircraft Y would have missed me, but it would have been very close. The controller said I should have told him I could not hold short. But he gave me the hold short instruction after I had landed and my first instinct at that moment was to stand on the brakes. I was forced to react instantaneously. Had I been advised in advance to land and hold short, I would have declined and offered to do a 270 degree turn back to final. Had I been advised to land long or to roll out expediently across the intersecting runway 12, there would have been no problem. The controller, in clearing me and the aircraft Y to land simultaneously on intersecting runways and then giving me a last second instruction to hold short, put both of us in a very dangerous situation. At night, with only the landing lights visible, it was difficult for me to judge the exact distance from the airport of aircraft Y. I assumed the tower controller had us safely sequenced, although in monitoring the aircraft Y progress I was tempted to say I would delay my landing until after aircraft Y. I thought that might anger the controller, but obviously I should have followed my instinct. A note of humor: my wife was on aircraft Y. When the captain announced they were going around because of an airplane on the runway, my wife announced that it was probably me. I was the focus of attention and good-natured chiding as the passenger disembarked!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A PLT RECEIVED A HOLD SHORT CLRNC AFTER TOUCHDOWN AND WAS UNABLE TO COMPLY PRIOR TO XING THE RWY AT PSC.

Narrative: ON THE EVENING IN OCT/XA/99, I WAS LNDG AT THE TRI-CITIES ARPT IN PASCO, WA. CONDITIONS WERE VMC ON A DARK, CLR NIGHT. A FEW MI OUT, I WAS CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 21R FROM A L BASE ENTRY. THIS WAS THE RECOMMENDED RWY FOR THE PREVAILING WINDS. AT THE SAME TIME, AN ACFT Y FLT WAS CLRED TO LAND ON A LONG STRAIGHT-IN APCH TO RWY 12. (I WAS INBOUND FROM THE E, ACFT Y WAS INBOUND FROM THE W.) I COULD SEE THE ACFT Y LIGHTS IN THE DISTANCE AND IN MONITORING ITS PROGRESS IT WAS EVIDENT WE WOULD BE ARRIVING AT THE ARPT VERY CLOSE TO THE SAME TIME. RWY 21R HAS A DISPLACED THRESHOLD WITH LESS THAN 2000 FT FROM THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD TO THE INTXN WITH RWY 12. RWY 21R IS NOT LISTED ON IFR CHARTS FOR LAHSO'S. I MADE A NORMAL LNDG ON RWY 21R AND AFTER I HAD TOUCHED DOWN, THE CTLR INSTRUCTED, 'HOLD SHORT OF RWY 12.' I REPEATED HIS INSTRUCTION AND BRAKED HEAVILY, BUT COULD NOT STOP BEFORE THE INTXN. ADDITIONALLY, THE XING RWY IS VERY DIFFICULT TO SEE AT GND LEVEL ON A DARK NIGHT. AS I CAME TO A STOP, I WAS IN THE INTXN WITH THE ACFT Y ON SHORT FINAL. THE ACFT Y ABORTED THEIR LNDG AND EXECUTED A GAR, CIRCLING TO LAND ON RWY 21R. ASSESSING THE SIT, I IMMEDIATELY ACCELERATED AND CLRED THE INTXN. ACFT Y WOULD HAVE MISSED ME, BUT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN VERY CLOSE. THE CTLR SAID I SHOULD HAVE TOLD HIM I COULD NOT HOLD SHORT. BUT HE GAVE ME THE HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTION AFTER I HAD LANDED AND MY FIRST INSTINCT AT THAT MOMENT WAS TO STAND ON THE BRAKES. I WAS FORCED TO REACT INSTANTANEOUSLY. HAD I BEEN ADVISED IN ADVANCE TO LAND AND HOLD SHORT, I WOULD HAVE DECLINED AND OFFERED TO DO A 270 DEG TURN BACK TO FINAL. HAD I BEEN ADVISED TO LAND LONG OR TO ROLL OUT EXPEDIENTLY ACROSS THE INTERSECTING RWY 12, THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO PROB. THE CTLR, IN CLRING ME AND THE ACFT Y TO LAND SIMULTANEOUSLY ON INTERSECTING RWYS AND THEN GIVING ME A LAST SECOND INSTRUCTION TO HOLD SHORT, PUT BOTH OF US IN A VERY DANGEROUS SIT. AT NIGHT, WITH ONLY THE LNDG LIGHTS VISIBLE, IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR ME TO JUDGE THE EXACT DISTANCE FROM THE ARPT OF ACFT Y. I ASSUMED THE TWR CTLR HAD US SAFELY SEQUENCED, ALTHOUGH IN MONITORING THE ACFT Y PROGRESS I WAS TEMPTED TO SAY I WOULD DELAY MY LNDG UNTIL AFTER ACFT Y. I THOUGHT THAT MIGHT ANGER THE CTLR, BUT OBVIOUSLY I SHOULD HAVE FOLLOWED MY INSTINCT. A NOTE OF HUMOR: MY WIFE WAS ON ACFT Y. WHEN THE CAPT ANNOUNCED THEY WERE GOING AROUND BECAUSE OF AN AIRPLANE ON THE RWY, MY WIFE ANNOUNCED THAT IT WAS PROBABLY ME. I WAS THE FOCUS OF ATTN AND GOOD-NATURED CHIDING AS THE PAX DISEMBARKED!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.