Narrative:

I was PF. We were still at about 11000 ft on a left downwind for runway 34L following 7 mi behind a B727 which we had in sight. We were told up to this point to maintain a speed of 210 KTS. We were cleared for a visual and turned our base to help expedite the traffic flow at about 5 or 6 DME. At this point we were a bit high and still fast, but there will be no problem getting down in 5 mi. But then approach instructs us to slow to 170 KTS and contact slc tower. If we slow to 170 KTS it's highly doubtful we will be able to get down in the next 5 mi. So we quickly switched to tower and while we were waiting for our turn to check in and request normal speed, I figured that the only way this was going to work out was if I tried to square the turn to final in order to give us the required room to get down and get slowed down. As soon as we got a hold of slc tower we were given normal speed, which allowed us to continue the required rate of descent. In my attempt to make this descent work out in the distance we had by squaring the turn to final, I managed to overshoot final by about 1.5 dots at 5 DME. Up to this point I was unaware of any conflicting traffic on the parallel runway 34R. Evidently there was traffic on runway 34R. We were then told we had overshot the final approach, which we obviously knew. After talking with several other pilots as well as controllers, it seems that slc approach control automatically assigns a speed of 170 KIAS a large part of the time, even when it's not actually required. This way, he doesn't have to make the phone call to tower to find out if it's actually necessary. This really adds to the problem when a plane is trying to descend and slow at the same time.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: E120 FLC OVERSHOOT TURN TO FINAL AT SLC.

Narrative: I WAS PF. WE WERE STILL AT ABOUT 11000 FT ON A L DOWNWIND FOR RWY 34L FOLLOWING 7 MI BEHIND A B727 WHICH WE HAD IN SIGHT. WE WERE TOLD UP TO THIS POINT TO MAINTAIN A SPD OF 210 KTS. WE WERE CLRED FOR A VISUAL AND TURNED OUR BASE TO HELP EXPEDITE THE TFC FLOW AT ABOUT 5 OR 6 DME. AT THIS POINT WE WERE A BIT HIGH AND STILL FAST, BUT THERE WILL BE NO PROB GETTING DOWN IN 5 MI. BUT THEN APCH INSTRUCTS US TO SLOW TO 170 KTS AND CONTACT SLC TWR. IF WE SLOW TO 170 KTS IT'S HIGHLY DOUBTFUL WE WILL BE ABLE TO GET DOWN IN THE NEXT 5 MI. SO WE QUICKLY SWITCHED TO TWR AND WHILE WE WERE WAITING FOR OUR TURN TO CHK IN AND REQUEST NORMAL SPD, I FIGURED THAT THE ONLY WAY THIS WAS GOING TO WORK OUT WAS IF I TRIED TO SQUARE THE TURN TO FINAL IN ORDER TO GIVE US THE REQUIRED ROOM TO GET DOWN AND GET SLOWED DOWN. AS SOON AS WE GOT A HOLD OF SLC TWR WE WERE GIVEN NORMAL SPD, WHICH ALLOWED US TO CONTINUE THE REQUIRED RATE OF DSCNT. IN MY ATTEMPT TO MAKE THIS DSCNT WORK OUT IN THE DISTANCE WE HAD BY SQUARING THE TURN TO FINAL, I MANAGED TO OVERSHOOT FINAL BY ABOUT 1.5 DOTS AT 5 DME. UP TO THIS POINT I WAS UNAWARE OF ANY CONFLICTING TFC ON THE PARALLEL RWY 34R. EVIDENTLY THERE WAS TFC ON RWY 34R. WE WERE THEN TOLD WE HAD OVERSHOT THE FINAL APCH, WHICH WE OBVIOUSLY KNEW. AFTER TALKING WITH SEVERAL OTHER PLTS AS WELL AS CTLRS, IT SEEMS THAT SLC APCH CTL AUTOMATICALLY ASSIGNS A SPD OF 170 KIAS A LARGE PART OF THE TIME, EVEN WHEN IT'S NOT ACTUALLY REQUIRED. THIS WAY, HE DOESN'T HAVE TO MAKE THE PHONE CALL TO TWR TO FIND OUT IF IT'S ACTUALLY NECESSARY. THIS REALLY ADDS TO THE PROB WHEN A PLANE IS TRYING TO DSND AND SLOW AT THE SAME TIME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.