Narrative:

Lead man (abc wxz) told myself and another mechanic to go to aircraft xyz, and close #2 engine. Went to plane, closed #2 fan cowls and patio. Left aircraft, updated electronic aircraft maintenance logbook. Jun/sun/99. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the only directive from the lead technician was to close up #2 engine cowling and work platform. The reporter said the lead technician returned from the job turnover briefing from the previous shift lead technician and said nothing about the #2 reverser being still activated for troubleshooting. The reporter said the throttle reverse block was removed, and all inoperative procedures on the engine were removed and the reverser was activated. The reporter stated the cowling was closed and latched and the work platform stowed and the airplane was dispatched with the reverser deferred as inoperative but not locked out per the MEL requirements. The reporter said the air carrier has recently implemented an aircraft electronic maintenance logbook where any log report and technician's write up is entered in the computer with absolutely no paperwork backup. The reporter said any job not done completely is entered in the computer to be turned over at shift change. The reporter stated the reactivation was in the computer but was not accessed by the lead technician, the reporter or helper. The reporter said the electronic logbook is failing and needs the paperwork backup. The reporter said the fact the electronic logbook recognized the discrepancy in the #2 engine reverser as not being cleared it still allowed a maintenance release to be issued.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DC10-30 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH A DEFERRED #2 ENG REVERSER INOP NOT LOCKED OUT PER THE MEL SPECIAL PROCS.

Narrative: LEAD MAN (ABC WXZ) TOLD MYSELF AND ANOTHER MECH TO GO TO ACFT XYZ, AND CLOSE #2 ENG. WENT TO PLANE, CLOSED #2 FAN COWLS AND PATIO. LEFT ACFT, UPDATED ELECTRONIC ACFT MAINT LOGBOOK. JUN/SUN/99. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE ONLY DIRECTIVE FROM THE LEAD TECHNICIAN WAS TO CLOSE UP #2 ENG COWLING AND WORK PLATFORM. THE RPTR SAID THE LEAD TECHNICIAN RETURNED FROM THE JOB TURNOVER BRIEFING FROM THE PREVIOUS SHIFT LEAD TECHNICIAN AND SAID NOTHING ABOUT THE #2 REVERSER BEING STILL ACTIVATED FOR TROUBLESHOOTING. THE RPTR SAID THE THROTTLE REVERSE BLOCK WAS REMOVED, AND ALL INOP PROCS ON THE ENG WERE REMOVED AND THE REVERSER WAS ACTIVATED. THE RPTR STATED THE COWLING WAS CLOSED AND LATCHED AND THE WORK PLATFORM STOWED AND THE AIRPLANE WAS DISPATCHED WITH THE REVERSER DEFERRED AS INOP BUT NOT LOCKED OUT PER THE MEL REQUIREMENTS. THE RPTR SAID THE ACR HAS RECENTLY IMPLEMENTED AN ACFT ELECTRONIC MAINT LOGBOOK WHERE ANY LOG RPT AND TECHNICIAN'S WRITE UP IS ENTERED IN THE COMPUTER WITH ABSOLUTELY NO PAPERWORK BACKUP. THE RPTR SAID ANY JOB NOT DONE COMPLETELY IS ENTERED IN THE COMPUTER TO BE TURNED OVER AT SHIFT CHANGE. THE RPTR STATED THE REACTIVATION WAS IN THE COMPUTER BUT WAS NOT ACCESSED BY THE LEAD TECHNICIAN, THE RPTR OR HELPER. THE RPTR SAID THE ELECTRONIC LOGBOOK IS FAILING AND NEEDS THE PAPERWORK BACKUP. THE RPTR SAID THE FACT THE ELECTRONIC LOGBOOK RECOGNIZED THE DISCREPANCY IN THE #2 ENG REVERSER AS NOT BEING CLRED IT STILL ALLOWED A MAINT RELEASE TO BE ISSUED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.