Narrative:

The approach to runway 18 at bhm is marginally safe at best and is a setup for an accident at worst. Runway 5/23 was closed from XA00Z to XK00Z. As a result, we briefed the localizer runway 18 approach. It was my first officer's leg and neither of us had flown to this runway before. We were both acutely aware of the high terrain to the north of the field and paid particular attention to that fact in our approach briefing. The only depiction of the high terrain is on the airport page. The WX was clear with excellent visibility. Bhm approach cleared us for the visual but we indicated we wanted to intercept the final outside of baskin and fly the final part of the localizer 18 approach. Although not listed on the approach page, there is a PAPI on the left side of runway 18 which has been in use for about 1 yr. We calculated the appropriate vdp based on timing as well as on the ibxo DME. From the vdp it was clear to us that if the field was not in sight at the 1300 ft altitude at the ibxo 3.3 DME, it would not be possible to complete the approach safely. The PAPI was visible from the 3.3 DME and we began a 700 FPM descent when on GS. The first officer and I were both bothered by the close visual proximity of the ground while on the final stages of the approach. At about 1 mi from touchdown, a car passed under us on an east/west road. It was between 100 ft and 80 ft AGL. I again verified visually that we were on the PAPI glide path and that the glide path was visually correct with the runway visual presentation. It was clear that we were correct and the radio altimeter then began to show the ground dropping away a bit. We passed over the threshold at 50 ft AGL having been centered on the glide path the entire time. By use of the ft scale and the graphic presentation on the airport page, I believe the radio altimeter was accurate and that we were on or even slightly above the glide path when we had the 80-100 ft reading. How high are the trees on that hill? Although the approach and landing were uneventful, the following problems are presented: 1) there is no note about the extremely close proximity to high terrain when on this approach. The mandatory airport review page does not address runway 18 or runway 36. 2) there is no PAPI depicted in commercial chart despite having been in service for about 1 yr according to the bhm tower. 3) using a 3 degree GS and an aim point 1000 ft down runway 18, the 884 ft terrain 4000 ft north of the field calculates to a ht above ground of less than 100 ft. Trees are of course not included in this calculation. 4) runway 18 slopes down to the south and complicates the landing. A 7100 ft runway means a 6100 ft area to stop in and the downslope tends to have the effect of falling away from an aircraft in the flare. Unless you fly it on to the runway fairly aggressively, the distance could be even less. 5) NOTAM 11/023 reports runway 18 is ungrooved from 1550 to 2490. NOTAM 11/024 reports runway 36 is ungrooved from 4610-5550 ft. This obviously would have an affect on stopping under most instrument conditions, ie, a wet runway. I respectfully submit the following recommendation: discontinue use of runway 18 for company operations due to the high terrain present under the normal glide path. This is a dangerous approach so prohibit it. If the use of runway 18 is not prohibited, then I make the following recommendations: 1) include a picture of the runway 18 and runway 36 approachs on the mandatory airport review pages. 2) include specific notes on the operations pages about the high terrain to the north giving radio altimeter readings of 80-100 ft, 1 mi north of the field. 3) restrict use of runway 18 to day VFR conditions only and require the localizer runway 18 approach be flown. 4) update the bhm page forthwith to show the PAPI for runway 18. To be blunt, I will not fly to this runway in the WX or to a wet runway. If it is the only runway open in those conditions I will divert. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter states that he has followed up with company, and they have issued a prohibition against using runways 18/36 except during day VFR conditions. He also stated that he did not see the rotating beacon on the hill approximately 1 mi from the runway. The GPWS indication did not show any red during the approach, but varied from green to amber. The first officer was flying the approach and the captain monitored the descent. He said that they did not exceed about 700 FPM rate throughout the final approach, and that after landing, both pilots debriefed their impressions to each other. They felt that they had taken prudent precautions, but that this approach was hazardous.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: F10 CREW CONCERNED ABOUT PROX TO TERRAIN ON APCH TO RWY 18 AT BHM.

Narrative: THE APCH TO RWY 18 AT BHM IS MARGINALLY SAFE AT BEST AND IS A SETUP FOR AN ACCIDENT AT WORST. RWY 5/23 WAS CLOSED FROM XA00Z TO XK00Z. AS A RESULT, WE BRIEFED THE LOC RWY 18 APCH. IT WAS MY FO'S LEG AND NEITHER OF US HAD FLOWN TO THIS RWY BEFORE. WE WERE BOTH ACUTELY AWARE OF THE HIGH TERRAIN TO THE N OF THE FIELD AND PAID PARTICULAR ATTN TO THAT FACT IN OUR APCH BRIEFING. THE ONLY DEPICTION OF THE HIGH TERRAIN IS ON THE ARPT PAGE. THE WX WAS CLR WITH EXCELLENT VISIBILITY. BHM APCH CLRED US FOR THE VISUAL BUT WE INDICATED WE WANTED TO INTERCEPT THE FINAL OUTSIDE OF BASKIN AND FLY THE FINAL PART OF THE LOC 18 APCH. ALTHOUGH NOT LISTED ON THE APCH PAGE, THERE IS A PAPI ON THE L SIDE OF RWY 18 WHICH HAS BEEN IN USE FOR ABOUT 1 YR. WE CALCULATED THE APPROPRIATE VDP BASED ON TIMING AS WELL AS ON THE IBXO DME. FROM THE VDP IT WAS CLR TO US THAT IF THE FIELD WAS NOT IN SIGHT AT THE 1300 FT ALT AT THE IBXO 3.3 DME, IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO COMPLETE THE APCH SAFELY. THE PAPI WAS VISIBLE FROM THE 3.3 DME AND WE BEGAN A 700 FPM DSCNT WHEN ON GS. THE FO AND I WERE BOTH BOTHERED BY THE CLOSE VISUAL PROX OF THE GND WHILE ON THE FINAL STAGES OF THE APCH. AT ABOUT 1 MI FROM TOUCHDOWN, A CAR PASSED UNDER US ON AN E/W ROAD. IT WAS BTWN 100 FT AND 80 FT AGL. I AGAIN VERIFIED VISUALLY THAT WE WERE ON THE PAPI GLIDE PATH AND THAT THE GLIDE PATH WAS VISUALLY CORRECT WITH THE RWY VISUAL PRESENTATION. IT WAS CLR THAT WE WERE CORRECT AND THE RADIO ALTIMETER THEN BEGAN TO SHOW THE GND DROPPING AWAY A BIT. WE PASSED OVER THE THRESHOLD AT 50 FT AGL HAVING BEEN CTRED ON THE GLIDE PATH THE ENTIRE TIME. BY USE OF THE FT SCALE AND THE GRAPHIC PRESENTATION ON THE ARPT PAGE, I BELIEVE THE RADIO ALTIMETER WAS ACCURATE AND THAT WE WERE ON OR EVEN SLIGHTLY ABOVE THE GLIDE PATH WHEN WE HAD THE 80-100 FT READING. HOW HIGH ARE THE TREES ON THAT HILL? ALTHOUGH THE APCH AND LNDG WERE UNEVENTFUL, THE FOLLOWING PROBS ARE PRESENTED: 1) THERE IS NO NOTE ABOUT THE EXTREMELY CLOSE PROX TO HIGH TERRAIN WHEN ON THIS APCH. THE MANDATORY ARPT REVIEW PAGE DOES NOT ADDRESS RWY 18 OR RWY 36. 2) THERE IS NO PAPI DEPICTED IN COMMERCIAL CHART DESPITE HAVING BEEN IN SVC FOR ABOUT 1 YR ACCORDING TO THE BHM TWR. 3) USING A 3 DEG GS AND AN AIM POINT 1000 FT DOWN RWY 18, THE 884 FT TERRAIN 4000 FT N OF THE FIELD CALCULATES TO A HT ABOVE GND OF LESS THAN 100 FT. TREES ARE OF COURSE NOT INCLUDED IN THIS CALCULATION. 4) RWY 18 SLOPES DOWN TO THE S AND COMPLICATES THE LNDG. A 7100 FT RWY MEANS A 6100 FT AREA TO STOP IN AND THE DOWNSLOPE TENDS TO HAVE THE EFFECT OF FALLING AWAY FROM AN ACFT IN THE FLARE. UNLESS YOU FLY IT ON TO THE RWY FAIRLY AGGRESSIVELY, THE DISTANCE COULD BE EVEN LESS. 5) NOTAM 11/023 RPTS RWY 18 IS UNGROOVED FROM 1550 TO 2490. NOTAM 11/024 RPTS RWY 36 IS UNGROOVED FROM 4610-5550 FT. THIS OBVIOUSLY WOULD HAVE AN AFFECT ON STOPPING UNDER MOST INST CONDITIONS, IE, A WET RWY. I RESPECTFULLY SUBMIT THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION: DISCONTINUE USE OF RWY 18 FOR COMPANY OPS DUE TO THE HIGH TERRAIN PRESENT UNDER THE NORMAL GLIDE PATH. THIS IS A DANGEROUS APCH SO PROHIBIT IT. IF THE USE OF RWY 18 IS NOT PROHIBITED, THEN I MAKE THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS: 1) INCLUDE A PICTURE OF THE RWY 18 AND RWY 36 APCHS ON THE MANDATORY ARPT REVIEW PAGES. 2) INCLUDE SPECIFIC NOTES ON THE OPS PAGES ABOUT THE HIGH TERRAIN TO THE N GIVING RADIO ALTIMETER READINGS OF 80-100 FT, 1 MI N OF THE FIELD. 3) RESTRICT USE OF RWY 18 TO DAY VFR CONDITIONS ONLY AND REQUIRE THE LOC RWY 18 APCH BE FLOWN. 4) UPDATE THE BHM PAGE FORTHWITH TO SHOW THE PAPI FOR RWY 18. TO BE BLUNT, I WILL NOT FLY TO THIS RWY IN THE WX OR TO A WET RWY. IF IT IS THE ONLY RWY OPEN IN THOSE CONDITIONS I WILL DIVERT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATES THAT HE HAS FOLLOWED UP WITH COMPANY, AND THEY HAVE ISSUED A PROHIBITION AGAINST USING RWYS 18/36 EXCEPT DURING DAY VFR CONDITIONS. HE ALSO STATED THAT HE DID NOT SEE THE ROTATING BEACON ON THE HILL APPROX 1 MI FROM THE RWY. THE GPWS INDICATION DID NOT SHOW ANY RED DURING THE APCH, BUT VARIED FROM GREEN TO AMBER. THE FO WAS FLYING THE APCH AND THE CAPT MONITORED THE DSCNT. HE SAID THAT THEY DID NOT EXCEED ABOUT 700 FPM RATE THROUGHOUT THE FINAL APCH, AND THAT AFTER LNDG, BOTH PLTS DEBRIEFED THEIR IMPRESSIONS TO EACH OTHER. THEY FELT THAT THEY HAD TAKEN PRUDENT PRECAUTIONS, BUT THAT THIS APCH WAS HAZARDOUS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.