Narrative:

I advised the controller that I had the field in sight, and was given clearance for the visual approach. I had extended a notch of flaps and dropped the gear at 110 KTS to slow down and increase my descent rate. The red gear unsafe light remained illuminated and the right main gear down green light failed to illuminate. I slowed further and cycled the gear up and back down, checking the circuit breaker in. The nose gear was visibly retracting and extending in the cowl mirror, but the same unsafe indications persisted. I advised the controller that I had a gear problem and asked to be vectored clear to troubleshoot. I was assigned an altitude and heading out over the lake. Once stable, I followed the emergency checklist in the afm to perform a manual extension at 85 KTS. I slowed to 80 KTS and worked the rudders, listening for any sign of actual right main extension. The unsafe light indications were still present. I retracted the flaps and reviewed the procedure again. At this point, the controller advised of a line of level 2 and 4 cells approaching the field from the west. I declared an emergency, requested the equipment, and explained my situation, fuel state, and souls on board. I reviewed these items with the controller again, and was given a heading to the airport, picked up the runway visually, and was cleared to land. Given the fact that I could not safely retract the gear, and that I had approximately 1 hour 50 mins of fuel remaining, and that the WX surrounding the airport would not permit orbiting VFR to burn additional fuel, I elected to land immediately. I advised the tower that I would continue and land on runway 28. They confirmed that my right main gear was not extended. At this point I was on short final, saw that the equipment was ready, and the tower issued a windshear perimeter alert for the west side of the airport. I could see that safe landing conditions would only be available for another several mins. I then decided to commit to a successful landing. I touched down at a lower than normal speed and held the right wing up using aileron control. After touching down and retarding the throttles I shut off the mixture controls and feathered the propellers. I shut off the magnetos and all electrical switches, and closed the fuel controls prior to allowing the right wing to slowly settle under aileron control. Since the wind was blowing hard from the southwest I was able to slow the aircraft without brakes and hold the wing up for a long time. The propellers feathered and did not strike the asphalt. I was able to use nosewheel steering and tried to gently aim at a wide taxiway in front of me to clear the runway at a slow speed. The aircraft stopped in the taxiway and I exited the copilot's door after checking all switches in the off position. I was not injured. This incident and damage to the aircraft could have been avoided by proper repair of the landing gear. The gear hinges appeared on initial post-incident mechanical inspection to have been improperly installed, but this problem was not visible on preflight. The hinges appeared normal on preflight. I do not understand why the gear test on jacks and test flight would not have demonstrated this problem prior to my flight. Under the circumstances I believe that all of my decisions following the gear malfunction were correct and appropriate. Once manually extended, the gear should not have been retracted. The nearest similar crash rescue coverage was available at albany, through lowering WX and possible convective activity. I did not want to consider other runways at syr due to the strong wind and approaching rain showers, and I did not favor landing on the grass, as that surface could not have been known to be smooth in advance of my landing. Since the runway in front of me was the only one available without windshear and heavy rain for another several mins, I believe that the choice I made to land immediately was mandatory.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PIPER SENECA LANDS SYR IN EMER CONDITION WITH PARTIAL GEAR UP.

Narrative: I ADVISED THE CTLR THAT I HAD THE FIELD IN SIGHT, AND WAS GIVEN CLRNC FOR THE VISUAL APCH. I HAD EXTENDED A NOTCH OF FLAPS AND DROPPED THE GEAR AT 110 KTS TO SLOW DOWN AND INCREASE MY DSCNT RATE. THE RED GEAR UNSAFE LIGHT REMAINED ILLUMINATED AND THE R MAIN GEAR DOWN GREEN LIGHT FAILED TO ILLUMINATE. I SLOWED FURTHER AND CYCLED THE GEAR UP AND BACK DOWN, CHKING THE CIRCUIT BREAKER IN. THE NOSE GEAR WAS VISIBLY RETRACTING AND EXTENDING IN THE COWL MIRROR, BUT THE SAME UNSAFE INDICATIONS PERSISTED. I ADVISED THE CTLR THAT I HAD A GEAR PROB AND ASKED TO BE VECTORED CLR TO TROUBLESHOOT. I WAS ASSIGNED AN ALT AND HEADING OUT OVER THE LAKE. ONCE STABLE, I FOLLOWED THE EMER CHKLIST IN THE AFM TO PERFORM A MANUAL EXTENSION AT 85 KTS. I SLOWED TO 80 KTS AND WORKED THE RUDDERS, LISTENING FOR ANY SIGN OF ACTUAL R MAIN EXTENSION. THE UNSAFE LIGHT INDICATIONS WERE STILL PRESENT. I RETRACTED THE FLAPS AND REVIEWED THE PROC AGAIN. AT THIS POINT, THE CTLR ADVISED OF A LINE OF LEVEL 2 AND 4 CELLS APCHING THE FIELD FROM THE W. I DECLARED AN EMER, REQUESTED THE EQUIP, AND EXPLAINED MY SIT, FUEL STATE, AND SOULS ON BOARD. I REVIEWED THESE ITEMS WITH THE CTLR AGAIN, AND WAS GIVEN A HEADING TO THE ARPT, PICKED UP THE RWY VISUALLY, AND WAS CLRED TO LAND. GIVEN THE FACT THAT I COULD NOT SAFELY RETRACT THE GEAR, AND THAT I HAD APPROX 1 HR 50 MINS OF FUEL REMAINING, AND THAT THE WX SURROUNDING THE ARPT WOULD NOT PERMIT ORBITING VFR TO BURN ADDITIONAL FUEL, I ELECTED TO LAND IMMEDIATELY. I ADVISED THE TWR THAT I WOULD CONTINUE AND LAND ON RWY 28. THEY CONFIRMED THAT MY R MAIN GEAR WAS NOT EXTENDED. AT THIS POINT I WAS ON SHORT FINAL, SAW THAT THE EQUIP WAS READY, AND THE TWR ISSUED A WINDSHEAR PERIMETER ALERT FOR THE W SIDE OF THE ARPT. I COULD SEE THAT SAFE LNDG CONDITIONS WOULD ONLY BE AVAILABLE FOR ANOTHER SEVERAL MINS. I THEN DECIDED TO COMMIT TO A SUCCESSFUL LNDG. I TOUCHED DOWN AT A LOWER THAN NORMAL SPD AND HELD THE R WING UP USING AILERON CTL. AFTER TOUCHING DOWN AND RETARDING THE THROTTLES I SHUT OFF THE MIXTURE CTLS AND FEATHERED THE PROPS. I SHUT OFF THE MAGNETOS AND ALL ELECTRICAL SWITCHES, AND CLOSED THE FUEL CTLS PRIOR TO ALLOWING THE R WING TO SLOWLY SETTLE UNDER AILERON CTL. SINCE THE WIND WAS BLOWING HARD FROM THE SW I WAS ABLE TO SLOW THE ACFT WITHOUT BRAKES AND HOLD THE WING UP FOR A LONG TIME. THE PROPS FEATHERED AND DID NOT STRIKE THE ASPHALT. I WAS ABLE TO USE NOSEWHEEL STEERING AND TRIED TO GENTLY AIM AT A WIDE TXWY IN FRONT OF ME TO CLR THE RWY AT A SLOW SPD. THE ACFT STOPPED IN THE TXWY AND I EXITED THE COPLT'S DOOR AFTER CHKING ALL SWITCHES IN THE OFF POS. I WAS NOT INJURED. THIS INCIDENT AND DAMAGE TO THE ACFT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED BY PROPER REPAIR OF THE LNDG GEAR. THE GEAR HINGES APPEARED ON INITIAL POST-INCIDENT MECHANICAL INSPECTION TO HAVE BEEN IMPROPERLY INSTALLED, BUT THIS PROB WAS NOT VISIBLE ON PREFLT. THE HINGES APPEARED NORMAL ON PREFLT. I DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE GEAR TEST ON JACKS AND TEST FLT WOULD NOT HAVE DEMONSTRATED THIS PROB PRIOR TO MY FLT. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES I BELIEVE THAT ALL OF MY DECISIONS FOLLOWING THE GEAR MALFUNCTION WERE CORRECT AND APPROPRIATE. ONCE MANUALLY EXTENDED, THE GEAR SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN RETRACTED. THE NEAREST SIMILAR CRASH RESCUE COVERAGE WAS AVAILABLE AT ALBANY, THROUGH LOWERING WX AND POSSIBLE CONVECTIVE ACTIVITY. I DID NOT WANT TO CONSIDER OTHER RWYS AT SYR DUE TO THE STRONG WIND AND APCHING RAIN SHOWERS, AND I DID NOT FAVOR LNDG ON THE GRASS, AS THAT SURFACE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN KNOWN TO BE SMOOTH IN ADVANCE OF MY LNDG. SINCE THE RWY IN FRONT OF ME WAS THE ONLY ONE AVAILABLE WITHOUT WINDSHEAR AND HVY RAIN FOR ANOTHER SEVERAL MINS, I BELIEVE THAT THE CHOICE I MADE TO LAND IMMEDIATELY WAS MANDATORY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.