Narrative:

Upon staring the takeoff roll from smf runway 34L, we got a takeoff aural warning for the trim on the elevator trim tab. We aborted the takeoff at about 40 KTS. The events that led to this abort were that my first officer that I normally fly with was gone for this trip and I was assigned a new first officer for this trip sequence. The new first officer prepared the manifest voluntarily. I conducted the taxi checklist. His complacency and relaxed attitude resulted in his missing the trim setting 3 times in the SOP. He was not following the flows or procedures outlined in the SOP. I failed in my duties to watch him conduct the required checklists. I was in the 'mode' of flying with my normal first officer and assumed that this new first officer was up to PAR with my regularly assigned first officer. I was wrong, which was evident in his conduct over the next few days.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB120 LOW SPD ABORT AT SMF.

Narrative: UPON STARING THE TKOF ROLL FROM SMF RWY 34L, WE GOT A TKOF AURAL WARNING FOR THE TRIM ON THE ELEVATOR TRIM TAB. WE ABORTED THE TKOF AT ABOUT 40 KTS. THE EVENTS THAT LED TO THIS ABORT WERE THAT MY FO THAT I NORMALLY FLY WITH WAS GONE FOR THIS TRIP AND I WAS ASSIGNED A NEW FO FOR THIS TRIP SEQUENCE. THE NEW FO PREPARED THE MANIFEST VOLUNTARILY. I CONDUCTED THE TAXI CHKLIST. HIS COMPLACENCY AND RELAXED ATTITUDE RESULTED IN HIS MISSING THE TRIM SETTING 3 TIMES IN THE SOP. HE WAS NOT FOLLOWING THE FLOWS OR PROCS OUTLINED IN THE SOP. I FAILED IN MY DUTIES TO WATCH HIM CONDUCT THE REQUIRED CHKLISTS. I WAS IN THE 'MODE' OF FLYING WITH MY NORMAL FO AND ASSUMED THAT THIS NEW FO WAS UP TO PAR WITH MY REGULARLY ASSIGNED FO. I WAS WRONG, WHICH WAS EVIDENT IN HIS CONDUCT OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.