Narrative:

During start of #2 engine in DC9-30, I missed the ignition on during the reading of the checklist. During pushback I got involved with the call of the time off the gate and again missed that the ignition switch was not on during my 'silent flow' to check switches. When I advanced the fuel control lever, there was no light off. Instead of clearing the engine as trained, I just inadvertently let go of the starter and failed to retard the fuel control lever. I planned to 'clear' the #2 engine after starting the #1 engine. When I put on the ignition switch to start the #1 engine, a fire started in the #2 engine that was still getting fuel and now ignition. I retarded the fuel control lever and then discharged both fire extinguisher bottles into the #2 engine because the ground crew indicated that the fire was still going. The fire stopped shortly thereafter. I think a way to reduce the occurrence of this event would be for the 'time call' off the gate be made later in the taxi out sequence. Also, one should not allow so many distrs to happen right when a start is initiated. Supplemental information from acn 430937: I believe the problem arose by the captain failing to place the ignition switch to 'on' in the beginning of the checklist and for myself for not xchking his work. Also, for the captain in failing to perform a clearing of engine after an abort start. I should have watched for the captain's actions of fuel control ignition and clearing of engine. Maintenance changed both fire bottles, performed a brief inspection, a run-up and we flew the aircraft out later that day. No damage to aircraft or engine. Contributing factors: some airlines use both pilots to start engines. My airline allows the captain only. The first officer is to monitor. I think if both pilots start engines this might not have occurred.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR DC9-30 CREW HAD THE #2 ENG CATCH ON FIRE DURING THE START WHEN THEY TURNED ON THE IGNITION SOME TIME AFTER THE FUEL LEVER WAS PLACED INTO THE 'ON' POS.

Narrative: DURING START OF #2 ENG IN DC9-30, I MISSED THE IGNITION ON DURING THE READING OF THE CHKLIST. DURING PUSHBACK I GOT INVOLVED WITH THE CALL OF THE TIME OFF THE GATE AND AGAIN MISSED THAT THE IGNITION SWITCH WAS NOT ON DURING MY 'SILENT FLOW' TO CHK SWITCHES. WHEN I ADVANCED THE FUEL CTL LEVER, THERE WAS NO LIGHT OFF. INSTEAD OF CLRING THE ENG AS TRAINED, I JUST INADVERTENTLY LET GO OF THE STARTER AND FAILED TO RETARD THE FUEL CTL LEVER. I PLANNED TO 'CLR' THE #2 ENG AFTER STARTING THE #1 ENG. WHEN I PUT ON THE IGNITION SWITCH TO START THE #1 ENG, A FIRE STARTED IN THE #2 ENG THAT WAS STILL GETTING FUEL AND NOW IGNITION. I RETARDED THE FUEL CTL LEVER AND THEN DISCHARGED BOTH FIRE EXTINGUISHER BOTTLES INTO THE #2 ENG BECAUSE THE GND CREW INDICATED THAT THE FIRE WAS STILL GOING. THE FIRE STOPPED SHORTLY THEREAFTER. I THINK A WAY TO REDUCE THE OCCURRENCE OF THIS EVENT WOULD BE FOR THE 'TIME CALL' OFF THE GATE BE MADE LATER IN THE TAXI OUT SEQUENCE. ALSO, ONE SHOULD NOT ALLOW SO MANY DISTRS TO HAPPEN RIGHT WHEN A START IS INITIATED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 430937: I BELIEVE THE PROB AROSE BY THE CAPT FAILING TO PLACE THE IGNITION SWITCH TO 'ON' IN THE BEGINNING OF THE CHKLIST AND FOR MYSELF FOR NOT XCHKING HIS WORK. ALSO, FOR THE CAPT IN FAILING TO PERFORM A CLRING OF ENG AFTER AN ABORT START. I SHOULD HAVE WATCHED FOR THE CAPT'S ACTIONS OF FUEL CTL IGNITION AND CLRING OF ENG. MAINT CHANGED BOTH FIRE BOTTLES, PERFORMED A BRIEF INSPECTION, A RUN-UP AND WE FLEW THE ACFT OUT LATER THAT DAY. NO DAMAGE TO ACFT OR ENG. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: SOME AIRLINES USE BOTH PLTS TO START ENGS. MY AIRLINE ALLOWS THE CAPT ONLY. THE FO IS TO MONITOR. I THINK IF BOTH PLTS START ENGS THIS MIGHT NOT HAVE OCCURRED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.