Narrative:

At night, in light rain with reduced visibility, we were operating a delayed flight. At the beginning of the flight, I briefed the first officer 'don't let me rush you -- if you need more time, let me know and we'll take more time.' first officer had 70 hours on the airplane, and did a very good job, but was slow in checklist accomplishment. We were expecting departure on runway 4L with a fairly long wait for takeoff. At the last min our departure runway was changed to runway 9. Completed the before takeoff checklist on the departure runway, and I did not realize the cabin PA announcement 'flight attendants be seated for departure' had not been made. We took off before the 2 flight attendants in the main cabin were seated at their assigned stations. When they realized we had begun our takeoff roll, they immediately sat down where they were at the time. Even though it was not my intention to conduct a rushed operation, I allowed last min occurrences to compromise safety. A lead flight attendant with only 4 trips to her credit, 2 flight attendants on their first trip, and a low time first officer should have raised a red flag to me. We were fortunate no one was hurt. This experience once again points to the need for good communication, and to the absolute requirement for taking one's time and not allowing time pressure to affect the operation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 FAILS TO MAKE CABIN ANNOUNCEMENT PRIOR TO TKOF AT BOS.

Narrative: AT NIGHT, IN LIGHT RAIN WITH REDUCED VISIBILITY, WE WERE OPERATING A DELAYED FLT. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE FLT, I BRIEFED THE FO 'DON'T LET ME RUSH YOU -- IF YOU NEED MORE TIME, LET ME KNOW AND WE'LL TAKE MORE TIME.' FO HAD 70 HRS ON THE AIRPLANE, AND DID A VERY GOOD JOB, BUT WAS SLOW IN CHKLIST ACCOMPLISHMENT. WE WERE EXPECTING DEP ON RWY 4L WITH A FAIRLY LONG WAIT FOR TKOF. AT THE LAST MIN OUR DEP RWY WAS CHANGED TO RWY 9. COMPLETED THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST ON THE DEP RWY, AND I DID NOT REALIZE THE CABIN PA ANNOUNCEMENT 'FLT ATTENDANTS BE SEATED FOR DEP' HAD NOT BEEN MADE. WE TOOK OFF BEFORE THE 2 FLT ATTENDANTS IN THE MAIN CABIN WERE SEATED AT THEIR ASSIGNED STATIONS. WHEN THEY REALIZED WE HAD BEGUN OUR TKOF ROLL, THEY IMMEDIATELY SAT DOWN WHERE THEY WERE AT THE TIME. EVEN THOUGH IT WAS NOT MY INTENTION TO CONDUCT A RUSHED OP, I ALLOWED LAST MIN OCCURRENCES TO COMPROMISE SAFETY. A LEAD FLT ATTENDANT WITH ONLY 4 TRIPS TO HER CREDIT, 2 FLT ATTENDANTS ON THEIR FIRST TRIP, AND A LOW TIME FO SHOULD HAVE RAISED A RED FLAG TO ME. WE WERE FORTUNATE NO ONE WAS HURT. THIS EXPERIENCE ONCE AGAIN POINTS TO THE NEED FOR GOOD COM, AND TO THE ABSOLUTE REQUIREMENT FOR TAKING ONE'S TIME AND NOT ALLOWING TIME PRESSURE TO AFFECT THE OP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.