Narrative:

On aug/fri/98, the captain, the crew, and myself were to show at XA44 for the flight departing out of ZZZ. Upon arriving at the airport, we were informed of an XE00 advise time due to maintenance. At approximately XE00 the captain and myself went to the aircraft. We decided to accomplish the preflight preparations in the interest of expediting the already delayed flight even though the mechanic was still working on the left wheel. I performed the walkaround according to standard company preflight procedures. At this time the mechanic was still finishing up his work on the left wheel. I then went into the cockpit with the captain to get ready for the taxi test. At approximately XE30 the mechanic boarded the plane and closed the forward door so we could perform the high speed taxi test. The mechanic occupied the jump seat in order to brief us on what to look for and to monitor the test. After we contacted operations to push us back, we obtained the proper clrncs to conduct the high speed taxi. We returned to the gate and the mechanic signed off the aircraft logbook approving the plane for return to service. After we departed the runway and while on initial climb out, we noted a green light indication on the left wheel. We consulted the emergency and abnormal checklists to see if there was a procedure for this indication. We found there was none and then decided to return for landing to determine the problem. When contacting operations to let them know of our intentions, they conferred with the mechanic and concluded the mechanic working on the airplane must have left the gear pin in. Upon blocking in the captain decided not to continue further flight for that evening so that all the proper maintenance inspections could be accomplished. There are a few factors that I believe contributed to this occurrence even though I will not use them as excuses. First off, I know the crew was tired from waiting around the airport for 3 hours not knowing if the flight would be delayed even longer. There was concern we would be up all night and then return from yng in the morning with no sleep. Secondly, the mechanic should have remembered the gear pin he inserted while working on the wheel. Also, the captain should have briefed me on the possibility of a gear pin being inserted due to maintenance on the wheel. Additionally, the gear pins should be stored in the cockpit in a more organized way. Currently, they are just tossed in a cubbyhole and no one wants to pick them up to count them since they are very greasy. I have learned from this incident not to assume that any particular employee will do everything their job entails. I should not have been concerned about getting in the way of the mechanic while I was conducting the preflight. I should also not assume the captain would recognize all sits where something could be overlooked.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A BAE-ATP ON INITIAL CLB AT 500 FT RETURNED TO THE FIELD DUE TO UNABLE TO RETRACT THE L LNDG GEAR CAUSED BY A GEAR PIN LEFT INSTALLED AFTER MAINT.

Narrative: ON AUG/FRI/98, THE CAPT, THE CREW, AND MYSELF WERE TO SHOW AT XA44 FOR THE FLT DEPARTING OUT OF ZZZ. UPON ARRIVING AT THE ARPT, WE WERE INFORMED OF AN XE00 ADVISE TIME DUE TO MAINT. AT APPROX XE00 THE CAPT AND MYSELF WENT TO THE ACFT. WE DECIDED TO ACCOMPLISH THE PREFLT PREPARATIONS IN THE INTEREST OF EXPEDITING THE ALREADY DELAYED FLT EVEN THOUGH THE MECH WAS STILL WORKING ON THE L WHEEL. I PERFORMED THE WALKAROUND ACCORDING TO STANDARD COMPANY PREFLT PROCS. AT THIS TIME THE MECH WAS STILL FINISHING UP HIS WORK ON THE L WHEEL. I THEN WENT INTO THE COCKPIT WITH THE CAPT TO GET READY FOR THE TAXI TEST. AT APPROX XE30 THE MECH BOARDED THE PLANE AND CLOSED THE FORWARD DOOR SO WE COULD PERFORM THE HIGH SPD TAXI TEST. THE MECH OCCUPIED THE JUMP SEAT IN ORDER TO BRIEF US ON WHAT TO LOOK FOR AND TO MONITOR THE TEST. AFTER WE CONTACTED OPS TO PUSH US BACK, WE OBTAINED THE PROPER CLRNCS TO CONDUCT THE HIGH SPD TAXI. WE RETURNED TO THE GATE AND THE MECH SIGNED OFF THE ACFT LOGBOOK APPROVING THE PLANE FOR RETURN TO SVC. AFTER WE DEPARTED THE RWY AND WHILE ON INITIAL CLBOUT, WE NOTED A GREEN LIGHT INDICATION ON THE L WHEEL. WE CONSULTED THE EMER AND ABNORMAL CHKLISTS TO SEE IF THERE WAS A PROC FOR THIS INDICATION. WE FOUND THERE WAS NONE AND THEN DECIDED TO RETURN FOR LNDG TO DETERMINE THE PROB. WHEN CONTACTING OPS TO LET THEM KNOW OF OUR INTENTIONS, THEY CONFERRED WITH THE MECH AND CONCLUDED THE MECH WORKING ON THE AIRPLANE MUST HAVE LEFT THE GEAR PIN IN. UPON BLOCKING IN THE CAPT DECIDED NOT TO CONTINUE FURTHER FLT FOR THAT EVENING SO THAT ALL THE PROPER MAINT INSPECTIONS COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED. THERE ARE A FEW FACTORS THAT I BELIEVE CONTRIBUTED TO THIS OCCURRENCE EVEN THOUGH I WILL NOT USE THEM AS EXCUSES. FIRST OFF, I KNOW THE CREW WAS TIRED FROM WAITING AROUND THE ARPT FOR 3 HRS NOT KNOWING IF THE FLT WOULD BE DELAYED EVEN LONGER. THERE WAS CONCERN WE WOULD BE UP ALL NIGHT AND THEN RETURN FROM YNG IN THE MORNING WITH NO SLEEP. SECONDLY, THE MECH SHOULD HAVE REMEMBERED THE GEAR PIN HE INSERTED WHILE WORKING ON THE WHEEL. ALSO, THE CAPT SHOULD HAVE BRIEFED ME ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A GEAR PIN BEING INSERTED DUE TO MAINT ON THE WHEEL. ADDITIONALLY, THE GEAR PINS SHOULD BE STORED IN THE COCKPIT IN A MORE ORGANIZED WAY. CURRENTLY, THEY ARE JUST TOSSED IN A CUBBYHOLE AND NO ONE WANTS TO PICK THEM UP TO COUNT THEM SINCE THEY ARE VERY GREASY. I HAVE LEARNED FROM THIS INCIDENT NOT TO ASSUME THAT ANY PARTICULAR EMPLOYEE WILL DO EVERYTHING THEIR JOB ENTAILS. I SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONCERNED ABOUT GETTING IN THE WAY OF THE MECH WHILE I WAS CONDUCTING THE PREFLT. I SHOULD ALSO NOT ASSUME THE CAPT WOULD RECOGNIZE ALL SITS WHERE SOMETHING COULD BE OVERLOOKED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.