 |
37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
An air carrier ATR42 flight crew has an near midair collision with a DC6 freighter aircraft during climb. The tower had issued an altitude assignment of 10000 ft, but unknown to the tower and flight crew, the ARTCC controller wanted them to hold 3000 ft.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 400911 |
| Time | |
| Date | 199804 |
| Day | Wed |
| Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | airport : msdq |
| State Reference | FO |
| Altitude | msl bound lower : 5500 msl bound upper : 5500 |
| Environment | |
| Flight Conditions | VMC |
| Light | Daylight |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Controlling Facilities | artcc : mdcs |
| Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
| Make Model Name | ATR 42 |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
| Navigation In Use | Other Other |
| Flight Phase | climbout : intermediate altitude |
| Route In Use | departure other |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Aircraft 2 | |
| Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
| Make Model Name | McDonnell Douglas Undifferentiated or Other Model |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
| Flight Phase | descent other |
| Route In Use | arrival other |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Person 1 | |
| Affiliation | company : air carrier |
| Function | flight crew : first officer |
| Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : atp |
| Experience | flight time last 90 days : 240 flight time total : 2200 flight time type : 1050 |
| ASRS Report | 400911 |
| Person 2 | |
| Affiliation | company : air carrier |
| Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
| Qualification | pilot : atp |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | conflict : nmac |
| Independent Detector | aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : unspecified other controllera other flight crewa |
| Resolutory Action | flight crew : took evasive action |
| Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew |
| Miss Distance | horizontal : 200 vertical : 200 |
| Supplementary | |
| Primary Problem | ATC Human Performance |
| Air Traffic Incident | other |
| Situations | |
| ATC Facility | procedure or policy : unspecified |
Narrative:
Shortly after takeoff from mdpc, in the dominican republic on an air carrier flight to san juan international airport, we had to respond to a TCASII RA. We waited more than the usual to contact santo domingo control center due to after takeoff duties. The aircraft was very light in weight so we had a good climb rate. By the time that we contacted santo domingo center we already had taken evasive action. We found out later that the center controller wanted us to stop the climb at 3000 ft after departure due to crossing traffic. Santo domingo center was aware of the potential situation and, to my understanding, never vectored the other traffic around us. Also, if santo domingo knew about the conflict, they should never have cleared us to climb unrestr to 10000 ft initially. Contributing factors: no standard instrument departure procedure in this airport. No tower to center coordinate with respect to inbound and outbound traffic. Our late frequency change to center. Recommendations: establish a tower vertical jurisdiction for IFR traffic. Better traffic coordination between tower and center. Create a standard instrument departure procedure. Flight safety can enormously be enhanced if the above recommendations are made. Some other airports under ICAO rules, in the caribbean have the same problem. The other aircraft was a DC6, cargo aircraft, en route to santo domingo.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: AN ACR ATR42 FLC HAS AN NMAC WITH A DC6 FREIGHTER ACFT DURING CLB. THE TWR HAD ISSUED AN ALT ASSIGNMENT OF 10000 FT, BUT UNKNOWN TO THE TWR AND FLC, THE ARTCC CTLR WANTED THEM TO HOLD 3000 FT.
Narrative: SHORTLY AFTER TKOF FROM MDPC, IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC ON AN ACR FLT TO SAN JUAN INTL ARPT, WE HAD TO RESPOND TO A TCASII RA. WE WAITED MORE THAN THE USUAL TO CONTACT SANTO DOMINGO CTL CTR DUE TO AFTER TKOF DUTIES. THE ACFT WAS VERY LIGHT IN WT SO WE HAD A GOOD CLB RATE. BY THE TIME THAT WE CONTACTED SANTO DOMINGO CTR WE ALREADY HAD TAKEN EVASIVE ACTION. WE FOUND OUT LATER THAT THE CTR CTLR WANTED US TO STOP THE CLB AT 3000 FT AFTER DEP DUE TO XING TFC. SANTO DOMINGO CTR WAS AWARE OF THE POTENTIAL SIT AND, TO MY UNDERSTANDING, NEVER VECTORED THE OTHER TFC AROUND US. ALSO, IF SANTO DOMINGO KNEW ABOUT THE CONFLICT, THEY SHOULD NEVER HAVE CLRED US TO CLB UNRESTR TO 10000 FT INITIALLY. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: NO STANDARD INST DEP PROC IN THIS ARPT. NO TWR TO CENTER COORDINATE WITH RESPECT TO INBOUND AND OUTBOUND TFC. OUR LATE FREQ CHANGE TO CTR. RECOMMENDATIONS: ESTABLISH A TWR VERT JURISDICTION FOR IFR TFC. BETTER TFC COORD BTWN TWR AND CTR. CREATE A STANDARD INST DEP PROC. FLT SAFETY CAN ENORMOUSLY BE ENHANCED IF THE ABOVE RECOMMENDATIONS ARE MADE. SOME OTHER ARPTS UNDER ICAO RULES, IN THE CARIBBEAN HAVE THE SAME PROB. THE OTHER ACFT WAS A DC6, CARGO ACFT, ENRTE TO SANTO DOMINGO.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.