Narrative:

I planned a VFR flight from ewb direct to bcb, intending to overfly the class B airspaces over jfk airport, phl, bwi, then dca and iad, etc. The planned altitude was 8500 ft until the phl area, then 10500 ft for bwi and dca. Navigation was to be primarily yoke-mounted garmin global positioning system (GPS, with moving map) supplemented with current VFR charts. IFR charts were available if WX necessitated an air-filed IFR flight plan. FSS indicated that, though the WX was expected to be VFR, very strong headwinds were expected for the first half of flight, lessening thereafter to the destination. The initial phase of the flight was normal and as planned. However, approaching long island it became necessary to climb to and cruise at 12500 ft to maintain VFR until southwest of phl, where improving WX allowed descent to cruise at 10500 ft until southeast of the dca area. This extended period of flight above 10000 ft may have become a contributing factor in this event, as by the time I arrived over the dca area (the event location), I had been flying above 10000 ft in excess of 3 hours. Following departure from ewb, I had no communication with any ATC until my arrival in the cho area. While en route, I noticed that, according to the GPS, the headwinds were stronger and more persistent than forecast. Approximately over the bwi area, it became clear to me that there was insufficient fuel to safely continue to bcb, and I therefore decided to land at cho, which was nearly on the original course line to bcb and 1 hour flying time closer. The new course line direct to cho required a slight course change to the south which, as I approached within 10-15 mi of dca, I noticed (on the GPS moving map) took me adjacent to P56 (the event location). As I approached to within 3 or 4 mi of the P56 circle, I took what I believed to be adequate corrective action by altering course to the left (south) in order to avoid P56 by approximately 1/2 mi, again according to information shown on the GPS moving map. Over the washington area, it was night and the WX was clear with unrestr visibility. The remainder of the flight to cho was uneventful. At the time I felt I had avoided P56 by a sufficient margin, and it was not until landing at cho and being requested by cho tower to call dca TRACON that I began to realize there might be a problem. Human performance considerations: it is clear in retrospect that, during this flight, I was complacent about the concerns of flying in the vicinity of special-use airspace and particularly the P56 prohibited area. The factors contributing to this complacency may have included mild hypoxia, as I mentioned above. I have used my garmin GPS 90 for over 2 yrs and have come to be amazed by its horizontal accuracy -- almost always better than 1/10 of a mi. However, in this instance, what appeared to be a 'miss' of 1/2 mi on the GPS moving map was apparently no miss at all, which points to the fact that the unit is capable of significant error. In retrospect, it's clear that I have taken the GPS' accuracy very much for granted. The effect of the strong headwind on the progress of the flight was also a factor, as I was concerned about my fuel status and was anxious to fly as direct a route as possible to cho. (I had only 1 1/2 hours of fuel left when I arrived in cho, which is very low by my standards.) in the future, I plan to give prohibited use airspace a much wider margin of avoidance. In addition, I will use the information provided by the GPS much more conservatively. And finally, any time I fly for over 1 hour above 8000-10000 ft, I must assume and take into account that hypoxia will be a factor in my performance. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter states that he has been interviewed twice by secret service personnel. Once by phone for about 2 hours and the second in person by 2 secret service people. There has been no FAA follow up. He feels that there is a possibility that an error could occur due to the lack of updating of the database. He has had the unit for about 1 1/2 yrs with no update. He also is sure that his high altitude flight could be part of his own error. He would normally file IFR but wanted to get home without detouring and WX was good VFR. Even though he did not communication with anyone he did listen in on each of the facilities as he was flying over. He always uses LORAN as back up when he flies and is really at a loss to understand why he encroached on the prohibited area. Another thought is that as an unidented aircraft, with no communication, he was definitely suspect so near the prohibited area. He now feels it is a good idea to keep in contact even when VFR.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT OF C177RG FLIES VFR WITH NO ATC CONTACT FROM EWB, MA, TO BCB, VA, AND APPARENTLY ENTERS P56 AIRSPACE. HE IS NOTIFIED ON LNDG AT CHO WHERE HE DIVERTED FOR FUEL CONCERNS.

Narrative: I PLANNED A VFR FLT FROM EWB DIRECT TO BCB, INTENDING TO OVERFLY THE CLASS B AIRSPACES OVER JFK ARPT, PHL, BWI, THEN DCA AND IAD, ETC. THE PLANNED ALT WAS 8500 FT UNTIL THE PHL AREA, THEN 10500 FT FOR BWI AND DCA. NAV WAS TO BE PRIMARILY YOKE-MOUNTED GARMIN GLOBAL POSITIONING SYS (GPS, WITH MOVING MAP) SUPPLEMENTED WITH CURRENT VFR CHARTS. IFR CHARTS WERE AVAILABLE IF WX NECESSITATED AN AIR-FILED IFR FLT PLAN. FSS INDICATED THAT, THOUGH THE WX WAS EXPECTED TO BE VFR, VERY STRONG HEADWINDS WERE EXPECTED FOR THE FIRST HALF OF FLT, LESSENING THEREAFTER TO THE DEST. THE INITIAL PHASE OF THE FLT WAS NORMAL AND AS PLANNED. HOWEVER, APCHING LONG ISLAND IT BECAME NECESSARY TO CLB TO AND CRUISE AT 12500 FT TO MAINTAIN VFR UNTIL SW OF PHL, WHERE IMPROVING WX ALLOWED DSCNT TO CRUISE AT 10500 FT UNTIL SE OF THE DCA AREA. THIS EXTENDED PERIOD OF FLT ABOVE 10000 FT MAY HAVE BECOME A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN THIS EVENT, AS BY THE TIME I ARRIVED OVER THE DCA AREA (THE EVENT LOCATION), I HAD BEEN FLYING ABOVE 10000 FT IN EXCESS OF 3 HRS. FOLLOWING DEP FROM EWB, I HAD NO COM WITH ANY ATC UNTIL MY ARR IN THE CHO AREA. WHILE ENRTE, I NOTICED THAT, ACCORDING TO THE GPS, THE HEADWINDS WERE STRONGER AND MORE PERSISTENT THAN FORECAST. APPROX OVER THE BWI AREA, IT BECAME CLR TO ME THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT FUEL TO SAFELY CONTINUE TO BCB, AND I THEREFORE DECIDED TO LAND AT CHO, WHICH WAS NEARLY ON THE ORIGINAL COURSE LINE TO BCB AND 1 HR FLYING TIME CLOSER. THE NEW COURSE LINE DIRECT TO CHO REQUIRED A SLIGHT COURSE CHANGE TO THE S WHICH, AS I APCHED WITHIN 10-15 MI OF DCA, I NOTICED (ON THE GPS MOVING MAP) TOOK ME ADJACENT TO P56 (THE EVENT LOCATION). AS I APCHED TO WITHIN 3 OR 4 MI OF THE P56 CIRCLE, I TOOK WHAT I BELIEVED TO BE ADEQUATE CORRECTIVE ACTION BY ALTERING COURSE TO THE L (S) IN ORDER TO AVOID P56 BY APPROX 1/2 MI, AGAIN ACCORDING TO INFO SHOWN ON THE GPS MOVING MAP. OVER THE WASHINGTON AREA, IT WAS NIGHT AND THE WX WAS CLR WITH UNRESTR VISIBILITY. THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT TO CHO WAS UNEVENTFUL. AT THE TIME I FELT I HAD AVOIDED P56 BY A SUFFICIENT MARGIN, AND IT WAS NOT UNTIL LNDG AT CHO AND BEING REQUESTED BY CHO TWR TO CALL DCA TRACON THAT I BEGAN TO REALIZE THERE MIGHT BE A PROB. HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS: IT IS CLR IN RETROSPECT THAT, DURING THIS FLT, I WAS COMPLACENT ABOUT THE CONCERNS OF FLYING IN THE VICINITY OF SPECIAL-USE AIRSPACE AND PARTICULARLY THE P56 PROHIBITED AREA. THE FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THIS COMPLACENCY MAY HAVE INCLUDED MILD HYPOXIA, AS I MENTIONED ABOVE. I HAVE USED MY GARMIN GPS 90 FOR OVER 2 YRS AND HAVE COME TO BE AMAZED BY ITS HORIZ ACCURACY -- ALMOST ALWAYS BETTER THAN 1/10 OF A MI. HOWEVER, IN THIS INSTANCE, WHAT APPEARED TO BE A 'MISS' OF 1/2 MI ON THE GPS MOVING MAP WAS APPARENTLY NO MISS AT ALL, WHICH POINTS TO THE FACT THAT THE UNIT IS CAPABLE OF SIGNIFICANT ERROR. IN RETROSPECT, IT'S CLR THAT I HAVE TAKEN THE GPS' ACCURACY VERY MUCH FOR GRANTED. THE EFFECT OF THE STRONG HEADWIND ON THE PROGRESS OF THE FLT WAS ALSO A FACTOR, AS I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT MY FUEL STATUS AND WAS ANXIOUS TO FLY AS DIRECT A RTE AS POSSIBLE TO CHO. (I HAD ONLY 1 1/2 HRS OF FUEL LEFT WHEN I ARRIVED IN CHO, WHICH IS VERY LOW BY MY STANDARDS.) IN THE FUTURE, I PLAN TO GIVE PROHIBITED USE AIRSPACE A MUCH WIDER MARGIN OF AVOIDANCE. IN ADDITION, I WILL USE THE INFO PROVIDED BY THE GPS MUCH MORE CONSERVATIVELY. AND FINALLY, ANY TIME I FLY FOR OVER 1 HR ABOVE 8000-10000 FT, I MUST ASSUME AND TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT HYPOXIA WILL BE A FACTOR IN MY PERFORMANCE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES THAT HE HAS BEEN INTERVIEWED TWICE BY SECRET SVC PERSONNEL. ONCE BY PHONE FOR ABOUT 2 HRS AND THE SECOND IN PERSON BY 2 SECRET SVC PEOPLE. THERE HAS BEEN NO FAA FOLLOW UP. HE FEELS THAT THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT AN ERROR COULD OCCUR DUE TO THE LACK OF UPDATING OF THE DATABASE. HE HAS HAD THE UNIT FOR ABOUT 1 1/2 YRS WITH NO UPDATE. HE ALSO IS SURE THAT HIS HIGH ALT FLT COULD BE PART OF HIS OWN ERROR. HE WOULD NORMALLY FILE IFR BUT WANTED TO GET HOME WITHOUT DETOURING AND WX WAS GOOD VFR. EVEN THOUGH HE DID NOT COM WITH ANYONE HE DID LISTEN IN ON EACH OF THE FACILITIES AS HE WAS FLYING OVER. HE ALWAYS USES LORAN AS BACK UP WHEN HE FLIES AND IS REALLY AT A LOSS TO UNDERSTAND WHY HE ENCROACHED ON THE PROHIBITED AREA. ANOTHER THOUGHT IS THAT AS AN UNIDENTED ACFT, WITH NO COM, HE WAS DEFINITELY SUSPECT SO NEAR THE PROHIBITED AREA. HE NOW FEELS IT IS A GOOD IDEA TO KEEP IN CONTACT EVEN WHEN VFR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.