Narrative:

Conducting far 135 proficiency check. Observed pilot conduct cockpit before takeoff checks and specifically recall pilot checking ailerons for freedom of movement. Pilot initiated takeoff roll on runway 7L at mke. Aircraft is equipped with a tiller for nosewheel steering operated with the left hand. Rudder becomes effective at approximately 40 KTS. At approximately 40 KTS pilot moved hand from tiller to control wheel. Immediately thereafter, observed pilot, move his right hand aft and up momentarily after which he placed his right hand on the control wheel. It should be noted that the aircraft's internal control lock is located in the center aft ceiling of the cockpit. Aircraft was developing normal power, accelerating normally and maintaining directional control. I recall wondering why he moved his hand and that his right hand should now be on the power levers rather than the control yoke. No communication between PIC and myself was made during the takeoff roll. Aircraft appeared to rotate normally and establish a normal climb. After aircraft made turn to northwest heading PIC stated elevator control very stiff. I questioned the PIC as to what he meant. He then stated he was not really able to move the elevators. PIC contacted mke ATCT advised of control problem and requested immediate landing on runway 7L. Runway 7L at mke is approximately 4000 ft long. Runway 7R at mke is approximately 8000 ft long. Advised pilot to request emergency landing on runway 7R and to request emergency equipment. Landing clearance was obtained for runway 7R. PIC established aircraft on approximately 2 mi. Aircraft landed runway 7R without incident. NTSB and FAA office notified. FAA airworthiness inspectors responded immediately. Dom (director of maintenance) was present. Dom (director of maintenance) seemed to realize almost immediately that trim pins were inadvertently left in place from maintenance conducted several days prior when trim was recalibrated. Inspection of the elevator confirmed dom's (director of maintenance) statement. It should be noted that trim pins are not visible on a normal pilot preflight inspection of the aircraft. Contributing factors: 1) the pins had no flags or streamers to alert maintenance personnel thatthey are still in place. 2) it would appear that maintenance personnel did not perform a functional check of the elevator control before approving the aircraft for return to service. 3) it would appear the PIC did not check for freedom of the elevator as required by before takeoff checklists (flight controls check). 4) I, as a check pilot, did not realize that the PIC had not conducted a full check of the flight controls. 5) it appears that PIC recognized some type of problem prior to aircraft becoming airborne but did not elect to abort the takeoff. This was discussed with PIC shortly after incident. He stated when he reached back to confirm that the controls were unlocked, he thought he was already airborne. 6) in retrospect, I could have asked the pilot what he was doing when he moved his right hand aft and up, however this was at a critical phase of flight and not a good time for discussion. This flight was conducted as a single pilot operation with no established crew coordination procedures. 7) although I have conducted approximately 8 flight checks in the SC7 aircraft over a 1 yr period, I have no actual flight time in the aircraft and am therefore, not intimately familiar with the aircraft. Greater familiarity with the aircraft might have alerted me to a control problem when the PIC moved his right hand. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the PIC conducted a walkaround check but the elevator lock was covered with a panel and could not be seen. The reporter said an aileron control check was made but did not see the elevator check accomplished. The reporter stated it appeared some elevator control must have been available. The reporter said flags on the correct lock pins would have prevented this incident. Callback conversation from reporter of acn 385579 revealed the following information: the reporter admits no procedures were in place to prevent the dispatch of an aircraft with control locks installed. The reporter said the air carrier has procedures now in place to prevent this type of incident and also has the correct locks with flags. The reporter stated all air carrier mechanics are being trained to follow the maintenance manual procedures withrespect to control surfaces.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT WAS RECEIVING A PROFICIENCY CHK WHEN ON TKOF, THE PLT NOTICED LACK OF ELEVATOR CTL. REQUESTED EMER LNDG. A SHORTS SC7 WAS DISPATCHED WITH THE ELEVATOR CTL SYS LOCKED IN THE NEUTRAL POS WITH AN UNAUTH TOOL AND NO WARNING FLAG OR WRITE-UP TO REMOVE BEFORE FLT.

Narrative: CONDUCTING FAR 135 PROFICIENCY CHK. OBSERVED PLT CONDUCT COCKPIT BEFORE TKOF CHKS AND SPECIFICALLY RECALL PLT CHKING AILERONS FOR FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT. PLT INITIATED TKOF ROLL ON RWY 7L AT MKE. ACFT IS EQUIPPED WITH A TILLER FOR NOSEWHEEL STEERING OPERATED WITH THE L HAND. RUDDER BECOMES EFFECTIVE AT APPROX 40 KTS. AT APPROX 40 KTS PLT MOVED HAND FROM TILLER TO CTL WHEEL. IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER, OBSERVED PLT, MOVE HIS R HAND AFT AND UP MOMENTARILY AFTER WHICH HE PLACED HIS R HAND ON THE CTL WHEEL. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE ACFT'S INTERNAL CTL LOCK IS LOCATED IN THE CTR AFT CEILING OF THE COCKPIT. ACFT WAS DEVELOPING NORMAL PWR, ACCELERATING NORMALLY AND MAINTAINING DIRECTIONAL CTL. I RECALL WONDERING WHY HE MOVED HIS HAND AND THAT HIS R HAND SHOULD NOW BE ON THE PWR LEVERS RATHER THAN THE CTL YOKE. NO COM BTWN PIC AND MYSELF WAS MADE DURING THE TKOF ROLL. ACFT APPEARED TO ROTATE NORMALLY AND ESTABLISH A NORMAL CLB. AFTER ACFT MADE TURN TO NW HEADING PIC STATED ELEVATOR CTL VERY STIFF. I QUESTIONED THE PIC AS TO WHAT HE MEANT. HE THEN STATED HE WAS NOT REALLY ABLE TO MOVE THE ELEVATORS. PIC CONTACTED MKE ATCT ADVISED OF CTL PROB AND REQUESTED IMMEDIATE LNDG ON RWY 7L. RWY 7L AT MKE IS APPROX 4000 FT LONG. RWY 7R AT MKE IS APPROX 8000 FT LONG. ADVISED PLT TO REQUEST EMER LNDG ON RWY 7R AND TO REQUEST EMER EQUIP. LNDG CLRNC WAS OBTAINED FOR RWY 7R. PIC ESTABLISHED ACFT ON APPROX 2 MI. ACFT LANDED RWY 7R WITHOUT INCIDENT. NTSB AND FAA OFFICE NOTIFIED. FAA AIRWORTHINESS INSPECTORS RESPONDED IMMEDIATELY. DOM (DIRECTOR OF MAINT) WAS PRESENT. DOM (DIRECTOR OF MAINT) SEEMED TO REALIZE ALMOST IMMEDIATELY THAT TRIM PINS WERE INADVERTENTLY LEFT IN PLACE FROM MAINT CONDUCTED SEVERAL DAYS PRIOR WHEN TRIM WAS RECALIBRATED. INSPECTION OF THE ELEVATOR CONFIRMED DOM'S (DIRECTOR OF MAINT) STATEMENT. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT TRIM PINS ARE NOT VISIBLE ON A NORMAL PLT PREFLT INSPECTION OF THE ACFT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) THE PINS HAD NO FLAGS OR STREAMERS TO ALERT MAINT PERSONNEL THATTHEY ARE STILL IN PLACE. 2) IT WOULD APPEAR THAT MAINT PERSONNEL DID NOT PERFORM A FUNCTIONAL CHK OF THE ELEVATOR CTL BEFORE APPROVING THE ACFT FOR RETURN TO SVC. 3) IT WOULD APPEAR THE PIC DID NOT CHK FOR FREEDOM OF THE ELEVATOR AS REQUIRED BY BEFORE TKOF CHKLISTS (FLT CTLS CHK). 4) I, AS A CHK PLT, DID NOT REALIZE THAT THE PIC HAD NOT CONDUCTED A FULL CHK OF THE FLT CTLS. 5) IT APPEARS THAT PIC RECOGNIZED SOME TYPE OF PROB PRIOR TO ACFT BECOMING AIRBORNE BUT DID NOT ELECT TO ABORT THE TKOF. THIS WAS DISCUSSED WITH PIC SHORTLY AFTER INCIDENT. HE STATED WHEN HE REACHED BACK TO CONFIRM THAT THE CTLS WERE UNLOCKED, HE THOUGHT HE WAS ALREADY AIRBORNE. 6) IN RETROSPECT, I COULD HAVE ASKED THE PLT WHAT HE WAS DOING WHEN HE MOVED HIS R HAND AFT AND UP, HOWEVER THIS WAS AT A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT AND NOT A GOOD TIME FOR DISCUSSION. THIS FLT WAS CONDUCTED AS A SINGLE PLT OP WITH NO ESTABLISHED CREW COORD PROCS. 7) ALTHOUGH I HAVE CONDUCTED APPROX 8 FLT CHKS IN THE SC7 ACFT OVER A 1 YR PERIOD, I HAVE NO ACTUAL FLT TIME IN THE ACFT AND AM THEREFORE, NOT INTIMATELY FAMILIAR WITH THE ACFT. GREATER FAMILIARITY WITH THE ACFT MIGHT HAVE ALERTED ME TO A CTL PROB WHEN THE PIC MOVED HIS R HAND. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE PIC CONDUCTED A WALKAROUND CHK BUT THE ELEVATOR LOCK WAS COVERED WITH A PANEL AND COULD NOT BE SEEN. THE RPTR SAID AN AILERON CTL CHK WAS MADE BUT DID NOT SEE THE ELEVATOR CHK ACCOMPLISHED. THE RPTR STATED IT APPEARED SOME ELEVATOR CTL MUST HAVE BEEN AVAILABLE. THE RPTR SAID FLAGS ON THE CORRECT LOCK PINS WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS INCIDENT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION FROM RPTR OF ACN 385579 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR ADMITS NO PROCS WERE IN PLACE TO PREVENT THE DISPATCH OF AN ACFT WITH CTL LOCKS INSTALLED. THE RPTR SAID THE ACR HAS PROCS NOW IN PLACE TO PREVENT THIS TYPE OF INCIDENT AND ALSO HAS THE CORRECT LOCKS WITH FLAGS. THE RPTR STATED ALL ACR MECHS ARE BEING TRAINED TO FOLLOW THE MAINT MANUAL PROCS WITHRESPECT TO CTL SURFACES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.