Narrative:

I was en route to mkc and had been handed off from center to kansas city approach control. Shortly after the handoff, another pilot called me on my #2 communication radio which was tuned to our company frequency. I couldn't hear him well so I turned the volume up on the #2 radio and down slightly on the #1 radio which was tuned to approach control. I was letting myself be distracted by my conversation on the #2 radio, and then by the operation of the aircraft's LORAN (with which I was unfamiliar), as it seemed to be malfunctioning. When I realized that I was behind the aircraft and that I needed to get ahead of the airplane and descend to a lower altitude, I tried to contact approach control. There was no response. I called several more times to no avail, then began troubleshooting. I did not immediately discover the problem partially due to how fatigued I was. This was the last leg of the night and of my week, and it was very early in the morning. I finally figured out that I had simply turned the volume almost all the way down on communication #1, not just slightly down as I had intended. I re-established radio contact with approach control, was cleared for the visual approach, and the controller told me that he had been trying to get a hold of me for about the past 30 mi. (My ground speed was approximately 200 KTS, so this translates to roughly 9 mins.) the controller handed me off to tower control, and I landed uneventfully. This lost communication situation was caused by me turning the volume down on the radio further than I had intended. Contributing factors included: my distraction with the conversation on the #2 radio, my distraction from the operation and troubleshooting of a LORAN with which I was unfamiliar, my lack of familiarity with this particular aircraft and its radio stack, my level of fatigue, and my assumption that the lack of radio traffic on the #1 radio was due to the time of morning. This situation could have been prevented by never turning down the volume on the #1 radio in the first place. If it had to be turned down then I could have left a finger on the volume so as to remember to turn it back up. I should have questioned why there was no radio traffic on the approach frequency sooner, and not assumed that it was due to the time of the morning. I learned that I should verify that radio contact is established when there is any doubt whatsoever. I also learned that I should always be extra vigilant in any airplane that I am not completely familiar with, and also when I am fatigued. Above all I learned how important it is to remain aware of the big picture, and to not let distractions become primary.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT OF CARGO ACFT ON NIGHT FLT TURNS DOWN #1 COM VOLUME AND BECOMES A NORDO ACFT. HE FINALLY TROUBLESHOOTS THE PROB AND RECEIVES HIS CLRNC TO APCH AND LAND.

Narrative: I WAS ENRTE TO MKC AND HAD BEEN HANDED OFF FROM CTR TO KANSAS CITY APCH CTL. SHORTLY AFTER THE HDOF, ANOTHER PLT CALLED ME ON MY #2 COM RADIO WHICH WAS TUNED TO OUR COMPANY FREQ. I COULDN'T HEAR HIM WELL SO I TURNED THE VOLUME UP ON THE #2 RADIO AND DOWN SLIGHTLY ON THE #1 RADIO WHICH WAS TUNED TO APCH CTL. I WAS LETTING MYSELF BE DISTRACTED BY MY CONVERSATION ON THE #2 RADIO, AND THEN BY THE OP OF THE ACFT'S LORAN (WITH WHICH I WAS UNFAMILIAR), AS IT SEEMED TO BE MALFUNCTIONING. WHEN I REALIZED THAT I WAS BEHIND THE ACFT AND THAT I NEEDED TO GET AHEAD OF THE AIRPLANE AND DSND TO A LOWER ALT, I TRIED TO CONTACT APCH CTL. THERE WAS NO RESPONSE. I CALLED SEVERAL MORE TIMES TO NO AVAIL, THEN BEGAN TROUBLESHOOTING. I DID NOT IMMEDIATELY DISCOVER THE PROB PARTIALLY DUE TO HOW FATIGUED I WAS. THIS WAS THE LAST LEG OF THE NIGHT AND OF MY WK, AND IT WAS VERY EARLY IN THE MORNING. I FINALLY FIGURED OUT THAT I HAD SIMPLY TURNED THE VOLUME ALMOST ALL THE WAY DOWN ON COM #1, NOT JUST SLIGHTLY DOWN AS I HAD INTENDED. I RE-ESTABLISHED RADIO CONTACT WITH APCH CTL, WAS CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH, AND THE CTLR TOLD ME THAT HE HAD BEEN TRYING TO GET A HOLD OF ME FOR ABOUT THE PAST 30 MI. (MY GND SPD WAS APPROX 200 KTS, SO THIS TRANSLATES TO ROUGHLY 9 MINS.) THE CTLR HANDED ME OFF TO TWR CTL, AND I LANDED UNEVENTFULLY. THIS LOST COM SIT WAS CAUSED BY ME TURNING THE VOLUME DOWN ON THE RADIO FURTHER THAN I HAD INTENDED. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS INCLUDED: MY DISTR WITH THE CONVERSATION ON THE #2 RADIO, MY DISTR FROM THE OP AND TROUBLESHOOTING OF A LORAN WITH WHICH I WAS UNFAMILIAR, MY LACK OF FAMILIARITY WITH THIS PARTICULAR ACFT AND ITS RADIO STACK, MY LEVEL OF FATIGUE, AND MY ASSUMPTION THAT THE LACK OF RADIO TFC ON THE #1 RADIO WAS DUE TO THE TIME OF MORNING. THIS SIT COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED BY NEVER TURNING DOWN THE VOLUME ON THE #1 RADIO IN THE FIRST PLACE. IF IT HAD TO BE TURNED DOWN THEN I COULD HAVE LEFT A FINGER ON THE VOLUME SO AS TO REMEMBER TO TURN IT BACK UP. I SHOULD HAVE QUESTIONED WHY THERE WAS NO RADIO TFC ON THE APCH FREQ SOONER, AND NOT ASSUMED THAT IT WAS DUE TO THE TIME OF THE MORNING. I LEARNED THAT I SHOULD VERIFY THAT RADIO CONTACT IS ESTABLISHED WHEN THERE IS ANY DOUBT WHATSOEVER. I ALSO LEARNED THAT I SHOULD ALWAYS BE EXTRA VIGILANT IN ANY AIRPLANE THAT I AM NOT COMPLETELY FAMILIAR WITH, AND ALSO WHEN I AM FATIGUED. ABOVE ALL I LEARNED HOW IMPORTANT IT IS TO REMAIN AWARE OF THE BIG PICTURE, AND TO NOT LET DISTRACTIONS BECOME PRIMARY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.