Narrative:

I had cleared aircraft #1 for takeoff on runway 26R. The next aircraft in the departure sequence was aircraft #2. I asked aircraft #2 if he was ready for departure and he gave an affirmative response. I then told aircraft #2 to taxi into position and hold on the same runway that aircraft #1 was departing (runway 26R). Aircraft #2 subsequently taxied onto the runway at an intersection in front of the departing B737. The flight crew of the B737 saw the cessna entering the runway and rejected the takeoff. The tower visibility at this particular intersection is poor to nil. At night the intersection B-11 is nearly impossible to see. This event occurred when the lineup of departures was stretched from the end of the runway to a point nearly 3000 ft down the taxiway. This cessna decided to pull into the intersection B-11 to 'get out of the way of the big boys.' he was instructed by ground to taxi to runway 26R and no mention was given to him by anyone to go to an intersection. The large aircraft lined up on taxiway B obscured my vision of the intersection. As a matter of fact, when the B737 flight crew told me that a cessna had just taxied onto the runway I still had a difficult time seeing the aircraft. The tower is approximately 1.3 to 1.5 mi from this intersection and the view at night is mostly blinking and steady lights of various colors. You have runway lights, taxiway lights, runway threshold lights, lights mounted on top of hangars, lights mounted on top of terminal 4, street lights in the background, and all the associated lights of approximately 3-4 acrs, who are directly in my line of sight, waiting on the taxiway in the departure sequence. That's what you see when you look at the threshold of runway 26R at night. Miscom is a factor. If the pilot knew controller and pilot phraseology, he would have asked for a departure at the intersection and the controller would either approve or deny his request. Again, if he knew the proper phraseology he would have known that something was wrong and would have questioned my control instructions. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter alleged the incident was handled as a pilot deviation since the pilot was instructed to taxi to the runway without reference to an intersection departure. Reporter indicated that phx does not allow intersection departures at night in order to avert a situation similar to the night time incident that occurred at lax airport. Reporter said that the runway hold lines were moved back from the runways and indicated that this may have contributed to the poor line of sight visibility when air carrier traffic is holding near or passing the B11 intersection. Reporter said that the CFI in the C172 thought the tower wanted the small aircraft to use the intersection for departure in order to stay out of the way of the air carrier aircraft. Reporter noted that someone from the facility has talked with the FBO operators to let them know they are not to use an intersection for departure at night. Reporter indicated there were no signs informing the pilots at any of the GA operations that the full length of the runways would be used at night.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TRAINING C172 WAS CLRED INTO POS BEHIND A DEPARTING ACR B737. THE C172 WENT ONTO THE RWY AT AN INTXN IN FRONT OF THE B737 ON TKOF ROLL. THE ACR ABORTED TKOF. THE LCL CTLR DID NOT SEE THE C172 GO ONTO THE RWY DUE TO POOR TWR VISIBILITY AT THAT INTXN. AN INTXN DEP HAD NOT BEEN ISSUED BY THE GND CTLR.

Narrative: I HAD CLRED ACFT #1 FOR TKOF ON RWY 26R. THE NEXT ACFT IN THE DEP SEQUENCE WAS ACFT #2. I ASKED ACFT #2 IF HE WAS READY FOR DEP AND HE GAVE AN AFFIRMATIVE RESPONSE. I THEN TOLD ACFT #2 TO TAXI INTO POS AND HOLD ON THE SAME RWY THAT ACFT #1 WAS DEPARTING (RWY 26R). ACFT #2 SUBSEQUENTLY TAXIED ONTO THE RWY AT AN INTXN IN FRONT OF THE DEPARTING B737. THE FLC OF THE B737 SAW THE CESSNA ENTERING THE RWY AND REJECTED THE TKOF. THE TWR VISIBILITY AT THIS PARTICULAR INTXN IS POOR TO NIL. AT NIGHT THE INTXN B-11 IS NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE TO SEE. THIS EVENT OCCURRED WHEN THE LINEUP OF DEPS WAS STRETCHED FROM THE END OF THE RWY TO A POINT NEARLY 3000 FT DOWN THE TXWY. THIS CESSNA DECIDED TO PULL INTO THE INTXN B-11 TO 'GET OUT OF THE WAY OF THE BIG BOYS.' HE WAS INSTRUCTED BY GND TO TAXI TO RWY 26R AND NO MENTION WAS GIVEN TO HIM BY ANYONE TO GO TO AN INTXN. THE LARGE ACFT LINED UP ON TXWY B OBSCURED MY VISION OF THE INTXN. AS A MATTER OF FACT, WHEN THE B737 FLC TOLD ME THAT A CESSNA HAD JUST TAXIED ONTO THE RWY I STILL HAD A DIFFICULT TIME SEEING THE ACFT. THE TWR IS APPROX 1.3 TO 1.5 MI FROM THIS INTXN AND THE VIEW AT NIGHT IS MOSTLY BLINKING AND STEADY LIGHTS OF VARIOUS COLORS. YOU HAVE RWY LIGHTS, TXWY LIGHTS, RWY THRESHOLD LIGHTS, LIGHTS MOUNTED ON TOP OF HANGARS, LIGHTS MOUNTED ON TOP OF TERMINAL 4, STREET LIGHTS IN THE BACKGROUND, AND ALL THE ASSOCIATED LIGHTS OF APPROX 3-4 ACRS, WHO ARE DIRECTLY IN MY LINE OF SIGHT, WAITING ON THE TXWY IN THE DEP SEQUENCE. THAT'S WHAT YOU SEE WHEN YOU LOOK AT THE THRESHOLD OF RWY 26R AT NIGHT. MISCOM IS A FACTOR. IF THE PLT KNEW CTLR AND PLT PHRASEOLOGY, HE WOULD HAVE ASKED FOR A DEP AT THE INTXN AND THE CTLR WOULD EITHER APPROVE OR DENY HIS REQUEST. AGAIN, IF HE KNEW THE PROPER PHRASEOLOGY HE WOULD HAVE KNOWN THAT SOMETHING WAS WRONG AND WOULD HAVE QUESTIONED MY CTL INSTRUCTIONS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR ALLEGED THE INCIDENT WAS HANDLED AS A PLTDEV SINCE THE PLT WAS INSTRUCTED TO TAXI TO THE RWY WITHOUT REF TO AN INTXN DEP. RPTR INDICATED THAT PHX DOES NOT ALLOW INTXN DEPS AT NIGHT IN ORDER TO AVERT A SIT SIMILAR TO THE NIGHT TIME INCIDENT THAT OCCURRED AT LAX ARPT. RPTR SAID THAT THE RWY HOLD LINES WERE MOVED BACK FROM THE RWYS AND INDICATED THAT THIS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE POOR LINE OF SIGHT VISIBILITY WHEN ACR TFC IS HOLDING NEAR OR PASSING THE B11 INTXN. RPTR SAID THAT THE CFI IN THE C172 THOUGHT THE TWR WANTED THE SMALL ACFT TO USE THE INTXN FOR DEP IN ORDER TO STAY OUT OF THE WAY OF THE ACR ACFT. RPTR NOTED THAT SOMEONE FROM THE FACILITY HAS TALKED WITH THE FBO OPERATORS TO LET THEM KNOW THEY ARE NOT TO USE AN INTXN FOR DEP AT NIGHT. RPTR INDICATED THERE WERE NO SIGNS INFORMING THE PLTS AT ANY OF THE GA OPS THAT THE FULL LENGTH OF THE RWYS WOULD BE USED AT NIGHT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.