Narrative:

Airlines flight, an MD88, departed WWW for YYY at AB17 local time, mar/mon/97. At AB23 the dispatcher and maintenance coordinator were contacted by the captain via company radio. He advised the company that he had a 'nosegear unsafe light.' the maintenance coordinator and dispatcher reviewed pom procedures which had been followed by the crew. After review of procedures, fuel flow, fuel onboard, en route WX, en route alternates if needed and other factors, the captain, maintenance and dispatcher agreed the flight could safely continue to YYY with the gear extended. Airspeed, altitude and fuel were monitored throughout the flight. En route alternates were relayed to the captain by dispatch as the captain relayed fuel flow and estimated arrival fuel to dispatch. Upon arrival into YYY airspace, the captain declared an emergency as a precaution for the unsafe gear indication. He then requested a 'fly- by' so a visual check of the landing gear could be accomplished. At AC47 local time the captain made a normal landing at YYY where he stopped the aircraft on runway 9L. He was met by maintenance and other ground personnel for the policy required tow to the gate. While this operation was conducted very carefully with the assistance of management and supervision on several levels, there was not a clearly defined procedure for the captain, dispatcher and maintenance coordinator to follow. The pom stopped once the gear procedure was completed. Calculations were based on the aircraft fuel flow and estimated arrival fuel. Our database could not produce numbers for dispatch to give the captain. Speed and altitudes were left to the captain's experience. Hopefully, as a result, a policy will be established, printed and calculations made available to those who might require them.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD88, UNABLE TO RAISE GEAR SINCE THE NOSEGEAR UNSAFE LIGHT REMAINED ON, FLEW TO DEST ARPT WITH GEAR EXTENDED. DISPATCHER RPTS THAT ACR HAS NO POLICY OR PROC TO COVER THIS TYPE EVENT WITH PREDETERMINED COMPUTER DATA FOR ENRTE CONSIDERATIONS.

Narrative: AIRLINES FLT, AN MD88, DEPARTED WWW FOR YYY AT AB17 LCL TIME, MAR/MON/97. AT AB23 THE DISPATCHER AND MAINT COORDINATOR WERE CONTACTED BY THE CAPT VIA COMPANY RADIO. HE ADVISED THE COMPANY THAT HE HAD A 'NOSEGEAR UNSAFE LIGHT.' THE MAINT COORDINATOR AND DISPATCHER REVIEWED POM PROCS WHICH HAD BEEN FOLLOWED BY THE CREW. AFTER REVIEW OF PROCS, FUEL FLOW, FUEL ONBOARD, ENRTE WX, ENRTE ALTERNATES IF NEEDED AND OTHER FACTORS, THE CAPT, MAINT AND DISPATCHER AGREED THE FLT COULD SAFELY CONTINUE TO YYY WITH THE GEAR EXTENDED. AIRSPD, ALT AND FUEL WERE MONITORED THROUGHOUT THE FLT. ENRTE ALTERNATES WERE RELAYED TO THE CAPT BY DISPATCH AS THE CAPT RELAYED FUEL FLOW AND ESTIMATED ARR FUEL TO DISPATCH. UPON ARR INTO YYY AIRSPACE, THE CAPT DECLARED AN EMER AS A PRECAUTION FOR THE UNSAFE GEAR INDICATION. HE THEN REQUESTED A 'FLY- BY' SO A VISUAL CHK OF THE LNDG GEAR COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED. AT AC47 LCL TIME THE CAPT MADE A NORMAL LNDG AT YYY WHERE HE STOPPED THE ACFT ON RWY 9L. HE WAS MET BY MAINT AND OTHER GND PERSONNEL FOR THE POLICY REQUIRED TOW TO THE GATE. WHILE THIS OP WAS CONDUCTED VERY CAREFULLY WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF MGMNT AND SUPERVISION ON SEVERAL LEVELS, THERE WAS NOT A CLRLY DEFINED PROC FOR THE CAPT, DISPATCHER AND MAINT COORDINATOR TO FOLLOW. THE POM STOPPED ONCE THE GEAR PROC WAS COMPLETED. CALCULATIONS WERE BASED ON THE ACFT FUEL FLOW AND ESTIMATED ARR FUEL. OUR DATABASE COULD NOT PRODUCE NUMBERS FOR DISPATCH TO GIVE THE CAPT. SPD AND ALTS WERE LEFT TO THE CAPT'S EXPERIENCE. HOPEFULLY, AS A RESULT, A POLICY WILL BE ESTABLISHED, PRINTED AND CALCULATIONS MADE AVAILABLE TO THOSE WHO MIGHT REQUIRE THEM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.