Narrative:

The second leg was now longer -- 3.6 hours planned with 440 NM and a fuel on board of 4 1/2 hours. This leg was planned at a more favorable altitude for winds and leaning the engine. A fuel check was accomplished 40 mins prior to landing over a potential divert base after ARTCC rerouting was received to shorten the flight slightly. It was felt that based on computed flight duration and quantity on gauges that I would land with 1 hour fuel in tanks. On 8 mi final the engine sputtered and I changed from right tank (2 gal) to left tank (5 gal) and power was regained. At 3 mi the engine quit and headwinds mandated a forced landing. Subsequent investigation revealed the PA28 operators manual and engine (lycoming) manufacturer's manual differed in fuel consumption rates for such a leg by 10 gals. All that was available to the pilot/aircraft at the time was the PA28 manual that showed lower gph rates. The fuel gauges showed sufficient fuel yet it was unknown (by the pilot) that the non-capacitive gauges are never to be trusted. Cross country fuel management and leaning procedures had not been covered in the chkout. The pilot was unaware of the higher fuel consumption rate, inaccuracy of the fuel gauges, and proper leaning procedures. Measures have been taken at the aeronautical club to correct this and start a program to better prepare experienced military pilots for the dangerous/differences in GA equipment. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that there was no damage to the aircraft during the off airport forced landing. He now learned the proper data about fuel gauges and computing fuel usage and passes on this information to pilots whenever possible in pilot meetings, etc.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT OF AN SMA SEL MADE AN OFF ARPT FORCED LNDG AFTER THE ENG QUIT DUE TO FUEL STARVATION.

Narrative: THE SECOND LEG WAS NOW LONGER -- 3.6 HRS PLANNED WITH 440 NM AND A FUEL ON BOARD OF 4 1/2 HRS. THIS LEG WAS PLANNED AT A MORE FAVORABLE ALT FOR WINDS AND LEANING THE ENG. A FUEL CHK WAS ACCOMPLISHED 40 MINS PRIOR TO LNDG OVER A POTENTIAL DIVERT BASE AFTER ARTCC REROUTING WAS RECEIVED TO SHORTEN THE FLT SLIGHTLY. IT WAS FELT THAT BASED ON COMPUTED FLT DURATION AND QUANTITY ON GAUGES THAT I WOULD LAND WITH 1 HR FUEL IN TANKS. ON 8 MI FINAL THE ENG SPUTTERED AND I CHANGED FROM R TANK (2 GAL) TO L TANK (5 GAL) AND PWR WAS REGAINED. AT 3 MI THE ENG QUIT AND HEADWINDS MANDATED A FORCED LNDG. SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION REVEALED THE PA28 OPERATORS MANUAL AND ENG (LYCOMING) MANUFACTURER'S MANUAL DIFFERED IN FUEL CONSUMPTION RATES FOR SUCH A LEG BY 10 GALS. ALL THAT WAS AVAILABLE TO THE PLT/ACFT AT THE TIME WAS THE PA28 MANUAL THAT SHOWED LOWER GPH RATES. THE FUEL GAUGES SHOWED SUFFICIENT FUEL YET IT WAS UNKNOWN (BY THE PLT) THAT THE NON-CAPACITIVE GAUGES ARE NEVER TO BE TRUSTED. XCOUNTRY FUEL MGMNT AND LEANING PROCS HAD NOT BEEN COVERED IN THE CHKOUT. THE PLT WAS UNAWARE OF THE HIGHER FUEL CONSUMPTION RATE, INACCURACY OF THE FUEL GAUGES, AND PROPER LEANING PROCS. MEASURES HAVE BEEN TAKEN AT THE AERO CLUB TO CORRECT THIS AND START A PROGRAM TO BETTER PREPARE EXPERIENCED MIL PLTS FOR THE DANGEROUS/DIFFERENCES IN GA EQUIP. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT THERE WAS NO DAMAGE TO THE ACFT DURING THE OFF ARPT FORCED LNDG. HE NOW LEARNED THE PROPER DATA ABOUT FUEL GAUGES AND COMPUTING FUEL USAGE AND PASSES ON THIS INFO TO PLTS WHENEVER POSSIBLE IN PLT MEETINGS, ETC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.