Narrative:

I am a member of a flying club located at north field in oak, ca, and am familiar with and usually fly, either of 2 club planes (an small aircraft X or Y). I had arranged to fly the small aircraft Y and for a club instructor to give me a flight lesson. However, neither of the 2 familiar aircraft were airworthy for this flight and we settled on my flying a more complex aircraft (an small aircraft Z) with which I was totally unfamiliar but in which I might still use my scheduled flight time for instrument training. The instructor performed the preflight check, gave me an overview of the control yoke knobs, and I was shown the position of the flight and engine instruments gauges (the fuel gauges showed full), and the location and procedures for switching fuel from left to right tanks and to off. In this airplane, the position of the fuel gauges is behind and below the control yoke (difficult to see in scanning) and the fuel control switch is on the floor between the left and right front seats. En route to lvk, I suggested to the instructor that we switch fuel tanks but in retrospect, I do no think he heard me as he did not do so. He may have been busy speaking to stockton approach control. Subsequently, I flew the lvk ILS 25R twice to minimums and twice þmissed.' by now, I had done my engine start-up, taxi, run up, takeoff, flight to 2 different airports, and performed 4 instrument approachs and 4 missed approachs (with gear and flaps configured for landing) on 1 fuel tank. Leaving the lvk airport, I was vectored first by lvk and then by the instructor to a position near sunol intersection where I contacted bay approach control and requested the oak 27R ILS approach. Prior to the 27R OM, I was handed off to oak tower and at the OM, I configured the aircraft for landing i.e., gear and flaps down, performed a þgump' check (except for the gas check which the instructor apparently did not notice). I was þunder the hood' on final approach to oak 27R ILS when at 300 ft and almost to the MM, the engine started to þcough.' I pushed the mixture control full forward and then experienced complete engine failure. Prior to removing my instrument hood and getting oriented for an emergency landing, the instructor took over control of the aircraft, contacted oak tower, and landed (beautifully performed) the aircraft on the golf course fairway on the 27 runway approach with damage both to the plane and our mutual pride. The possible reasons for this airplane accident are: 1) fuel starvation due to lack of switching fuel flow to fullest tank. 2) inexperience of instrument pilot in training, in flight aircraft. 3) last min change in aircraft for instrument flight instruction. 4) instructor error in monitoring student's in-flight fuel management. 5) lack of student chkout in unfamiliar aircraft. 6) transfer by student to the instructor of airplane fuel management chores. 7) 2 adverse experiences at airport 1, resulted in use of an alternate airport (#2) for in-flight pilot training. This resulted in an unanticipated fuel use for the flight. 8) vectors to airport #3 resulted in pilot distraction at the start of last approach. Remedial actions for me will include the following: 1) complete all my written and flight training in the small aircraft Z prior to my next flight in this aircraft. 2) demand better radar vectors and have less confusion between myself and travis approach controller trainees when they assign radar vectors. 3) when training, keep my personal inbound approach minimums and miss altitudes high when departing traffic is on my inbound course. 4) verify all altitudes and question any confusing radar vectors in all my radio reports when controllers (including those at bay TRACON) change heading of my aircraft.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: OFF ARPT LNDG UNDERSHOT WHEN SMA SUFFERS FUEL STARVATION. EMER FORCED LNDG.

Narrative: I AM A MEMBER OF A FLYING CLUB LOCATED AT N FIELD IN OAK, CA, AND AM FAMILIAR WITH AND USUALLY FLY, EITHER OF 2 CLUB PLANES (AN SMA X OR Y). I HAD ARRANGED TO FLY THE SMA Y AND FOR A CLUB INSTRUCTOR TO GIVE ME A FLT LESSON. HOWEVER, NEITHER OF THE 2 FAMILIAR ACFT WERE AIRWORTHY FOR THIS FLT AND WE SETTLED ON MY FLYING A MORE COMPLEX ACFT (AN SMA Z) WITH WHICH I WAS TOTALLY UNFAMILIAR BUT IN WHICH I MIGHT STILL USE MY SCHEDULED FLT TIME FOR INST TRAINING. THE INSTRUCTOR PERFORMED THE PREFLT CHK, GAVE ME AN OVERVIEW OF THE CTL YOKE KNOBS, AND I WAS SHOWN THE POS OF THE FLT AND ENG INSTS GAUGES (THE FUEL GAUGES SHOWED FULL), AND THE LOCATION AND PROCS FOR SWITCHING FUEL FROM L TO R TANKS AND TO OFF. IN THIS AIRPLANE, THE POS OF THE FUEL GAUGES IS BEHIND AND BELOW THE CTL YOKE (DIFFICULT TO SEE IN SCANNING) AND THE FUEL CTL SWITCH IS ON THE FLOOR BTWN THE L AND R FRONT SEATS. ENRTE TO LVK, I SUGGESTED TO THE INSTRUCTOR THAT WE SWITCH FUEL TANKS BUT IN RETROSPECT, I DO NO THINK HE HEARD ME AS HE DID NOT DO SO. HE MAY HAVE BEEN BUSY SPEAKING TO STOCKTON APCH CTL. SUBSEQUENTLY, I FLEW THE LVK ILS 25R TWICE TO MINIMUMS AND TWICE þMISSED.' BY NOW, I HAD DONE MY ENG START-UP, TAXI, RUN UP, TKOF, FLT TO 2 DIFFERENT ARPTS, AND PERFORMED 4 INST APCHS AND 4 MISSED APCHS (WITH GEAR AND FLAPS CONFIGURED FOR LNDG) ON 1 FUEL TANK. LEAVING THE LVK ARPT, I WAS VECTORED FIRST BY LVK AND THEN BY THE INSTRUCTOR TO A POS NEAR SUNOL INTXN WHERE I CONTACTED BAY APCH CTL AND REQUESTED THE OAK 27R ILS APCH. PRIOR TO THE 27R OM, I WAS HANDED OFF TO OAK TWR AND AT THE OM, I CONFIGURED THE ACFT FOR LNDG I.E., GEAR AND FLAPS DOWN, PERFORMED A þGUMP' CHK (EXCEPT FOR THE GAS CHK WHICH THE INSTRUCTOR APPARENTLY DID NOT NOTICE). I WAS þUNDER THE HOOD' ON FINAL APCH TO OAK 27R ILS WHEN AT 300 FT AND ALMOST TO THE MM, THE ENG STARTED TO þCOUGH.' I PUSHED THE MIXTURE CTL FULL FORWARD AND THEN EXPERIENCED COMPLETE ENG FAILURE. PRIOR TO REMOVING MY INST HOOD AND GETTING ORIENTED FOR AN EMER LNDG, THE INSTRUCTOR TOOK OVER CTL OF THE ACFT, CONTACTED OAK TWR, AND LANDED (BEAUTIFULLY PERFORMED) THE ACFT ON THE GOLF COURSE FAIRWAY ON THE 27 RWY APCH WITH DAMAGE BOTH TO THE PLANE AND OUR MUTUAL PRIDE. THE POSSIBLE REASONS FOR THIS AIRPLANE ACCIDENT ARE: 1) FUEL STARVATION DUE TO LACK OF SWITCHING FUEL FLOW TO FULLEST TANK. 2) INEXPERIENCE OF INST PLT IN TRAINING, IN FLT ACFT. 3) LAST MIN CHANGE IN ACFT FOR INST FLT INSTRUCTION. 4) INSTRUCTOR ERROR IN MONITORING STUDENT'S INFLT FUEL MGMNT. 5) LACK OF STUDENT CHKOUT IN UNFAMILIAR ACFT. 6) TRANSFER BY STUDENT TO THE INSTRUCTOR OF AIRPLANE FUEL MGMNT CHORES. 7) 2 ADVERSE EXPERIENCES AT ARPT 1, RESULTED IN USE OF AN ALTERNATE ARPT (#2) FOR INFLT PLT TRAINING. THIS RESULTED IN AN UNANTICIPATED FUEL USE FOR THE FLT. 8) VECTORS TO ARPT #3 RESULTED IN PLT DISTR AT THE START OF LAST APCH. REMEDIAL ACTIONS FOR ME WILL INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING: 1) COMPLETE ALL MY WRITTEN AND FLT TRAINING IN THE SMA Z PRIOR TO MY NEXT FLT IN THIS ACFT. 2) DEMAND BETTER RADAR VECTORS AND HAVE LESS CONFUSION BTWN MYSELF AND TRAVIS APCH CTLR TRAINEES WHEN THEY ASSIGN RADAR VECTORS. 3) WHEN TRAINING, KEEP MY PERSONAL INBOUND APCH MINIMUMS AND MISS ALTS HIGH WHEN DEPARTING TFC IS ON MY INBOUND COURSE. 4) VERIFY ALL ALTS AND QUESTION ANY CONFUSING RADAR VECTORS IN ALL MY RADIO RPTS WHEN CTLRS (INCLUDING THOSE AT BAY TRACON) CHANGE HDG OF MY ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.