Narrative:

During taxi in, smoke cargo warning was received during the shutdown of #1 engine. Single engine taxi was planned for the last few ft to our gate. During an engine shutdown, one will receive a master warning with triple chime for low oil pressure, so the first officer and I were 'expecting' that warning. During the 3-CHIME the first officer canceled the warning and I taxied a few more ft when we saw the smoke cargo EICAS message. The cancellation of the warning apparently stopped the audio message 'smoke' because neither of us recall hearing it. Now we were maneuvering into the parking space. I told the first officer we would evacuate/evacuation and called memory items for the cargo smoke. The cargo extinguishers were armed and fired by the first officer and he called for assistance. I ordered the 'evacuate/evacuation' and all went ok. Problems: our call for assistance went out over communication #2, company frequency rather than communication #1, ATC. The fire department was delayed about 1-2 mins extra, I would guess. The fire department did not know the location of the cargo bay, nor how to open it. I showed/told them. Additionally, I'd like to note that the passenger did not evacuate/evacuation through the overwing exits nor the front service doors. Apparently they were standing, or beginning to stand (seat belt sign still on) making ready to deplane -- they followed the flight attendant's evacuate/evacuation instructions however. Factors: our previous day had begun at XA45 departing the hotel in cle, 7:37 hours of flight, arrival mco XM31. The van from our hotel picked us up after XN15 and took us to another hotel. Checking in at the desk, they knew nothing about us. Several phone calls later, we got to our rooms around XO00. Neither one of us had breakfast on thursday as the van picked us up at XX45. We had planned on a 'beignet' break in msy -- that is, the first officer would run for food, I'd remain and do the post/preflight inspection, ATIS, clearance, flight plan, and weight and balance. As we were so close to our gate the first officer had selected his communication to company. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the aircraft was a CL65 canadair regional jet. The CL65 has been in operation since june of 1993 in the united states and about 6 months prior to that in europe and elsewhere. The company fix this day was not successful. The same false warning occurred the next day as the next pilot shut the #1 engine down after landing preparing to taxi to the gate. The company made another fix which seems to have corrected the problem. As the right engine shuts down the respective bus is then powered by the APU. The reporter said the company had not disclosed what the final and successful fix was. The aircraft has had no further false warnings after that one the next day. The reporter was not apprised of the cause of the false warning.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CARGO SMOKE WARNING OCCURRED TO THE RPTR JUST AFTER SHUTTING DOWN THE #1 ENG TAXIING TO THE GATE. THE ACFT WAS PARKED, THE APPROPRIATE PROCS WERE ACCOMPLISHED, THE ACFT WAS EVACED AND THE EMER GND EQUIP WAS SUMMONED. THE WARNING WAS FALSE.

Narrative: DURING TAXI IN, SMOKE CARGO WARNING WAS RECEIVED DURING THE SHUTDOWN OF #1 ENG. SINGLE ENG TAXI WAS PLANNED FOR THE LAST FEW FT TO OUR GATE. DURING AN ENG SHUTDOWN, ONE WILL RECEIVE A MASTER WARNING WITH TRIPLE CHIME FOR LOW OIL PRESSURE, SO THE FO AND I WERE 'EXPECTING' THAT WARNING. DURING THE 3-CHIME THE FO CANCELED THE WARNING AND I TAXIED A FEW MORE FT WHEN WE SAW THE SMOKE CARGO EICAS MESSAGE. THE CANCELLATION OF THE WARNING APPARENTLY STOPPED THE AUDIO MESSAGE 'SMOKE' BECAUSE NEITHER OF US RECALL HEARING IT. NOW WE WERE MANEUVERING INTO THE PARKING SPACE. I TOLD THE FO WE WOULD EVAC AND CALLED MEMORY ITEMS FOR THE CARGO SMOKE. THE CARGO EXTINGUISHERS WERE ARMED AND FIRED BY THE FO AND HE CALLED FOR ASSISTANCE. I ORDERED THE 'EVAC' AND ALL WENT OK. PROBS: OUR CALL FOR ASSISTANCE WENT OUT OVER COM #2, COMPANY FREQ RATHER THAN COM #1, ATC. THE FIRE DEPT WAS DELAYED ABOUT 1-2 MINS EXTRA, I WOULD GUESS. THE FIRE DEPT DID NOT KNOW THE LOCATION OF THE CARGO BAY, NOR HOW TO OPEN IT. I SHOWED/TOLD THEM. ADDITIONALLY, I'D LIKE TO NOTE THAT THE PAX DID NOT EVAC THROUGH THE OVERWING EXITS NOR THE FRONT SVC DOORS. APPARENTLY THEY WERE STANDING, OR BEGINNING TO STAND (SEAT BELT SIGN STILL ON) MAKING READY TO DEPLANE -- THEY FOLLOWED THE FLT ATTENDANT'S EVAC INSTRUCTIONS HOWEVER. FACTORS: OUR PREVIOUS DAY HAD BEGUN AT XA45 DEPARTING THE HOTEL IN CLE, 7:37 HRS OF FLT, ARR MCO XM31. THE VAN FROM OUR HOTEL PICKED US UP AFTER XN15 AND TOOK US TO ANOTHER HOTEL. CHKING IN AT THE DESK, THEY KNEW NOTHING ABOUT US. SEVERAL PHONE CALLS LATER, WE GOT TO OUR ROOMS AROUND XO00. NEITHER ONE OF US HAD BREAKFAST ON THURSDAY AS THE VAN PICKED US UP AT XX45. WE HAD PLANNED ON A 'BEIGNET' BREAK IN MSY -- THAT IS, THE FO WOULD RUN FOR FOOD, I'D REMAIN AND DO THE POST/PREFLT INSPECTION, ATIS, CLRNC, FLT PLAN, AND WT AND BAL. AS WE WERE SO CLOSE TO OUR GATE THE FO HAD SELECTED HIS COM TO COMPANY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE ACFT WAS A CL65 CANADAIR REGIONAL JET. THE CL65 HAS BEEN IN OP SINCE JUNE OF 1993 IN THE UNITED STATES AND ABOUT 6 MONTHS PRIOR TO THAT IN EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE. THE COMPANY FIX THIS DAY WAS NOT SUCCESSFUL. THE SAME FALSE WARNING OCCURRED THE NEXT DAY AS THE NEXT PLT SHUT THE #1 ENG DOWN AFTER LNDG PREPARING TO TAXI TO THE GATE. THE COMPANY MADE ANOTHER FIX WHICH SEEMS TO HAVE CORRECTED THE PROB. AS THE R ENG SHUTS DOWN THE RESPECTIVE BUS IS THEN POWERED BY THE APU. THE RPTR SAID THE COMPANY HAD NOT DISCLOSED WHAT THE FINAL AND SUCCESSFUL FIX WAS. THE ACFT HAS HAD NO FURTHER FALSE WARNINGS AFTER THAT ONE THE NEXT DAY. THE RPTR WAS NOT APPRISED OF THE CAUSE OF THE FALSE WARNING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.