Narrative:

The flight started with a normal departure from stewart international airport. The captain reviewed the WX and decided to depart VFR to phl. Both forecasted and current WX supported this as a sound decision. After departing and proceeding closer to phl I obtained the current WX information which indicated an overcast layer at 5000 ft and visibility at 10 mi. I informed the captain of current WX and asked him at that time if he would like me to request a local IFR clearance for the descent. He told me he wanted to wait and see if what appeared to be a broken layer ahead would afford us the opportunity to descend VFR. By this time we were handed over to phl approach and were cleared into the class B air space VFR. Additionally, we were given a vector and descent instructions. We requested a lower altitude but it was not granted because of traffic. At this time I requested an IFR clearance as we were not going to be able to maintain VFR at the assigned altitude and heading. Due to controller workload we never received our IFR clearance and proceeded through some clouds for a short period of time. Probably 5 seconds or so. During one of the vectors the captain in an effort to maintain VFR banked the aircraft 45 degrees. After landing uneventfully I had a conversation with the captain concerning the issue. He had no good explanation as to why he would not let me obtain a clearance earlier. He indicated he thought he could maintain VFR knowing very well it would be questionable. I had a previous conversation with this captain on a separate issue. I unfortunately do not know of a good solution to this kind of problem that still exists in aviation community. Fortunately flight safety was not jeopardized seriously and there are not many capts like this remaining. The company I work for would not support, encourage any of the actions that this captain made during this flight. There is effectively no pressure from them to be on time while jeopardizing safety. There needs to be a better checks and balances of crew members than just line checks and reviews of first officer's. Maybe there should be reviews of capts by first first officer's.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: THE FLC FAILED TO GAIN AN IFR CLRNC PRIOR TO FLYING THROUGH CLOUDS. THE FO WANTED THE CLRNC. THE CAPT SAID THEY WOULD NOT NEED IT. THE FO IS FRUSTRATED WITH THE CAPT'S JUDGEMENT.

Narrative: THE FLT STARTED WITH A NORMAL DEP FROM STEWART INTL ARPT. THE CAPT REVIEWED THE WX AND DECIDED TO DEPART VFR TO PHL. BOTH FORECASTED AND CURRENT WX SUPPORTED THIS AS A SOUND DECISION. AFTER DEPARTING AND PROCEEDING CLOSER TO PHL I OBTAINED THE CURRENT WX INFO WHICH INDICATED AN OVCST LAYER AT 5000 FT AND VISIBILITY AT 10 MI. I INFORMED THE CAPT OF CURRENT WX AND ASKED HIM AT THAT TIME IF HE WOULD LIKE ME TO REQUEST A LCL IFR CLRNC FOR THE DSCNT. HE TOLD ME HE WANTED TO WAIT AND SEE IF WHAT APPEARED TO BE A BROKEN LAYER AHEAD WOULD AFFORD US THE OPPORTUNITY TO DSND VFR. BY THIS TIME WE WERE HANDED OVER TO PHL APCH AND WERE CLRED INTO THE CLASS B AIR SPACE VFR. ADDITIONALLY, WE WERE GIVEN A VECTOR AND DSCNT INSTRUCTIONS. WE REQUESTED A LOWER ALT BUT IT WAS NOT GRANTED BECAUSE OF TFC. AT THIS TIME I REQUESTED AN IFR CLRNC AS WE WERE NOT GOING TO BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN VFR AT THE ASSIGNED ALT AND HDG. DUE TO CTLR WORKLOAD WE NEVER RECEIVED OUR IFR CLRNC AND PROCEEDED THROUGH SOME CLOUDS FOR A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME. PROBABLY 5 SECONDS OR SO. DURING ONE OF THE VECTORS THE CAPT IN AN EFFORT TO MAINTAIN VFR BANKED THE ACFT 45 DEGS. AFTER LNDG UNEVENTFULLY I HAD A CONVERSATION WITH THE CAPT CONCERNING THE ISSUE. HE HAD NO GOOD EXPLANATION AS TO WHY HE WOULD NOT LET ME OBTAIN A CLRNC EARLIER. HE INDICATED HE THOUGHT HE COULD MAINTAIN VFR KNOWING VERY WELL IT WOULD BE QUESTIONABLE. I HAD A PREVIOUS CONVERSATION WITH THIS CAPT ON A SEPARATE ISSUE. I UNFORTUNATELY DO NOT KNOW OF A GOOD SOLUTION TO THIS KIND OF PROB THAT STILL EXISTS IN AVIATION COMMUNITY. FORTUNATELY FLT SAFETY WAS NOT JEOPARDIZED SERIOUSLY AND THERE ARE NOT MANY CAPTS LIKE THIS REMAINING. THE COMPANY I WORK FOR WOULD NOT SUPPORT, ENCOURAGE ANY OF THE ACTIONS THAT THIS CAPT MADE DURING THIS FLT. THERE IS EFFECTIVELY NO PRESSURE FROM THEM TO BE ON TIME WHILE JEOPARDIZING SAFETY. THERE NEEDS TO BE A BETTER CHKS AND BALS OF CREW MEMBERS THAN JUST LINE CHKS AND REVIEWS OF FO'S. MAYBE THERE SHOULD BE REVIEWS OF CAPTS BY FIRST FO'S.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.