Narrative:

We had just crossed the seal beach VOR (sli) and been given a northerly vector for a visual approach to los angeles international airport's south complex. Lax was landing to the west, and was reporting partially obscured skies with the visibility at 4 mi with haze. A jetliner, also for the south complex, was approaching lax from the east. Socal pointed him out to us and we subsequently advised ATC that we had visual contact with that aircraft. With that the controller issued a visual approach clearance intending for us to maneuver over and behind his path for runway 25R while he proceeded to runway 25L. We however understood just the opposite and believed ourselves to be for runway 25L and him for runway 25R. Socal proceeded to tell us that we could pull along side the jetliner but we were not to pass, then advised us to contact lax tower. Since we did not have lax in sight, the visual approach was contingent on us maintaining visual separation with the jetliner and since we believed ourselves to be for runway 25L we began to position ourselves behind and to the left of the aircraft we were to follow to the airport. We realized we were left of that runway's centerline because of the full right scale deflection of our localizer indication. We elected not to alter our heading any further to the right for obvious proximity and wake turbulence considerations. At a distance of 7 mi east of lax we were about to question the tower if the preceding aircraft was in fact approaching to land on runway 25R and that we were in fact for runway 25L when 2 things happened. The jetliner received a TCASII resolution, presumably on us, and initiated a go around. The second of these things was that the runways 25L and 25R came into our view. When the preceding aircraft initiated the go around the tower queried us as to whether or not we still had visual contact with him, and we replied that we still did. A runway 25L landing clearance was then issued to us and we landed without further incident. It was not until after a runway 25L landing clearance was issued to us that the tower advised us that they were expecting us for runway 25R. The misunderstanding was probably facilitated by several factors. The 1ST of these was that we were concentrating our efforts in maintaining separation with the preceding aircraft. 2ND when the first officer acknowledged our approach clearance he may not have read back the runway assignment. 3RD, since the runway environment was not in sight it was impossible to determine which runway the preceding aircraft was aligned with until we had achieved a parallel heading. 4TH, since we were not accustomed to maneuvering over and behind another aircraft's approach course at lax and it seemed more logical for us to be aligned for the left and him for the right to avoid a crisscross maneuver, we may have inadvertently anticipated the controller's instructions and preprogrammed ourselves to hear and believe that we had been cleared for the runway 25L visual approach. 5TH, it became apparent that the aircraft we were assigned to maintain visual contact with did not have our aircraft in visual contact. And finally fatigue may have also been a contributing factor. I was completing my 30TH leg in a 5 day period. While my first officer was completing his 25TH leg in a 4 day period. On this particular day we were on the 7TH leg of an 8 leg day and had been on duty for approximately 9.7 hours at the time of the aforementioned events. We had completed 6.8 hours of flying upon landing at lax and, due to WX and ATC delays, we had not received any adequate meal or rest breaks. Had the mix-up been discovered earlier the problem could have probably been easily corrected. As far as avoiding the problem to begin with, I think that if during simultaneous approachs if both aircraft crews are required to have visual contact with each other or at the very least have the airport environment in sight, the probability of recognizing and correcting a similar situation in a more timely manner greatly increases. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter states he was flying a jetstream aircraft. He believes they were never closer than 1/4 mi from the B767. He talked to socal approach controller who indicated the air carrier flight crew was upset but socal indicated they were on a visual approach and socal was not responsible for separation. Socal also indicated they might file a report. To this date reporter has heard nothing. Supplemental information from acn 325366: we were cleared ILS runway 25L to lax off of the civet arrival. A commuter was to our left cleared to keep visual with us and go to runway 25R. Out of 1500 ft TCASII prompted a climb command, screen showed traffic 100 ft below underneath us. Go around accomplished with normal landing back on runway 25L. Socal TRACON contacted after landing, they will pull tape. Believe commuter thought we would land on runway 25R, still too close. Callback conversation with reporter of acn 325366 revealed the following information: reporter states the tapes indicated that commuter flight crew acknowledged the correct runway. Reporter was informed of the traffic but it was behind him and he believed he wouldn't have to worry about that aircraft. There has been no other action taken from B767 flight crew standpoint. Reporter is more concerned that the approach controller and tower controller were not involved and did not give any indication that the traffic was closing and/or in the wrong position for runway 25R versus runway 25L. He feels they should have been aware and given both aircraft notice of the proximity. Reporter was also concerned that the commuter flight crew did not give enough consideration to the possible wake turbulence issue in coming so close to the B767.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: COMMUTER JETSTREAM ASSIGNED A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 25R BEHIND A B767 ASSIGNED RWY 25L. COMMUTER LINES UP FOR RWY 25L INSTEAD AND B767 RECEIVES TCASII RA. B767 EXECUTES A GAR.

Narrative: WE HAD JUST CROSSED THE SEAL BEACH VOR (SLI) AND BEEN GIVEN A NORTHERLY VECTOR FOR A VISUAL APCH TO LOS ANGELES INTL ARPT'S S COMPLEX. LAX WAS LNDG TO THE W, AND WAS RPTING PARTIALLY OBSCURED SKIES WITH THE VISIBILITY AT 4 MI WITH HAZE. A JETLINER, ALSO FOR THE S COMPLEX, WAS APCHING LAX FROM THE E. SOCAL POINTED HIM OUT TO US AND WE SUBSEQUENTLY ADVISED ATC THAT WE HAD VISUAL CONTACT WITH THAT ACFT. WITH THAT THE CTLR ISSUED A VISUAL APCH CLRNC INTENDING FOR US TO MANEUVER OVER AND BEHIND HIS PATH FOR RWY 25R WHILE HE PROCEEDED TO RWY 25L. WE HOWEVER UNDERSTOOD JUST THE OPPOSITE AND BELIEVED OURSELVES TO BE FOR RWY 25L AND HIM FOR RWY 25R. SOCAL PROCEEDED TO TELL US THAT WE COULD PULL ALONG SIDE THE JETLINER BUT WE WERE NOT TO PASS, THEN ADVISED US TO CONTACT LAX TWR. SINCE WE DID NOT HAVE LAX IN SIGHT, THE VISUAL APCH WAS CONTINGENT ON US MAINTAINING VISUAL SEPARATION WITH THE JETLINER AND SINCE WE BELIEVED OURSELVES TO BE FOR RWY 25L WE BEGAN TO POS OURSELVES BEHIND AND TO THE L OF THE ACFT WE WERE TO FOLLOW TO THE ARPT. WE REALIZED WE WERE L OF THAT RWY'S CTRLINE BECAUSE OF THE FULL R SCALE DEFLECTION OF OUR LOC INDICATION. WE ELECTED NOT TO ALTER OUR HEADING ANY FURTHER TO THE R FOR OBVIOUS PROX AND WAKE TURB CONSIDERATIONS. AT A DISTANCE OF 7 MI E OF LAX WE WERE ABOUT TO QUESTION THE TWR IF THE PRECEDING ACFT WAS IN FACT APCHING TO LAND ON RWY 25R AND THAT WE WERE IN FACT FOR RWY 25L WHEN 2 THINGS HAPPENED. THE JETLINER RECEIVED A TCASII RESOLUTION, PRESUMABLY ON US, AND INITIATED A GAR. THE SECOND OF THESE THINGS WAS THAT THE RWYS 25L AND 25R CAME INTO OUR VIEW. WHEN THE PRECEDING ACFT INITIATED THE GAR THE TWR QUERIED US AS TO WHETHER OR NOT WE STILL HAD VISUAL CONTACT WITH HIM, AND WE REPLIED THAT WE STILL DID. A RWY 25L LNDG CLRNC WAS THEN ISSUED TO US AND WE LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. IT WAS NOT UNTIL AFTER A RWY 25L LNDG CLRNC WAS ISSUED TO US THAT THE TWR ADVISED US THAT THEY WERE EXPECTING US FOR RWY 25R. THE MISUNDERSTANDING WAS PROBABLY FACILITATED BY SEVERAL FACTORS. THE 1ST OF THESE WAS THAT WE WERE CONCENTRATING OUR EFFORTS IN MAINTAINING SEPARATION WITH THE PRECEDING ACFT. 2ND WHEN THE FO ACKNOWLEDGED OUR APCH CLRNC HE MAY NOT HAVE READ BACK THE RWY ASSIGNMENT. 3RD, SINCE THE RWY ENVIRONMENT WAS NOT IN SIGHT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE WHICH RWY THE PRECEDING ACFT WAS ALIGNED WITH UNTIL WE HAD ACHIEVED A PARALLEL HEADING. 4TH, SINCE WE WERE NOT ACCUSTOMED TO MANEUVERING OVER AND BEHIND ANOTHER ACFT'S APCH COURSE AT LAX AND IT SEEMED MORE LOGICAL FOR US TO BE ALIGNED FOR THE L AND HIM FOR THE R TO AVOID A CRISSCROSS MANEUVER, WE MAY HAVE INADVERTENTLY ANTICIPATED THE CTLR'S INSTRUCTIONS AND PREPROGRAMMED OURSELVES TO HEAR AND BELIEVE THAT WE HAD BEEN CLRED FOR THE RWY 25L VISUAL APCH. 5TH, IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THE ACFT WE WERE ASSIGNED TO MAINTAIN VISUAL CONTACT WITH DID NOT HAVE OUR ACFT IN VISUAL CONTACT. AND FINALLY FATIGUE MAY HAVE ALSO BEEN A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR. I WAS COMPLETING MY 30TH LEG IN A 5 DAY PERIOD. WHILE MY FO WAS COMPLETING HIS 25TH LEG IN A 4 DAY PERIOD. ON THIS PARTICULAR DAY WE WERE ON THE 7TH LEG OF AN 8 LEG DAY AND HAD BEEN ON DUTY FOR APPROX 9.7 HRS AT THE TIME OF THE AFOREMENTIONED EVENTS. WE HAD COMPLETED 6.8 HRS OF FLYING UPON LNDG AT LAX AND, DUE TO WX AND ATC DELAYS, WE HAD NOT RECEIVED ANY ADEQUATE MEAL OR REST BREAKS. HAD THE MIX-UP BEEN DISCOVERED EARLIER THE PROB COULD HAVE PROBABLY BEEN EASILY CORRECTED. AS FAR AS AVOIDING THE PROB TO BEGIN WITH, I THINK THAT IF DURING SIMULTANEOUS APCHS IF BOTH ACFT CREWS ARE REQUIRED TO HAVE VISUAL CONTACT WITH EACH OTHER OR AT THE VERY LEAST HAVE THE ARPT ENVIRONMENT IN SIGHT, THE PROBABILITY OF RECOGNIZING AND CORRECTING A SIMILAR SIT IN A MORE TIMELY MANNER GREATLY INCREASES. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES HE WAS FLYING A JETSTREAM ACFT. HE BELIEVES THEY WERE NEVER CLOSER THAN 1/4 MI FROM THE B767. HE TALKED TO SOCAL APCH CTLR WHO INDICATED THE ACR FLC WAS UPSET BUT SOCAL INDICATED THEY WERE ON A VISUAL APCH AND SOCAL WAS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR SEPARATION. SOCAL ALSO INDICATED THEY MIGHT FILE A RPT. TO THIS DATE RPTR HAS HEARD NOTHING. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 325366: WE WERE CLRED ILS RWY 25L TO LAX OFF OF THE CIVET ARR. A COMMUTER WAS TO OUR L CLRED TO KEEP VISUAL WITH US AND GO TO RWY 25R. OUT OF 1500 FT TCASII PROMPTED A CLB COMMAND, SCREEN SHOWED TFC 100 FT BELOW UNDERNEATH US. GAR ACCOMPLISHED WITH NORMAL LNDG BACK ON RWY 25L. SOCAL TRACON CONTACTED AFTER LNDG, THEY WILL PULL TAPE. BELIEVE COMMUTER THOUGHT WE WOULD LAND ON RWY 25R, STILL TOO CLOSE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR OF ACN 325366 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES THE TAPES INDICATED THAT COMMUTER FLC ACKNOWLEDGED THE CORRECT RWY. RPTR WAS INFORMED OF THE TFC BUT IT WAS BEHIND HIM AND HE BELIEVED HE WOULDN'T HAVE TO WORRY ABOUT THAT ACFT. THERE HAS BEEN NO OTHER ACTION TAKEN FROM B767 FLC STANDPOINT. RPTR IS MORE CONCERNED THAT THE APCH CTLR AND TWR CTLR WERE NOT INVOLVED AND DID NOT GIVE ANY INDICATION THAT THE TFC WAS CLOSING AND/OR IN THE WRONG POS FOR RWY 25R VERSUS RWY 25L. HE FEELS THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARE AND GIVEN BOTH ACFT NOTICE OF THE PROX. RPTR WAS ALSO CONCERNED THAT THE COMMUTER FLC DID NOT GIVE ENOUGH CONSIDERATION TO THE POSSIBLE WAKE TURB ISSUE IN COMING SO CLOSE TO THE B767.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.