|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||1201 To 1800|
|Locale Reference||airport : yul|
|Altitude||agl bound lower : 0|
agl bound upper : 0
|Operator||common carrier : air carrier|
|Make Model Name||Commercial Fixed Wing|
|Operating Under FAR Part||Part 121|
|Flight Phase||ground : parked|
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : captain|
oversight : pic
|Qualification||pilot : cfi|
pilot : atp
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 100|
flight time total : 12000
flight time type : 2500
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : first officer|
|Qualification||pilot : instrument|
pilot : commercial
|Anomaly||other anomaly other|
|Independent Detector||other other : unspecified|
|Resolutory Action||none taken : detected after the fact|
|Air Traffic Incident||other|
This was my second yul turn of the day. The first turn was completed on schedule and without incident. Approximately 20 min prior to arrival at yul I contacted operations with my ETA of XA25L. I was 5 mins behind schedule due to ewr departure delays. My gate assignment was Y. My actual arrival time at the gate was XA28L. As I approached the gate I noticed that there were no ramp personnel visible in the gate area so I brought the aircraft to a stop about 2 plane lengths from the gate. At this time I had only the #1 engine running. After about 1-2 mins, several ramp personnel came running onto the scene and one individual in ramp agent uniform began signaling me, with unlit wands, a come ahead signal. His come ahead signals included no lateral alignment assistance and he appeared to be somewhat tentative about his signals, looking to other ramp agents occasionally for coaching. As I approached a position abeam the jetway, the signalman gave me a stop signal with crossed wands. I stopped the aircraft, parked the brakes and shut down the #1 engine. It was now XA31L. I watched the signalman for the 'chocks in' signal. Instead of 'chocks in' however, the signalman began signaling come ahead again. I looked out to the jetway and several individuals in uniforms were signaling me that I needed to move forward about a ft. I looked back at the signalman and he continued relentlessly signaling, 'come ahead.' at this time I instructed the first officer to restart the #1 engine, which had completely spooled down. Just as the #1 engine reached idle, the signalman gave me a slashing throat 'shutdown' signal. I shut down the #1 engine. At this time I made a brief PA and asked the passenger to please remain seated and bear with me until I could sort out the problem. At this point, I opened my side window to try to establish some sort of verbal communications. A gentleman in the jetway who was assisting a gate agent with the jetway operation said that I needed to move the aircraft forward about a ft. I asked him to have the ramp agent plug in a headset. He informed me that the ramp agent had no headset. I called down to the signalman and motioned with my hands on my ears indicating I wanted headset communications. He simply said, with a strong french accent, 'no, no, no headset.' within about 1 min of my request for a headset, the signalman began signaling with one wand waving in a circular motion above his head 'start engine.' there was now a strong level of confidence and conviction in the way the signalman was waving his wand and I felt confident that he did indeed want me to start the engine. I instructed the first officer to restart the #1 engine. By the time the engine reached idle, the signalman was already signaling 'come ahead.' after taxiing forward about 6 inches, I again received a stop signal, followed by the shutdown signal. I again shut down the #1 engine. The signalman then walked away without giving me a 'chocks in' signal. I left the brakes parked and called for the 'parking checklist.' at this point, I thought the worst was behind me. I was wrong. While I was stretching my legs just outside the jetway door to the ramp, the ramp agent who had been my signalman passed by me and said as he walked by, with a very strong french accent, 'sorry.' I responded 'don't worry about it.' shortly thereafter, I was approached by a gentleman in coat and tie who idented himself as 1 of 2 employees at this station. He said 'we have a problem.' apparently, the first time I restarted the #1 engine, in response to the relentless come ahead signal by my signalman, a lav truck had pulled up to service the lavs and the driver had idle power exhaust gas blown on him and his truck. He had informed that he intended to file a 'violation.' my first question was, 'was there any injury or damage?' he assured me that there was no injury or damage. The lav truck driver indicated that he believed the anti-collision light was not on, therefore it was a violation to have an engine running, and he intended to pursue this issue. As far as the anti-collision light is concerned, to the best of my knowledge, it was on untilthe third and final engine shutdown. I say this because I had not called for the parking checklist until the third and final shutdown and, upon asking the first officer about it, he remembered turning it off after the third and final engine shutdown in accordance with the check list. At departure time, a tug was hooked up to the aircraft and my signalman plugged a headset into the aircraft and established communications. 'Cleared to start' was all he said. 'Are you sure you want me to start up here at the gate?' I said. 'No, no, release brakes.' well, we managed to get out of the ramp area without further incident. I believe the cause of this incident was a lack of supervision of an inexperienced marshalling signalman which resulted in poor communications with me and with other ground crewmen. The language barrier and lack of availability of a communications headset added to the communications problem.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: INADEQUATE COM BTWN GND PERSONNEL AND FLC IN PARKING AN MDT LED TO CONFUSION.
Narrative: THIS WAS MY SECOND YUL TURN OF THE DAY. THE FIRST TURN WAS COMPLETED ON SCHEDULE AND WITHOUT INCIDENT. APPROX 20 MIN PRIOR TO ARR AT YUL I CONTACTED OPS WITH MY ETA OF XA25L. I WAS 5 MINS BEHIND SCHEDULE DUE TO EWR DEP DELAYS. MY GATE ASSIGNMENT WAS Y. MY ACTUAL ARR TIME AT THE GATE WAS XA28L. AS I APCHED THE GATE I NOTICED THAT THERE WERE NO RAMP PERSONNEL VISIBLE IN THE GATE AREA SO I BROUGHT THE ACFT TO A STOP ABOUT 2 PLANE LENGTHS FROM THE GATE. AT THIS TIME I HAD ONLY THE #1 ENG RUNNING. AFTER ABOUT 1-2 MINS, SEVERAL RAMP PERSONNEL CAME RUNNING ONTO THE SCENE AND ONE INDIVIDUAL IN RAMP AGENT UNIFORM BEGAN SIGNALING ME, WITH UNLIT WANDS, A COME AHEAD SIGNAL. HIS COME AHEAD SIGNALS INCLUDED NO LATERAL ALIGNMENT ASSISTANCE AND HE APPEARED TO BE SOMEWHAT TENTATIVE ABOUT HIS SIGNALS, LOOKING TO OTHER RAMP AGENTS OCCASIONALLY FOR COACHING. AS I APCHED A POS ABEAM THE JETWAY, THE SIGNALMAN GAVE ME A STOP SIGNAL WITH CROSSED WANDS. I STOPPED THE ACFT, PARKED THE BRAKES AND SHUT DOWN THE #1 ENG. IT WAS NOW XA31L. I WATCHED THE SIGNALMAN FOR THE 'CHOCKS IN' SIGNAL. INSTEAD OF 'CHOCKS IN' HOWEVER, THE SIGNALMAN BEGAN SIGNALING COME AHEAD AGAIN. I LOOKED OUT TO THE JETWAY AND SEVERAL INDIVIDUALS IN UNIFORMS WERE SIGNALING ME THAT I NEEDED TO MOVE FORWARD ABOUT A FT. I LOOKED BACK AT THE SIGNALMAN AND HE CONTINUED RELENTLESSLY SIGNALING, 'COME AHEAD.' AT THIS TIME I INSTRUCTED THE FO TO RESTART THE #1 ENG, WHICH HAD COMPLETELY SPOOLED DOWN. JUST AS THE #1 ENG REACHED IDLE, THE SIGNALMAN GAVE ME A SLASHING THROAT 'SHUTDOWN' SIGNAL. I SHUT DOWN THE #1 ENG. AT THIS TIME I MADE A BRIEF PA AND ASKED THE PAX TO PLEASE REMAIN SEATED AND BEAR WITH ME UNTIL I COULD SORT OUT THE PROB. AT THIS POINT, I OPENED MY SIDE WINDOW TO TRY TO ESTABLISH SOME SORT OF VERBAL COMS. A GENTLEMAN IN THE JETWAY WHO WAS ASSISTING A GATE AGENT WITH THE JETWAY OP SAID THAT I NEEDED TO MOVE THE ACFT FORWARD ABOUT A FT. I ASKED HIM TO HAVE THE RAMP AGENT PLUG IN A HEADSET. HE INFORMED ME THAT THE RAMP AGENT HAD NO HEADSET. I CALLED DOWN TO THE SIGNALMAN AND MOTIONED WITH MY HANDS ON MY EARS INDICATING I WANTED HEADSET COMS. HE SIMPLY SAID, WITH A STRONG FRENCH ACCENT, 'NO, NO, NO HEADSET.' WITHIN ABOUT 1 MIN OF MY REQUEST FOR A HEADSET, THE SIGNALMAN BEGAN SIGNALING WITH ONE WAND WAVING IN A CIRCULAR MOTION ABOVE HIS HEAD 'START ENG.' THERE WAS NOW A STRONG LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE AND CONVICTION IN THE WAY THE SIGNALMAN WAS WAVING HIS WAND AND I FELT CONFIDENT THAT HE DID INDEED WANT ME TO START THE ENG. I INSTRUCTED THE FO TO RESTART THE #1 ENG. BY THE TIME THE ENG REACHED IDLE, THE SIGNALMAN WAS ALREADY SIGNALING 'COME AHEAD.' AFTER TAXIING FORWARD ABOUT 6 INCHES, I AGAIN RECEIVED A STOP SIGNAL, FOLLOWED BY THE SHUTDOWN SIGNAL. I AGAIN SHUT DOWN THE #1 ENG. THE SIGNALMAN THEN WALKED AWAY WITHOUT GIVING ME A 'CHOCKS IN' SIGNAL. I LEFT THE BRAKES PARKED AND CALLED FOR THE 'PARKING CHKLIST.' AT THIS POINT, I THOUGHT THE WORST WAS BEHIND ME. I WAS WRONG. WHILE I WAS STRETCHING MY LEGS JUST OUTSIDE THE JETWAY DOOR TO THE RAMP, THE RAMP AGENT WHO HAD BEEN MY SIGNALMAN PASSED BY ME AND SAID AS HE WALKED BY, WITH A VERY STRONG FRENCH ACCENT, 'SORRY.' I RESPONDED 'DON'T WORRY ABOUT IT.' SHORTLY THEREAFTER, I WAS APCHED BY A GENTLEMAN IN COAT AND TIE WHO IDENTED HIMSELF AS 1 OF 2 EMPLOYEES AT THIS STATION. HE SAID 'WE HAVE A PROB.' APPARENTLY, THE FIRST TIME I RESTARTED THE #1 ENG, IN RESPONSE TO THE RELENTLESS COME AHEAD SIGNAL BY MY SIGNALMAN, A LAV TRUCK HAD PULLED UP TO SVC THE LAVS AND THE DRIVER HAD IDLE PWR EXHAUST GAS BLOWN ON HIM AND HIS TRUCK. HE HAD INFORMED THAT HE INTENDED TO FILE A 'VIOLATION.' MY FIRST QUESTION WAS, 'WAS THERE ANY INJURY OR DAMAGE?' HE ASSURED ME THAT THERE WAS NO INJURY OR DAMAGE. THE LAV TRUCK DRIVER INDICATED THAT HE BELIEVED THE ANTI-COLLISION LIGHT WAS NOT ON, THEREFORE IT WAS A VIOLATION TO HAVE AN ENG RUNNING, AND HE INTENDED TO PURSUE THIS ISSUE. AS FAR AS THE ANTI-COLLISION LIGHT IS CONCERNED, TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE, IT WAS ON UNTILTHE THIRD AND FINAL ENG SHUTDOWN. I SAY THIS BECAUSE I HAD NOT CALLED FOR THE PARKING CHKLIST UNTIL THE THIRD AND FINAL SHUTDOWN AND, UPON ASKING THE FO ABOUT IT, HE REMEMBERED TURNING IT OFF AFTER THE THIRD AND FINAL ENG SHUTDOWN IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHK LIST. AT DEP TIME, A TUG WAS HOOKED UP TO THE ACFT AND MY SIGNALMAN PLUGGED A HEADSET INTO THE ACFT AND ESTABLISHED COMS. 'CLRED TO START' WAS ALL HE SAID. 'ARE YOU SURE YOU WANT ME TO START UP HERE AT THE GATE?' I SAID. 'NO, NO, RELEASE BRAKES.' WELL, WE MANAGED TO GET OUT OF THE RAMP AREA WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. I BELIEVE THE CAUSE OF THIS INCIDENT WAS A LACK OF SUPERVISION OF AN INEXPERIENCED MARSHALLING SIGNALMAN WHICH RESULTED IN POOR COMS WITH ME AND WITH OTHER GND CREWMEN. THE LANGUAGE BARRIER AND LACK OF AVAILABILITY OF A COMS HEADSET ADDED TO THE COMS PROB.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.