Narrative:

On flight mar/xx/95, slc-rno, my first officer was the PF. The WX was up and down in rno in occasional near blizzard conditions. Briefed the localizer DME 1 runway 16R circle to land runway 16L. This provided us with 1000/3 (5412 ft minimum descent altitude/3 mi visibility) as the working minimum for the approach. Published for category C aircraft is 5340/2 3/4 mi. This translates to the aforementioned 1000/3 per our operations specifications. Flew excellent approachs. However, the varying WX forced a missed approach on our first attempt. I saw the runway nearly straight down while in the miss, but that was all. After completing most of the missed procedure, approach control placed us on vectors. As I recall, we were assigned 8500 ft, and we were set up to intercept right at sparks. As the controller gave us the heading to intercept the localizer course, he advised that the heading and altitude might cause a GPWS warning that he characterized as spurious, but that we would clear the terrain (or words to that effect). Note: I have requested that the tapes be pulled for the associated period. No controller should attempt vectors that, to his knowledge, may generate a GPWS warning. There is no savings of fuel or time that is worth that level of risk! I had briefed that we would respect all GPWS warnings during our operations at rno. Applied power, and began rotating and climbing. The warning stopped with the radar altimeter stabilized at 980 ft, then increased rapidly as we cleared the terrain. We were still in a position to salvage the approach since we were just capturing the localizer over a known position and altitude. Did an excellent job in recovering and placing us back in the groove. The next day, windshear coupled with terrain would again place us in jeopardy in rno. I was the PF on flight. About 30 mins out, I had the so, check the rno WX. It was essentially woxof in snow. Moderate to severe turbulence associated with the mountains and high winds was reported (and had earlier been encountered when departing rno) on descent. The WX was then changing rapidly in rno, and had improved significantly by the time we began our approach. Though we could see much of the city while on downwind, there was a layer off the approach end to be considered. We again set up for the now familiar localizer DME 1 runway 16R, circle runway 16L. We got on the localizer without incident, and began the approach. There were significant tailwinds at altitude associated with frontal passage. The surface winds remained predominately down the runway at approximately 12 KTS. Inside dicey, we picked up runway 16L, and got aligned with the centerline, with the PAPI showing 1 red, 3 white, or slightly high on the visual approach (the localizer course was 1 DOT right when on centerline, runway 16L). Due to the tailwind aloft, our descent rate was fairly high to maintain the visual slope. That combined with the rise on the north side of the hills (5088 ft) triggered a GPWS warning. I immediately added power and began rotating as I looked over the nose. I saw that we were not in danger, though the radar altitude did go down to approximately 900 ft. I re-stabilized and continued to landing. Note that we never went low on the visual GS, indicating that we were where we were supposed to be. On extremely short final, tower reported winds just shifting out of the north at 8 KTS. We were at maximum landing weight, 154000 pounds, however, we were in the flare and were going to be well within the touchdown zone. I elected to complete the landing. In short order, events proved that to be a good decision. With the engines stabilized at 1.7 EPR in reverse, #3 engine compressor stalled twice. I reduced the amount of EPR on #3. Immediately, the so reported an aft cargo light. We finished the landing rollout, and exited the runway. A flight was then about 3-4 mi out for the same runway. We advised tower to wave him off since we could not be sure that we hadn't dumped cargo on the runway. We further advised that a visual inspection would be required of the runway to ensure that it was clear. Tower took aircraft around, and advised that they were changing the airport around to a runway 34R operation. We proceeded to the gate, and called for maintenance. The procedures are complex in rno, and to needlessly place crews without an approach procedure to an instrument runway of intended landing is asinine. There is a critical safety need for a procedure to runway 16L. After looking over the terrain and approach pages, why is there not a sidestep procedure off of the ILS DME 3 runway 16R approach? That would define when and where the sidestep would occur, and would avoid the potential GPWS warning from the 5088 ft hills that are approximately 4 mi off of the approach end of runway 16L. An additional benefit could accrue if it gave us a lower WX minimum to work with. It would certainly improve safety by providing a bubble of protection from terrain that is just barely visible at night and is invisible during low visibility conditions in the approach area. Let me tell you for sure that the visibility value at the field has no relation to conditions on the approach end of runway 16L when WX is moving through out of the south! Given that the runway closure is a fact of life until sep, something must be done -- and it must be done rapidly! To be out there murking around in an essentially visual maneuver with the terrain, WX, windshear, and occasional darkness encountered in those mountains is unacceptable. Surely, the finest ATC system in the world can do better!??? Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that he believed that ATC should be recommended to not vector aircraft lower than 2000 ft above mountainous terrain since it could cause a GPWS warning as it did in this incident. He also firmly believes that there should be a 'sidestep' approach to the other parallel runway since he thinks that would be safer than the existing circle to land. He further stated that his company has been recently issued special approach plates that depict lower minimums that the standard approach charts using localizer DME as the guidance. It was suggested to reporter that the standard instrument approach procedures would probably be reinstated for this operator if the new special ones were considered unsafe, as he is indicating in his report. He further stated that he believes that the airport management could have changed the closing time for the main ILS runway even though he has no facts to support this belief. He has heard back that his employee organization is trying to stop ATC from issuing vectors that could cause a possible GPWS warning.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT OF AN LGT COMPLAINS THAT THERE IS INSUFFICIENT INST APCH PROCS AT RNO ARPT. IN ADDITION, 1 ENG STALLED OUT DURING REVERSE, A CARGO DOOR WARNING LIGHT ILLUMINATED DURING LNDG ROLLOUT AND THE GPWS SOUNDED DURING APCH.

Narrative: ON FLT MAR/XX/95, SLC-RNO, MY FO WAS THE PF. THE WX WAS UP AND DOWN IN RNO IN OCCASIONAL NEAR BLIZZARD CONDITIONS. BRIEFED THE LOC DME 1 RWY 16R CIRCLE TO LAND RWY 16L. THIS PROVIDED US WITH 1000/3 (5412 FT MINIMUM DSCNT ALT/3 MI VISIBILITY) AS THE WORKING MINIMUM FOR THE APCH. PUBLISHED FOR CATEGORY C ACFT IS 5340/2 3/4 MI. THIS TRANSLATES TO THE AFOREMENTIONED 1000/3 PER OUR OPS SPECS. FLEW EXCELLENT APCHS. HOWEVER, THE VARYING WX FORCED A MISSED APCH ON OUR FIRST ATTEMPT. I SAW THE RWY NEARLY STRAIGHT DOWN WHILE IN THE MISS, BUT THAT WAS ALL. AFTER COMPLETING MOST OF THE MISSED PROC, APCH CTL PLACED US ON VECTORS. AS I RECALL, WE WERE ASSIGNED 8500 FT, AND WE WERE SET UP TO INTERCEPT RIGHT AT SPARKS. AS THE CTLR GAVE US THE HDG TO INTERCEPT THE LOC COURSE, HE ADVISED THAT THE HDG AND ALT MIGHT CAUSE A GPWS WARNING THAT HE CHARACTERIZED AS SPURIOUS, BUT THAT WE WOULD CLR THE TERRAIN (OR WORDS TO THAT EFFECT). NOTE: I HAVE REQUESTED THAT THE TAPES BE PULLED FOR THE ASSOCIATED PERIOD. NO CTLR SHOULD ATTEMPT VECTORS THAT, TO HIS KNOWLEDGE, MAY GENERATE A GPWS WARNING. THERE IS NO SAVINGS OF FUEL OR TIME THAT IS WORTH THAT LEVEL OF RISK! I HAD BRIEFED THAT WE WOULD RESPECT ALL GPWS WARNINGS DURING OUR OPS AT RNO. APPLIED PWR, AND BEGAN ROTATING AND CLBING. THE WARNING STOPPED WITH THE RADAR ALTIMETER STABILIZED AT 980 FT, THEN INCREASED RAPIDLY AS WE CLRED THE TERRAIN. WE WERE STILL IN A POS TO SALVAGE THE APCH SINCE WE WERE JUST CAPTURING THE LOC OVER A KNOWN POS AND ALT. DID AN EXCELLENT JOB IN RECOVERING AND PLACING US BACK IN THE GROOVE. THE NEXT DAY, WINDSHEAR COUPLED WITH TERRAIN WOULD AGAIN PLACE US IN JEOPARDY IN RNO. I WAS THE PF ON FLT. ABOUT 30 MINS OUT, I HAD THE SO, CHK THE RNO WX. IT WAS ESSENTIALLY WOXOF IN SNOW. MODERATE TO SEVERE TURB ASSOCIATED WITH THE MOUNTAINS AND HIGH WINDS WAS RPTED (AND HAD EARLIER BEEN ENCOUNTERED WHEN DEPARTING RNO) ON DSCNT. THE WX WAS THEN CHANGING RAPIDLY IN RNO, AND HAD IMPROVED SIGNIFICANTLY BY THE TIME WE BEGAN OUR APCH. THOUGH WE COULD SEE MUCH OF THE CITY WHILE ON DOWNWIND, THERE WAS A LAYER OFF THE APCH END TO BE CONSIDERED. WE AGAIN SET UP FOR THE NOW FAMILIAR LOC DME 1 RWY 16R, CIRCLE RWY 16L. WE GOT ON THE LOC WITHOUT INCIDENT, AND BEGAN THE APCH. THERE WERE SIGNIFICANT TAILWINDS AT ALT ASSOCIATED WITH FRONTAL PASSAGE. THE SURFACE WINDS REMAINED PREDOMINATELY DOWN THE RWY AT APPROX 12 KTS. INSIDE DICEY, WE PICKED UP RWY 16L, AND GOT ALIGNED WITH THE CTRLINE, WITH THE PAPI SHOWING 1 RED, 3 WHITE, OR SLIGHTLY HIGH ON THE VISUAL APCH (THE LOC COURSE WAS 1 DOT R WHEN ON CTRLINE, RWY 16L). DUE TO THE TAILWIND ALOFT, OUR DSCNT RATE WAS FAIRLY HIGH TO MAINTAIN THE VISUAL SLOPE. THAT COMBINED WITH THE RISE ON THE N SIDE OF THE HILLS (5088 FT) TRIGGERED A GPWS WARNING. I IMMEDIATELY ADDED PWR AND BEGAN ROTATING AS I LOOKED OVER THE NOSE. I SAW THAT WE WERE NOT IN DANGER, THOUGH THE RADAR ALT DID GO DOWN TO APPROX 900 FT. I RE-STABILIZED AND CONTINUED TO LNDG. NOTE THAT WE NEVER WENT LOW ON THE VISUAL GS, INDICATING THAT WE WERE WHERE WE WERE SUPPOSED TO BE. ON EXTREMELY SHORT FINAL, TWR RPTED WINDS JUST SHIFTING OUT OF THE N AT 8 KTS. WE WERE AT MAX LNDG WT, 154000 LBS, HOWEVER, WE WERE IN THE FLARE AND WERE GOING TO BE WELL WITHIN THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE. I ELECTED TO COMPLETE THE LNDG. IN SHORT ORDER, EVENTS PROVED THAT TO BE A GOOD DECISION. WITH THE ENGS STABILIZED AT 1.7 EPR IN REVERSE, #3 ENG COMPRESSOR STALLED TWICE. I REDUCED THE AMOUNT OF EPR ON #3. IMMEDIATELY, THE SO RPTED AN AFT CARGO LIGHT. WE FINISHED THE LNDG ROLLOUT, AND EXITED THE RWY. A FLT WAS THEN ABOUT 3-4 MI OUT FOR THE SAME RWY. WE ADVISED TWR TO WAVE HIM OFF SINCE WE COULD NOT BE SURE THAT WE HADN'T DUMPED CARGO ON THE RWY. WE FURTHER ADVISED THAT A VISUAL INSPECTION WOULD BE REQUIRED OF THE RWY TO ENSURE THAT IT WAS CLR. TWR TOOK ACFT AROUND, AND ADVISED THAT THEY WERE CHANGING THE ARPT AROUND TO A RWY 34R OP. WE PROCEEDED TO THE GATE, AND CALLED FOR MAINT. THE PROCS ARE COMPLEX IN RNO, AND TO NEEDLESSLY PLACE CREWS WITHOUT AN APCH PROC TO AN INST RWY OF INTENDED LNDG IS ASININE. THERE IS A CRITICAL SAFETY NEED FOR A PROC TO RWY 16L. AFTER LOOKING OVER THE TERRAIN AND APCH PAGES, WHY IS THERE NOT A SIDESTEP PROC OFF OF THE ILS DME 3 RWY 16R APCH? THAT WOULD DEFINE WHEN AND WHERE THE SIDESTEP WOULD OCCUR, AND WOULD AVOID THE POTENTIAL GPWS WARNING FROM THE 5088 FT HILLS THAT ARE APPROX 4 MI OFF OF THE APCH END OF RWY 16L. AN ADDITIONAL BENEFIT COULD ACCRUE IF IT GAVE US A LOWER WX MINIMUM TO WORK WITH. IT WOULD CERTAINLY IMPROVE SAFETY BY PROVIDING A BUBBLE OF PROTECTION FROM TERRAIN THAT IS JUST BARELY VISIBLE AT NIGHT AND IS INVISIBLE DURING LOW VISIBILITY CONDITIONS IN THE APCH AREA. LET ME TELL YOU FOR SURE THAT THE VISIBILITY VALUE AT THE FIELD HAS NO RELATION TO CONDITIONS ON THE APCH END OF RWY 16L WHEN WX IS MOVING THROUGH OUT OF THE S! GIVEN THAT THE RWY CLOSURE IS A FACT OF LIFE UNTIL SEP, SOMETHING MUST BE DONE -- AND IT MUST BE DONE RAPIDLY! TO BE OUT THERE MURKING AROUND IN AN ESSENTIALLY VISUAL MANEUVER WITH THE TERRAIN, WX, WINDSHEAR, AND OCCASIONAL DARKNESS ENCOUNTERED IN THOSE MOUNTAINS IS UNACCEPTABLE. SURELY, THE FINEST ATC SYS IN THE WORLD CAN DO BETTER!??? CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT ATC SHOULD BE RECOMMENDED TO NOT VECTOR ACFT LOWER THAN 2000 FT ABOVE MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN SINCE IT COULD CAUSE A GPWS WARNING AS IT DID IN THIS INCIDENT. HE ALSO FIRMLY BELIEVES THAT THERE SHOULD BE A 'SIDESTEP' APCH TO THE OTHER PARALLEL RWY SINCE HE THINKS THAT WOULD BE SAFER THAN THE EXISTING CIRCLE TO LAND. HE FURTHER STATED THAT HIS COMPANY HAS BEEN RECENTLY ISSUED SPECIAL APCH PLATES THAT DEPICT LOWER MINIMUMS THAT THE STANDARD APCH CHARTS USING LOC DME AS THE GUIDANCE. IT WAS SUGGESTED TO RPTR THAT THE STANDARD INST APCH PROCS WOULD PROBABLY BE REINSTATED FOR THIS OPERATOR IF THE NEW SPECIAL ONES WERE CONSIDERED UNSAFE, AS HE IS INDICATING IN HIS RPT. HE FURTHER STATED THAT HE BELIEVES THAT THE ARPT MGMNT COULD HAVE CHANGED THE CLOSING TIME FOR THE MAIN ILS RWY EVEN THOUGH HE HAS NO FACTS TO SUPPORT THIS BELIEF. HE HAS HEARD BACK THAT HIS EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATION IS TRYING TO STOP ATC FROM ISSUING VECTORS THAT COULD CAUSE A POSSIBLE GPWS WARNING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.