Narrative:

Approaching pope AFB, nc (pob), I contacted flight service efas for an update on the WX and NOTAMS for the second leg of my trip. My duats briefing prior to departure had shown some potentially IFR WX from savannah southward, and I wanted an update in order to decide whether or not to file an IFR flight plan from dlc onward. After receiving the information, I then made a pilot report, noting that I was directly over pope AFB: I could look straight down and see the runways under me. The FSS briefer was most helpful, and based upon the information I began to look at the low altitude en route chart for the leg beyond dlc. With the excellent visibility, maintaining the desired course and altitude was relatively easy. I divided my attention between flying the airplane and studying the low altitude en route chart. With the WX beyond savannah forecast to improve, I elected not to file an IFR flight plan and proceeded to dlc. Upon taxiing to the fueling area, I was told by the FBO operator that the range officer at pob wanted me to call him because I had flown through restr area R-5311, which was active at the time and contained aircraft involved in live-fire exercises. I was shocked! I had no idea I had blundered through this restr airspace. I saw no other aircraft at any time, and have no way to estimate the danger I was in and that I put others in, except to believe that it was significant. The restr area goes up to 12000 ft: I flew at 6500 ft. I've been considering what chain of events led to this blunder, and I believe there are several contributing factors. The main factor is pilot inattn to the task at hand -- navigating the aircraft on the current leg, paying attention to what is happening right now rather than getting overly involved in the next leg of the flight. This was a single-pilot operation, which means that the pilot's attention must be focused on flying the airplane right now. Contributing factors are: -- excellent VFR WX, smooth flying conditions leading to loss of attention to the task at hand. - - Being overly-focused on the challenging task of attempting direct navigation rather than flying the easier route on established airways. -- Dividing my attention between flying the airplane, just maintaining a heading, while studying charts for the next leg. -- Not being fully aware of the dangers of direct routing. -- Even though I reported to the FSS that I was directly over pob, I was not advised that R-5311 was 'hot' although I am uncertain about whether this kind of information is within the purview of the efas briefer to provide. Finally, it's not clear to me what, if any, consideration the duats gives to special-use airspace. For example, it seems clear that direct routings do not consider this airspace. What about airway routings? What about the method I normally use -- a combination of VOR and direct routings (option 3 on the duats flight planning sub-menu)? In the final analysis, though, it is my responsibility to verify that my intended route is safely flyable. I will certainly be extra careful!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ERRONEOUS PENETRATION OF HOT RESTR AREA R-5311.

Narrative: APCHING POPE AFB, NC (POB), I CONTACTED FLT SVC EFAS FOR AN UPDATE ON THE WX AND NOTAMS FOR THE SECOND LEG OF MY TRIP. MY DUATS BRIEFING PRIOR TO DEP HAD SHOWN SOME POTENTIALLY IFR WX FROM SAVANNAH SOUTHWARD, AND I WANTED AN UPDATE IN ORDER TO DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT TO FILE AN IFR FLT PLAN FROM DLC ONWARD. AFTER RECEIVING THE INFO, I THEN MADE A PLT RPT, NOTING THAT I WAS DIRECTLY OVER POPE AFB: I COULD LOOK STRAIGHT DOWN AND SEE THE RWYS UNDER ME. THE FSS BRIEFER WAS MOST HELPFUL, AND BASED UPON THE INFO I BEGAN TO LOOK AT THE LOW ALT ENRTE CHART FOR THE LEG BEYOND DLC. WITH THE EXCELLENT VISIBILITY, MAINTAINING THE DESIRED COURSE AND ALT WAS RELATIVELY EASY. I DIVIDED MY ATTN BTWN FLYING THE AIRPLANE AND STUDYING THE LOW ALT ENRTE CHART. WITH THE WX BEYOND SAVANNAH FORECAST TO IMPROVE, I ELECTED NOT TO FILE AN IFR FLT PLAN AND PROCEEDED TO DLC. UPON TAXIING TO THE FUELING AREA, I WAS TOLD BY THE FBO OPERATOR THAT THE RANGE OFFICER AT POB WANTED ME TO CALL HIM BECAUSE I HAD FLOWN THROUGH RESTR AREA R-5311, WHICH WAS ACTIVE AT THE TIME AND CONTAINED ACFT INVOLVED IN LIVE-FIRE EXERCISES. I WAS SHOCKED! I HAD NO IDEA I HAD BLUNDERED THROUGH THIS RESTR AIRSPACE. I SAW NO OTHER ACFT AT ANY TIME, AND HAVE NO WAY TO ESTIMATE THE DANGER I WAS IN AND THAT I PUT OTHERS IN, EXCEPT TO BELIEVE THAT IT WAS SIGNIFICANT. THE RESTR AREA GOES UP TO 12000 FT: I FLEW AT 6500 FT. I'VE BEEN CONSIDERING WHAT CHAIN OF EVENTS LED TO THIS BLUNDER, AND I BELIEVE THERE ARE SEVERAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS. THE MAIN FACTOR IS PLT INATTN TO THE TASK AT HAND -- NAVIGATING THE ACFT ON THE CURRENT LEG, PAYING ATTN TO WHAT IS HAPPENING RIGHT NOW RATHER THAN GETTING OVERLY INVOLVED IN THE NEXT LEG OF THE FLT. THIS WAS A SINGLE-PLT OP, WHICH MEANS THAT THE PLT'S ATTN MUST BE FOCUSED ON FLYING THE AIRPLANE RIGHT NOW. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS ARE: -- EXCELLENT VFR WX, SMOOTH FLYING CONDITIONS LEADING TO LOSS OF ATTN TO THE TASK AT HAND. - - BEING OVERLY-FOCUSED ON THE CHALLENGING TASK OF ATTEMPTING DIRECT NAV RATHER THAN FLYING THE EASIER RTE ON ESTABLISHED AIRWAYS. -- DIVIDING MY ATTN BTWN FLYING THE AIRPLANE, JUST MAINTAINING A HDG, WHILE STUDYING CHARTS FOR THE NEXT LEG. -- NOT BEING FULLY AWARE OF THE DANGERS OF DIRECT RTING. -- EVEN THOUGH I RPTED TO THE FSS THAT I WAS DIRECTLY OVER POB, I WAS NOT ADVISED THAT R-5311 WAS 'HOT' ALTHOUGH I AM UNCERTAIN ABOUT WHETHER THIS KIND OF INFO IS WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE EFAS BRIEFER TO PROVIDE. FINALLY, IT'S NOT CLR TO ME WHAT, IF ANY, CONSIDERATION THE DUATS GIVES TO SPECIAL-USE AIRSPACE. FOR EXAMPLE, IT SEEMS CLR THAT DIRECT ROUTINGS DO NOT CONSIDER THIS AIRSPACE. WHAT ABOUT AIRWAY ROUTINGS? WHAT ABOUT THE METHOD I NORMALLY USE -- A COMBINATION OF VOR AND DIRECT ROUTINGS (OPTION 3 ON THE DUATS FLT PLANNING SUB-MENU)? IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, THOUGH, IT IS MY RESPONSIBILITY TO VERIFY THAT MY INTENDED RTE IS SAFELY FLYABLE. I WILL CERTAINLY BE EXTRA CAREFUL!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.