Narrative:

Saturday, feb/xx/95 on a flight from moline, il, (mli) to des moines, ia, (dsm). I departed the moline airport at XA50 pm with approximately 2:20 min fuel on board the aircraft. During the climb out I noticed the cylinder head temperature gauge was reading unusually high. I decreased my rate of climb and thought that the temperature would decrease when I leveled off. The temperature did decrease temporarily, but later increased well above red line. I had become somewhat preoccupied with the cylinder head temperature gauge and did not switch fuel tanks when I normally would have on this leg. I was on a visual approach for runway 13L at or possibly below 3000 ft MSL when the engine failed. Due to my concern of the cylinder head temperature, I had predisposed myself to thinking that it was the source of my engine failure. I made the decision that I would not be able to make it to the airport and set myself up for a landing in a suitable field. I had to fly a tight steep pattern to make the field. On the downwind leg I began the checklist and realized that the right tank was empty. I switched tanks but did not get it past the detent the first time. I looked outside to focus my attention for the turn from base to final and then was able to switch it fully. The engine fired a little bit but died again. I was on short final at this point and made the decision to commit to a landing, and did so. This situation can be avoided in the future by practicing strict adherence to the use of checklist instead of making assumptions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMER FORCED OFF ARPT LNDG BY AN ATX PLT. FUEL STARVATION.

Narrative: SATURDAY, FEB/XX/95 ON A FLT FROM MOLINE, IL, (MLI) TO DES MOINES, IA, (DSM). I DEPARTED THE MOLINE ARPT AT XA50 PM WITH APPROX 2:20 MIN FUEL ON BOARD THE ACFT. DURING THE CLBOUT I NOTICED THE CYLINDER HEAD TEMP GAUGE WAS READING UNUSUALLY HIGH. I DECREASED MY RATE OF CLB AND THOUGHT THAT THE TEMP WOULD DECREASE WHEN I LEVELED OFF. THE TEMP DID DECREASE TEMPORARILY, BUT LATER INCREASED WELL ABOVE RED LINE. I HAD BECOME SOMEWHAT PREOCCUPIED WITH THE CYLINDER HEAD TEMP GAUGE AND DID NOT SWITCH FUEL TANKS WHEN I NORMALLY WOULD HAVE ON THIS LEG. I WAS ON A VISUAL APCH FOR RWY 13L AT OR POSSIBLY BELOW 3000 FT MSL WHEN THE ENG FAILED. DUE TO MY CONCERN OF THE CYLINDER HEAD TEMP, I HAD PREDISPOSED MYSELF TO THINKING THAT IT WAS THE SOURCE OF MY ENG FAILURE. I MADE THE DECISION THAT I WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO MAKE IT TO THE ARPT AND SET MYSELF UP FOR A LNDG IN A SUITABLE FIELD. I HAD TO FLY A TIGHT STEEP PATTERN TO MAKE THE FIELD. ON THE DOWNWIND LEG I BEGAN THE CHKLIST AND REALIZED THAT THE R TANK WAS EMPTY. I SWITCHED TANKS BUT DID NOT GET IT PAST THE DETENT THE FIRST TIME. I LOOKED OUTSIDE TO FOCUS MY ATTN FOR THE TURN FROM BASE TO FINAL AND THEN WAS ABLE TO SWITCH IT FULLY. THE ENG FIRED A LITTLE BIT BUT DIED AGAIN. I WAS ON SHORT FINAL AT THIS POINT AND MADE THE DECISION TO COMMIT TO A LNDG, AND DID SO. THIS SIT CAN BE AVOIDED IN THE FUTURE BY PRACTICING STRICT ADHERENCE TO THE USE OF CHKLIST INSTEAD OF MAKING ASSUMPTIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.