Narrative:

Leveled off at 2000 ft, and the captain increased airspeed to 250 KIAS from 210 KIAS used in climb, without my request. Socal apparently gave us a climb to 13000 ft, but I did not hear it, nor did I notice the captain change the altitude alerter from 2000 ft to 13000 ft. He then selected level change, without my asking for it, which commanded climb thrust from the engines. Since I was unaware of the new altitude, I was maintaining 2000 ft, and the airspeed increased to 285-295 KIAS before the captain said anything about climbing. This is a classic example of a breakdown in cockpit resource management, and against our airlines requirement for the pilot not setting the altitude alerter, to acknowledge the altitude set. The PNF should not push any buttons on the autoflt director system without the PF asking for it. Capts at my airline, (about 50 percent) think that it is ok for them to do this, because they are the captain. Our airlines policy regarding changing the altitude alerter is excellent, and works very well, when used. It should be used all of the time. It involves both pilots being aware of what altitude the aircraft is going to, and is an excellent example of cockpit resource management. When it breaks down, like it did in this instance, a violation of the FARS occurs.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: POOR FLC PROCS, AND COM, LED TO AN ACR'S EXCEEDING 250 KIAS BELOW 10000 FT.

Narrative: LEVELED OFF AT 2000 FT, AND THE CAPT INCREASED AIRSPD TO 250 KIAS FROM 210 KIAS USED IN CLB, WITHOUT MY REQUEST. SOCAL APPARENTLY GAVE US A CLB TO 13000 FT, BUT I DID NOT HEAR IT, NOR DID I NOTICE THE CAPT CHANGE THE ALT ALERTER FROM 2000 FT TO 13000 FT. HE THEN SELECTED LEVEL CHANGE, WITHOUT MY ASKING FOR IT, WHICH COMMANDED CLB THRUST FROM THE ENGS. SINCE I WAS UNAWARE OF THE NEW ALT, I WAS MAINTAINING 2000 FT, AND THE AIRSPD INCREASED TO 285-295 KIAS BEFORE THE CAPT SAID ANYTHING ABOUT CLBING. THIS IS A CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF A BREAKDOWN IN COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT, AND AGAINST OUR AIRLINES REQUIREMENT FOR THE PLT NOT SETTING THE ALT ALERTER, TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE ALT SET. THE PNF SHOULD NOT PUSH ANY BUTTONS ON THE AUTOFLT DIRECTOR SYS WITHOUT THE PF ASKING FOR IT. CAPTS AT MY AIRLINE, (ABOUT 50 PERCENT) THINK THAT IT IS OK FOR THEM TO DO THIS, BECAUSE THEY ARE THE CAPT. OUR AIRLINES POLICY REGARDING CHANGING THE ALT ALERTER IS EXCELLENT, AND WORKS VERY WELL, WHEN USED. IT SHOULD BE USED ALL OF THE TIME. IT INVOLVES BOTH PLTS BEING AWARE OF WHAT ALT THE ACFT IS GOING TO, AND IS AN EXCELLENT EXAMPLE OF COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT. WHEN IT BREAKS DOWN, LIKE IT DID IN THIS INSTANCE, A VIOLATION OF THE FARS OCCURS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.