Narrative:

I was captain, as well as 'PF,' when we were cleared for the ILS runway 9L, at fll, by miami approach. We had flown over 9.5 hours, and had just traversed an area of moderate convective activity. After becoming established on final approach, we both spent time xchking and commenting on the GS indications, which had disagreed momentarily, on an approach, earlier in the day. They both crosschecked good and we continued the approach in predominantly VFR conditions. We were #1 for the airport and we continued to monitor approach control as they vectored 3 aircraft, behind us. (I would classify the amount of traffic in the area as 'light). We completed the 'before landing' checklist, and were in full landing confign by 1000 ft AGL. We landed on runway 9L (no other aircraft were observed on the ground), without realizing that we had never spoken to, or received landing clearance from ft lauderdale tower. Immediately, after landing, the first officer realized that approach control had never handed us off to tower, and we finally called tower, who instructed us to taxi to the ramp. No other communication was offered. I believe that the primary factor was our failure to check for landing clearance, prior to calling for the 'before landing checklist complete.' landing clearance is not 1 of the items on our 'before landing' checklist. A strong contributing factor was miami approach control's failure to change us over to tower frequency. I instructed the first officer to always suffix the 'before landing' checklist with the phrase 'cleared to land' or 'awaiting landing clearance,' as deemed appropriate. Hopefully this will prevent future incidents. Supplemental information from acn 296730: I had been on duty 14 hours with 9.6 hours of flight. I think the complacency of flying into our home base with excellent WX conditions led to the problem. Long day (fatigue). Failure to check '3 green -- cleared to land' over the fence.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ON APCH INTO THE HOME-BASE ARPT, AN AIR AMBULANCE FLC FAILED TO CONTACT THE TWR, AND THUS, LANDED WITHOUT A CLRNC TO LAND.

Narrative: I WAS CAPT, AS WELL AS 'PF,' WHEN WE WERE CLRED FOR THE ILS RWY 9L, AT FLL, BY MIAMI APCH. WE HAD FLOWN OVER 9.5 HRS, AND HAD JUST TRAVERSED AN AREA OF MODERATE CONVECTIVE ACTIVITY. AFTER BECOMING ESTABLISHED ON FINAL APCH, WE BOTH SPENT TIME XCHKING AND COMMENTING ON THE GS INDICATIONS, WHICH HAD DISAGREED MOMENTARILY, ON AN APCH, EARLIER IN THE DAY. THEY BOTH XCHKED GOOD AND WE CONTINUED THE APCH IN PREDOMINANTLY VFR CONDITIONS. WE WERE #1 FOR THE ARPT AND WE CONTINUED TO MONITOR APCH CTL AS THEY VECTORED 3 ACFT, BEHIND US. (I WOULD CLASSIFY THE AMOUNT OF TFC IN THE AREA AS 'LIGHT). WE COMPLETED THE 'BEFORE LNDG' CHKLIST, AND WERE IN FULL LNDG CONFIGN BY 1000 FT AGL. WE LANDED ON RWY 9L (NO OTHER ACFT WERE OBSERVED ON THE GND), WITHOUT REALIZING THAT WE HAD NEVER SPOKEN TO, OR RECEIVED LNDG CLRNC FROM FT LAUDERDALE TWR. IMMEDIATELY, AFTER LNDG, THE FO REALIZED THAT APCH CTL HAD NEVER HANDED US OFF TO TWR, AND WE FINALLY CALLED TWR, WHO INSTRUCTED US TO TAXI TO THE RAMP. NO OTHER COM WAS OFFERED. I BELIEVE THAT THE PRIMARY FACTOR WAS OUR FAILURE TO CHK FOR LNDG CLRNC, PRIOR TO CALLING FOR THE 'BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST COMPLETE.' LNDG CLRNC IS NOT 1 OF THE ITEMS ON OUR 'BEFORE LNDG' CHKLIST. A STRONG CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS MIAMI APCH CTL'S FAILURE TO CHANGE US OVER TO TWR FREQ. I INSTRUCTED THE FO TO ALWAYS SUFFIX THE 'BEFORE LNDG' CHKLIST WITH THE PHRASE 'CLRED TO LAND' OR 'AWAITING LNDG CLRNC,' AS DEEMED APPROPRIATE. HOPEFULLY THIS WILL PREVENT FUTURE INCIDENTS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 296730: I HAD BEEN ON DUTY 14 HRS WITH 9.6 HRS OF FLT. I THINK THE COMPLACENCY OF FLYING INTO OUR HOME BASE WITH EXCELLENT WX CONDITIONS LED TO THE PROB. LONG DAY (FATIGUE). FAILURE TO CHK '3 GREEN -- CLRED TO LAND' OVER THE FENCE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.