Narrative:

Problem or event: we landed at runway 49J, hilton head, sc on a runway about 300 ft too short for part 135 landing distance situation leading to event: we were dispatched on a 135 charter in a lr-35A to fly from richmond, va to savanah, GA. On landing at savanah and clearing the active runway our passenger instructed the PIC he wanted to be at hilton head, sc which is a small 4300 ft airport 22 mi east of savanah. Having radioed ahead and confirming limos and rental cars were standing by at savanah I urged the PIC to stop or taxi to the FBO and discuss the situation with our passenger and make them know that all their transportation was in place at savanah, not hilton head. Knowing this I felt they'd drop the idea of hilton head. But, the PIC told me he didn't want to mention anything to the passenger for fear of them thinking he'd landed at the wrong airport and instructed me to ask for taxi back to active and let sav tower know we'd fly VFR the 22 mi to hilton head. Being very busy computing takeoff speeds and distances and power settings and running taxi, takeoff and after takeoff checklists I once again let the PIC know I felt we were making a mistake - that it was no coincidence everything was in place in savanah and I was sure nothing was arranged (or available for that matter) at hilton head. He chose to press and so I got the landing speeds but neglected to add the 60% landing distance. With a 300 ft displaced threshold. Our required distance was 300-400 ft short. The straight flight manual landing distance was about 2600 ft which we easily did! But with the 1.60 factor we were short as mentioned above. Being clear cool and dry we landed in about half the runway. Corrective actions: I as PIC should be more assertive. My company should emphasize that any change in the itinerary must be approved by dispatch. My company should go to further lengths to make sure the passenger - not just the secretaries know when an airport is unacceptable. This would preclude pilots being put on the spot and under pressure. I myself, even as sic should verify with passenger before initial takeoff exactly where we're going to land. I did not have foresight to think that just may be our passenger would want to go to hilton head and thus be more assertive with PIC to check it out carefully. I should have been more forceful in at least slowing the PIC and taking the time to work the landing distances, ie, the 1.60 135 factor. Supplemental information from acn 296762: I did not check with the lead passenger to confirm our destination. On landing at sav our passenger said 'we are supposed be at hilton head.' in the future, I will not let the passenger who need to be somewhere rush me.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: UNAUTH LNDG FOR PART 135 OPS.

Narrative: PROB OR EVENT: WE LANDED AT RWY 49J, HILTON HEAD, SC ON A RWY ABOUT 300 FT TOO SHORT FOR PART 135 LNDG DISTANCE SIT LEADING TO EVENT: WE WERE DISPATCHED ON A 135 CHARTER IN A LR-35A TO FLY FROM RICHMOND, VA TO SAVANAH, GA. ON LNDG AT SAVANAH AND CLRING THE ACTIVE RWY OUR PAX INSTRUCTED THE PIC HE WANTED TO BE AT HILTON HEAD, SC WHICH IS A SMALL 4300 FT ARPT 22 MI E OF SAVANAH. HAVING RADIOED AHEAD AND CONFIRMING LIMOS AND RENTAL CARS WERE STANDING BY AT SAVANAH I URGED THE PIC TO STOP OR TAXI TO THE FBO AND DISCUSS THE SIT WITH OUR PAX AND MAKE THEM KNOW THAT ALL THEIR TRANSPORTATION WAS IN PLACE AT SAVANAH, NOT HILTON HEAD. KNOWING THIS I FELT THEY'D DROP THE IDEA OF HILTON HEAD. BUT, THE PIC TOLD ME HE DIDN'T WANT TO MENTION ANYTHING TO THE PAX FOR FEAR OF THEM THINKING HE'D LANDED AT THE WRONG ARPT AND INSTRUCTED ME TO ASK FOR TAXI BACK TO ACTIVE AND LET SAV TWR KNOW WE'D FLY VFR THE 22 MI TO HILTON HEAD. BEING VERY BUSY COMPUTING TKOF SPDS AND DISTANCES AND PWR SETTINGS AND RUNNING TAXI, TKOF AND AFTER TKOF CHKLISTS I ONCE AGAIN LET THE PIC KNOW I FELT WE WERE MAKING A MISTAKE - THAT IT WAS NO COINCIDENCE EVERYTHING WAS IN PLACE IN SAVANAH AND I WAS SURE NOTHING WAS ARRANGED (OR AVAILABLE FOR THAT MATTER) AT HILTON HEAD. HE CHOSE TO PRESS AND SO I GOT THE LNDG SPDS BUT NEGLECTED TO ADD THE 60% LNDG DISTANCE. WITH A 300 FT DISPLACED THRESHOLD. OUR REQUIRED DISTANCE WAS 300-400 FT SHORT. THE STRAIGHT FLT MANUAL LNDG DISTANCE WAS ABOUT 2600 FT WHICH WE EASILY DID! BUT WITH THE 1.60 FACTOR WE WERE SHORT AS MENTIONED ABOVE. BEING CLR COOL AND DRY WE LANDED IN ABOUT HALF THE RWY. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: I AS PIC SHOULD BE MORE ASSERTIVE. MY COMPANY SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT ANY CHANGE IN THE ITINERARY MUST BE APPROVED BY DISPATCH. MY COMPANY SHOULD GO TO FURTHER LENGTHS TO MAKE SURE THE PAX - NOT JUST THE SECRETARIES KNOW WHEN AN ARPT IS UNACCEPTABLE. THIS WOULD PRECLUDE PLTS BEING PUT ON THE SPOT AND UNDER PRESSURE. I MYSELF, EVEN AS SIC SHOULD VERIFY WITH PAX BEFORE INITIAL TKOF EXACTLY WHERE WE'RE GOING TO LAND. I DID NOT HAVE FORESIGHT TO THINK THAT JUST MAY BE OUR PAX WOULD WANT TO GO TO HILTON HEAD AND THUS BE MORE ASSERTIVE WITH PIC TO CHK IT OUT CAREFULLY. I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE FORCEFUL IN AT LEAST SLOWING THE PIC AND TAKING THE TIME TO WORK THE LNDG DISTANCES, IE, THE 1.60 135 FACTOR. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 296762: I DID NOT CHK WITH THE LEAD PAX TO CONFIRM OUR DEST. ON LNDG AT SAV OUR PAX SAID 'WE ARE SUPPOSED BE AT HILTON HEAD.' IN THE FUTURE, I WILL NOT LET THE PAX WHO NEED TO BE SOMEWHERE RUSH ME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.