Narrative:

The problem was caused by a late flare and subsequent bounce caused late and excessive control (elevator) input. Hard landing occurred on next touchdown. My height perception using outside visual clues was very faulty. This was caused by too many outside lights being available for height perception. Actually, it was the lights being reflected off the wet ground that gave visual overload. Also, the aircraft landing lights were reflected off the wet runway giving the appearance of descending into a black hole. I thought I had only bounced a few ft above runway. I heard the engines accelerating (due to climb). I brought the throttles to idle. The subsequent touchdown was at 3 G's (from flight data recorder). This following item was discovered by talking to fleet manager, who talked to first officer. The first officer said that he made some control inputs. I was unaware that he had made any inputs. This is one of the weak points of the A-320, especially during time critical events. If both pilots are making control inputs without the other's knowledge, nobody is really flying the airplane. In retrospect, the best action would have been a go around. Fault height perception plus mission completion focus was the cause of the poor judgement of making a landing, no matter what. I don't know what effect control confusion made on the incident, but this is something that should be discussed whenever A-320 pilots fly together for the first time. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter's total time in the aircraft was 66 hours. He had just completed his initial operating experience. This was his first aircraft to fly as captain. He had not flown this aircraft as a first officer. The company response to this event was to have him fly as first officer in this aircraft for 3 months and then get some re-check to requalify as captain. The previous flying was in the 747- 400/standard. His flying was in the pacific. There were very few lndgs and they were mostly daylight. Previous to that, he had flown as copilot and flight engineer on the 727. The reporter does some GA flying in the mooney and yankee. The training consisted of simulator and then initial operating experience in the aircraft. The characteristics of the A-320 that are difficult for him to get used to and that contributed to the hard lndgs -- the throttle does not move with power changes and the captain was not aware the first officer was also moving his control sidestick. Also, on the bounce, the spoilers may have come up when he retarded the throttle with wheels spinning. Damage to the aircraft was minor scrape on drain pipe. Thorough hard landing inspections were made on the aircraft replete with gear retraction tests. The major complaint with the aircraft in this event is the design such that the pilot has no visual cue as to what the aircraft logic is doing with the power in that the throttles do not move, and the PF does not know what control input the copilot is putting in to the elevator and aileron as there is no feel transfer between the left and right control stick.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RPTR MAKES HARD LNDG.

Narrative: THE PROB WAS CAUSED BY A LATE FLARE AND SUBSEQUENT BOUNCE CAUSED LATE AND EXCESSIVE CTL (ELEVATOR) INPUT. HARD LNDG OCCURRED ON NEXT TOUCHDOWN. MY HEIGHT PERCEPTION USING OUTSIDE VISUAL CLUES WAS VERY FAULTY. THIS WAS CAUSED BY TOO MANY OUTSIDE LIGHTS BEING AVAILABLE FOR HEIGHT PERCEPTION. ACTUALLY, IT WAS THE LIGHTS BEING REFLECTED OFF THE WET GND THAT GAVE VISUAL OVERLOAD. ALSO, THE ACFT LNDG LIGHTS WERE REFLECTED OFF THE WET RWY GIVING THE APPEARANCE OF DSNDING INTO A BLACK HOLE. I THOUGHT I HAD ONLY BOUNCED A FEW FT ABOVE RWY. I HEARD THE ENGS ACCELERATING (DUE TO CLB). I BROUGHT THE THROTTLES TO IDLE. THE SUBSEQUENT TOUCHDOWN WAS AT 3 G'S (FROM FLT DATA RECORDER). THIS FOLLOWING ITEM WAS DISCOVERED BY TALKING TO FLEET MGR, WHO TALKED TO FO. THE FO SAID THAT HE MADE SOME CTL INPUTS. I WAS UNAWARE THAT HE HAD MADE ANY INPUTS. THIS IS ONE OF THE WEAK POINTS OF THE A-320, ESPECIALLY DURING TIME CRITICAL EVENTS. IF BOTH PLTS ARE MAKING CTL INPUTS WITHOUT THE OTHER'S KNOWLEDGE, NOBODY IS REALLY FLYING THE AIRPLANE. IN RETROSPECT, THE BEST ACTION WOULD HAVE BEEN A GAR. FAULT HEIGHT PERCEPTION PLUS MISSION COMPLETION FOCUS WAS THE CAUSE OF THE POOR JUDGEMENT OF MAKING A LNDG, NO MATTER WHAT. I DON'T KNOW WHAT EFFECT CTL CONFUSION MADE ON THE INCIDENT, BUT THIS IS SOMETHING THAT SHOULD BE DISCUSSED WHENEVER A-320 PLTS FLY TOGETHER FOR THE FIRST TIME. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR'S TOTAL TIME IN THE ACFT WAS 66 HRS. HE HAD JUST COMPLETED HIS INITIAL OPERATING EXPERIENCE. THIS WAS HIS FIRST ACFT TO FLY AS CAPT. HE HAD NOT FLOWN THIS ACFT AS A FO. THE COMPANY RESPONSE TO THIS EVENT WAS TO HAVE HIM FLY AS FO IN THIS ACFT FOR 3 MONTHS AND THEN GET SOME RE-CHK TO REQUALIFY AS CAPT. THE PREVIOUS FLYING WAS IN THE 747- 400/STD. HIS FLYING WAS IN THE PACIFIC. THERE WERE VERY FEW LNDGS AND THEY WERE MOSTLY DAYLIGHT. PREVIOUS TO THAT, HE HAD FLOWN AS COPLT AND FE ON THE 727. THE RPTR DOES SOME GA FLYING IN THE MOONEY AND YANKEE. THE TRAINING CONSISTED OF SIMULATOR AND THEN INITIAL OPERATING EXPERIENCE IN THE ACFT. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE A-320 THAT ARE DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO GET USED TO AND THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE HARD LNDGS -- THE THROTTLE DOES NOT MOVE WITH PWR CHANGES AND THE CAPT WAS NOT AWARE THE FO WAS ALSO MOVING HIS CTL SIDESTICK. ALSO, ON THE BOUNCE, THE SPOILERS MAY HAVE COME UP WHEN HE RETARDED THE THROTTLE WITH WHEELS SPINNING. DAMAGE TO THE ACFT WAS MINOR SCRAPE ON DRAIN PIPE. THOROUGH HARD LNDG INSPECTIONS WERE MADE ON THE ACFT REPLETE WITH GEAR RETRACTION TESTS. THE MAJOR COMPLAINT WITH THE ACFT IN THIS EVENT IS THE DESIGN SUCH THAT THE PLT HAS NO VISUAL CUE AS TO WHAT THE ACFT LOGIC IS DOING WITH THE PWR IN THAT THE THROTTLES DO NOT MOVE, AND THE PF DOES NOT KNOW WHAT CTL INPUT THE COPLT IS PUTTING IN TO THE ELEVATOR AND AILERON AS THERE IS NO FEEL TRANSFER BTWN THE L AND R CTL STICK.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.