Narrative:

As it was related to us by the TRACON supervisor via telephone, the problem started when we were left at 11000 ft, 15 mi from the airport due to the inability of approach and center to coordination our handoff to approach. Initially we were given a 180 degree heading and then a 270 degree right turn to join the localizer runway 9R. The vector took us north of the localizer (at standard rate), so we were given a 100 degree heading to correct. We were given a descent on the 180 degree heading. At the same time we were asked to maintain 200 KTS to gritt, (runway 9R IAF) and follow a heavy airbus that was ahead. We initially had the airbus in sight. But then lost sight of him. The ' nquired about our speed and we told her that we had lost sight of the preceding traffic and slowed to 175 KTS. Our intention was to avoid the wake turbulence generated by the heavy jet. The controller complained about our speed reduction and told us to maintain 180 KTS to iness (OM runway 9R) which we did. She then instructed the traffic behind us to slow also because traffic ahead slowed to 'bug speed.' the controller was rather rude and derogatory during the entire episode. At iness, we extended our gear and the rest of our flaps and slowed to our normal approach speed of 130 KTS. After our touchdown, we were asked if we could turn off at T-1, approximately 2000 ft from the approach end of runway 9R. We could not -- safely. At that time the aircraft behind us was instructed to go around. After contacting ground, we were asked to call the TRACON supervisor. The supervisor proceeded to explain to us his difficulty in getting our handoff from center and how important speed control is when he is 'packing' aircraft together on final. We explained to the TRACON supervisor how important it was to avoid wake turbulence, not let a controller rush us in our jobs, and how important it is to us to conduct our flight safely.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: THE RPTING ACFT COULD NOT FOLLOW ATC INSTRUCTIONS SO A FOLLOWING ACFT HAD TO TAKE EVASIVE ACTION GAR.

Narrative: AS IT WAS RELATED TO US BY THE TRACON SUPVR VIA TELEPHONE, THE PROB STARTED WHEN WE WERE LEFT AT 11000 FT, 15 MI FROM THE ARPT DUE TO THE INABILITY OF APCH AND CTR TO COORD OUR HDOF TO APCH. INITIALLY WE WERE GIVEN A 180 DEG HDG AND THEN A 270 DEG R TURN TO JOIN THE LOC RWY 9R. THE VECTOR TOOK US N OF THE LOC (AT STANDARD RATE), SO WE WERE GIVEN A 100 DEG HDG TO CORRECT. WE WERE GIVEN A DSCNT ON THE 180 DEG HDG. AT THE SAME TIME WE WERE ASKED TO MAINTAIN 200 KTS TO GRITT, (RWY 9R IAF) AND FOLLOW A HVY AIRBUS THAT WAS AHEAD. WE INITIALLY HAD THE AIRBUS IN SIGHT. BUT THEN LOST SIGHT OF HIM. THE ' NQUIRED ABOUT OUR SPD AND WE TOLD HER THAT WE HAD LOST SIGHT OF THE PRECEDING TFC AND SLOWED TO 175 KTS. OUR INTENTION WAS TO AVOID THE WAKE TURB GENERATED BY THE HVY JET. THE CTLR COMPLAINED ABOUT OUR SPD REDUCTION AND TOLD US TO MAINTAIN 180 KTS TO INESS (OM RWY 9R) WHICH WE DID. SHE THEN INSTRUCTED THE TFC BEHIND US TO SLOW ALSO BECAUSE TFC AHEAD SLOWED TO 'BUG SPD.' THE CTLR WAS RATHER RUDE AND DEROGATORY DURING THE ENTIRE EPISODE. AT INESS, WE EXTENDED OUR GEAR AND THE REST OF OUR FLAPS AND SLOWED TO OUR NORMAL APCH SPD OF 130 KTS. AFTER OUR TOUCHDOWN, WE WERE ASKED IF WE COULD TURN OFF AT T-1, APPROX 2000 FT FROM THE APCH END OF RWY 9R. WE COULD NOT -- SAFELY. AT THAT TIME THE ACFT BEHIND US WAS INSTRUCTED TO GAR. AFTER CONTACTING GND, WE WERE ASKED TO CALL THE TRACON SUPVR. THE SUPVR PROCEEDED TO EXPLAIN TO US HIS DIFFICULTY IN GETTING OUR HDOF FROM CTR AND HOW IMPORTANT SPD CTL IS WHEN HE IS 'PACKING' ACFT TOGETHER ON FINAL. WE EXPLAINED TO THE TRACON SUPVR HOW IMPORTANT IT WAS TO AVOID WAKE TURB, NOT LET A CTLR RUSH US IN OUR JOBS, AND HOW IMPORTANT IT IS TO US TO CONDUCT OUR FLT SAFELY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.