Narrative:

During departure flap retraction on flight XXXX from iad, a loud cavitation sound was followed by the failure of both hydraulic pumps. This was evident as both pump indicators decreased to the zero pressure position. The first officer was flying and I instructed him to continue the departure while I completed the quick reference handbook checklist for 'loss of hydraulic pressure.' after completing the checklist, it was determined that we would need to return to iad. We asked for and received delay vectors so that we could complete the emergency checklists for lowering of gear and flaps, and for loss of normal braking. Both maintenance control and company dispatch were consulted and informed of our intention to return to iad. Once the emergency checklists were all completed, passenger notified and positive indications on the landing gear and flaps were achieved, I told iad TRACON that we were ready to return to iad. Vectors for runway 12 were received and I briefed the first officer on the approach and landing to be made. Transfer of flight controls was then made, and I became the PF. An emergency was then officially declared and a request that crash and rescue equipment be standing by was made. The subsequent landing was uneventful. Aircraft was stopped on the runway and an evacuation of the passenger was initiated. As the passenger were evacuating the aircraft was secured in accordance with the evacuation checklist. Postflt inspection revealed a 'blown' hydraulic line in the right main landing gear bay. Aircraft was towed off runway to gate. Everything about this emergency went extremely well. I don't think that there is any way that the failure could have been avoided as there was no wear or other indication that the line would fail. There were 2 specific items that were eye openers for me, and those were -- first, the amount of actual pressure that is felt on the hand pump for the lowering of gear and flaps is not even close to the amount that is represented in the bae 3200 simulator. During an actual emergency lowering, there is essentially no pressure at all until just prior to a down and locked indication for each leg (this led to apprehension that the gear was not coming down). Second, iad tower was aware of the nature of our emergency and yet they still asked us (while rolling out on an emergency landing) if we could 'make the highspd.' during a hydraulic failure in the jetstream there is very limited braking and no nosewheel steering available. It is difficult enough to keep the aircraft on centerline with nosewheel steering. Tower was informed prior to landing that we would be shutting down and performing an evacuation on the runway. I feel that the query by iad tower was in intrusion into a critical moment in the cockpit which both momentarily removed my thoughts from the task at hand and also caused unnecessary communication as I had to communication to my first officer to respond in the negative.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LOST HYD FLUID, DECLARED AN EMER, COMPLETED PROCS, RETURNED AND LANDED. STOPPED ON THE RWY AND EVACED PAX.

Narrative: DURING DEP FLAP RETRACTION ON FLT XXXX FROM IAD, A LOUD CAVITATION SOUND WAS FOLLOWED BY THE FAILURE OF BOTH HYD PUMPS. THIS WAS EVIDENT AS BOTH PUMP INDICATORS DECREASED TO THE ZERO PRESSURE POS. THE FO WAS FLYING AND I INSTRUCTED HIM TO CONTINUE THE DEP WHILE I COMPLETED THE QUICK REF HANDBOOK CHKLIST FOR 'LOSS OF HYD PRESSURE.' AFTER COMPLETING THE CHKLIST, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT WE WOULD NEED TO RETURN TO IAD. WE ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED DELAY VECTORS SO THAT WE COULD COMPLETE THE EMER CHKLISTS FOR LOWERING OF GEAR AND FLAPS, AND FOR LOSS OF NORMAL BRAKING. BOTH MAINT CTL AND COMPANY DISPATCH WERE CONSULTED AND INFORMED OF OUR INTENTION TO RETURN TO IAD. ONCE THE EMER CHKLISTS WERE ALL COMPLETED, PAX NOTIFIED AND POSITIVE INDICATIONS ON THE LNDG GEAR AND FLAPS WERE ACHIEVED, I TOLD IAD TRACON THAT WE WERE READY TO RETURN TO IAD. VECTORS FOR RWY 12 WERE RECEIVED AND I BRIEFED THE FO ON THE APCH AND LNDG TO BE MADE. TRANSFER OF FLT CTLS WAS THEN MADE, AND I BECAME THE PF. AN EMER WAS THEN OFFICIALLY DECLARED AND A REQUEST THAT CRASH AND RESCUE EQUIP BE STANDING BY WAS MADE. THE SUBSEQUENT LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL. ACFT WAS STOPPED ON THE RWY AND AN EVACUATION OF THE PAX WAS INITIATED. AS THE PAX WERE EVACUATING THE ACFT WAS SECURED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVACUATION CHKLIST. POSTFLT INSPECTION REVEALED A 'BLOWN' HYD LINE IN THE R MAIN LNDG GEAR BAY. ACFT WAS TOWED OFF RWY TO GATE. EVERYTHING ABOUT THIS EMER WENT EXTREMELY WELL. I DON'T THINK THAT THERE IS ANY WAY THAT THE FAILURE COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED AS THERE WAS NO WEAR OR OTHER INDICATION THAT THE LINE WOULD FAIL. THERE WERE 2 SPECIFIC ITEMS THAT WERE EYE OPENERS FOR ME, AND THOSE WERE -- FIRST, THE AMOUNT OF ACTUAL PRESSURE THAT IS FELT ON THE HAND PUMP FOR THE LOWERING OF GEAR AND FLAPS IS NOT EVEN CLOSE TO THE AMOUNT THAT IS REPRESENTED IN THE BAE 3200 SIMULATOR. DURING AN ACTUAL EMER LOWERING, THERE IS ESSENTIALLY NO PRESSURE AT ALL UNTIL JUST PRIOR TO A DOWN AND LOCKED INDICATION FOR EACH LEG (THIS LED TO APPREHENSION THAT THE GEAR WAS NOT COMING DOWN). SECOND, IAD TWR WAS AWARE OF THE NATURE OF OUR EMER AND YET THEY STILL ASKED US (WHILE ROLLING OUT ON AN EMER LNDG) IF WE COULD 'MAKE THE HIGHSPD.' DURING A HYD FAILURE IN THE JETSTREAM THERE IS VERY LIMITED BRAKING AND NO NOSEWHEEL STEERING AVAILABLE. IT IS DIFFICULT ENOUGH TO KEEP THE ACFT ON CTRLINE WITH NOSEWHEEL STEERING. TWR WAS INFORMED PRIOR TO LNDG THAT WE WOULD BE SHUTTING DOWN AND PERFORMING AN EVACUATION ON THE RWY. I FEEL THAT THE QUERY BY IAD TWR WAS IN INTRUSION INTO A CRITICAL MOMENT IN THE COCKPIT WHICH BOTH MOMENTARILY REMOVED MY THOUGHTS FROM THE TASK AT HAND AND ALSO CAUSED UNNECESSARY COM AS I HAD TO COM TO MY FO TO RESPOND IN THE NEGATIVE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.