Narrative:

Out whole crew arrived late to the airport due to hotel transportation problems. Upon reaching the gate we were told by our gate agent that a 'rude and cocky' FAA operations specialists demanded to be let onto the airplane. He was on the airplane when we arrived and he was less than cooperative. I attribute his presence and demeanor as a primary factor for the captain's and myself distrs. We normally brief unusual procedures, equipment, departures, etc, but failed to brief the fact that we were in a dash 500 jet which uses flaps 5 only for takeoff. We had been flying a dash 300 on all sequences prior. The dash 300 uses primarily flaps 1 for takeoff. After pushback the captain called for flaps 1 from habit. Being a new first officer (my first month on line) I selected flaps 1 and didn't make the catch even though I had figured flaps 5 takeoff data. Takeoff power was applied but not yet attained and the takeoff warning horn sounded. The captain aborted the takeoff. We had no airspeed indication yet at this time, but we still reviewed procedures, ie, brake cooling, paperwork, etc. We selected proper flap setting, notified passenger, then re-ran the checklist for another departure. The rest of the flight went uneventful. The captain and I discussed the potential for this to happen again and we both agreed that a red line placed on the flap indicator from flaps up to flaps 5 on all B-737-500 jets would help to visually cue the flight crew to misplaced flap settings. I also feel that my inexperience in the 737 along with having an FAA specialist looking over our shoulders help to set this situation up. I know that I will be more aware of this 'gotcha' in the future and make every effort to avoided it.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT OF A B737-500 ABORTED TKOF DUE TO TKOF WARNING HORN DURING INITIAL TKOF ROLL CAUSED BY THE WRONG WING FLAP SETTING.

Narrative: OUT WHOLE CREW ARRIVED LATE TO THE ARPT DUE TO HOTEL TRANSPORTATION PROBS. UPON REACHING THE GATE WE WERE TOLD BY OUR GATE AGENT THAT A 'RUDE AND COCKY' FAA OPS SPECIALISTS DEMANDED TO BE LET ONTO THE AIRPLANE. HE WAS ON THE AIRPLANE WHEN WE ARRIVED AND HE WAS LESS THAN COOPERATIVE. I ATTRIBUTE HIS PRESENCE AND DEMEANOR AS A PRIMARY FACTOR FOR THE CAPT'S AND MYSELF DISTRS. WE NORMALLY BRIEF UNUSUAL PROCS, EQUIP, DEPS, ETC, BUT FAILED TO BRIEF THE FACT THAT WE WERE IN A DASH 500 JET WHICH USES FLAPS 5 ONLY FOR TKOF. WE HAD BEEN FLYING A DASH 300 ON ALL SEQUENCES PRIOR. THE DASH 300 USES PRIMARILY FLAPS 1 FOR TKOF. AFTER PUSHBACK THE CAPT CALLED FOR FLAPS 1 FROM HABIT. BEING A NEW FO (MY FIRST MONTH ON LINE) I SELECTED FLAPS 1 AND DIDN'T MAKE THE CATCH EVEN THOUGH I HAD FIGURED FLAPS 5 TKOF DATA. TKOF PWR WAS APPLIED BUT NOT YET ATTAINED AND THE TKOF WARNING HORN SOUNDED. THE CAPT ABORTED THE TKOF. WE HAD NO AIRSPD INDICATION YET AT THIS TIME, BUT WE STILL REVIEWED PROCS, IE, BRAKE COOLING, PAPERWORK, ETC. WE SELECTED PROPER FLAP SETTING, NOTIFIED PAX, THEN RE-RAN THE CHKLIST FOR ANOTHER DEP. THE REST OF THE FLT WENT UNEVENTFUL. THE CAPT AND I DISCUSSED THE POTENTIAL FOR THIS TO HAPPEN AGAIN AND WE BOTH AGREED THAT A RED LINE PLACED ON THE FLAP INDICATOR FROM FLAPS UP TO FLAPS 5 ON ALL B-737-500 JETS WOULD HELP TO VISUALLY CUE THE FLC TO MISPLACED FLAP SETTINGS. I ALSO FEEL THAT MY INEXPERIENCE IN THE 737 ALONG WITH HAVING AN FAA SPECIALIST LOOKING OVER OUR SHOULDERS HELP TO SET THIS SIT UP. I KNOW THAT I WILL BE MORE AWARE OF THIS 'GOTCHA' IN THE FUTURE AND MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO AVOIDED IT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.