Narrative:

I am a very active flight instructor, my full-time job. On dec/xx/93 I was giving a commercial sel MEL instrument rated pilot a combined biannual flight review and signoff for his 10TH set of wings for the FAA 'wings' program. The pilot had over 700 hours total time. We did an hour and 45 mins of ground instruction. Then went to fly. Before the flight we discussed what we would do (stalls, minimum ctlable airspeed, slow flight, steep turns and simulated engine failure). In-flight he did everything above commercial pilot standards and had a good handle on the aircraft. After a stall recovery, I brought the throttle to idle to simulate engine failure. The pilot set up for landing on an airport. The approach looked normal. I was expecting him to land. As we neared the ground I realized we were moving at a fast ground speed, airspeed normal, then I noticed the tailwind. In that instant of awareness a go around decision looked to be a dangerous decision. I told the pilot to go ahead with the landing. We touched down and I took the controls to slow the aircraft. The grass was slick and we weren't decelerating. The airplane swerved left and started to come around. We slid to a stop. The wingtip contacted the ground and the nose cowling came to rest against a small pine tree. No problems other than engine and skin damage to the airplane. Chain of events and contributing factors: the air was very smooth and we both noted a trash fire's smoke was rising vertically near our location. Wind did not seem to be a factor. It was. The pilot was doing an excellent job and my guard was down as compared to someone not so proficient, so when the situation arose, his and my decision process was prolonged. Once the decision to land was made, I was mentally committed to it. My perceptions were that the approach was at the proper speed, GS flap confign and alignment for a normal safe landing not until we were down close to the ground did I notice the excessive ground speed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT OF AN SMA SEL ACFT LOST CTL OF THE ACFT DURING ROLL RESULTING IN A GND LOOP OFF THE RWY CAUSING MINOR DAMAGE TO THE ACFT. THERE WERE NO INJURIES.

Narrative: I AM A VERY ACTIVE FLT INSTRUCTOR, MY FULL-TIME JOB. ON DEC/XX/93 I WAS GIVING A COMMERCIAL SEL MEL INST RATED PLT A COMBINED BIANNUAL FLT REVIEW AND SIGNOFF FOR HIS 10TH SET OF WINGS FOR THE FAA 'WINGS' PROGRAM. THE PLT HAD OVER 700 HRS TOTAL TIME. WE DID AN HR AND 45 MINS OF GND INSTRUCTION. THEN WENT TO FLY. BEFORE THE FLT WE DISCUSSED WHAT WE WOULD DO (STALLS, MINIMUM CTLABLE AIRSPD, SLOW FLT, STEEP TURNS AND SIMULATED ENG FAILURE). INFLT HE DID EVERYTHING ABOVE COMMERCIAL PLT STANDARDS AND HAD A GOOD HANDLE ON THE ACFT. AFTER A STALL RECOVERY, I BROUGHT THE THROTTLE TO IDLE TO SIMULATE ENG FAILURE. THE PLT SET UP FOR LNDG ON AN ARPT. THE APCH LOOKED NORMAL. I WAS EXPECTING HIM TO LAND. AS WE NEARED THE GND I REALIZED WE WERE MOVING AT A FAST GND SPD, AIRSPD NORMAL, THEN I NOTICED THE TAILWIND. IN THAT INSTANT OF AWARENESS A GAR DECISION LOOKED TO BE A DANGEROUS DECISION. I TOLD THE PLT TO GO AHEAD WITH THE LNDG. WE TOUCHED DOWN AND I TOOK THE CTLS TO SLOW THE ACFT. THE GRASS WAS SLICK AND WE WEREN'T DECELERATING. THE AIRPLANE SWERVED L AND STARTED TO COME AROUND. WE SLID TO A STOP. THE WINGTIP CONTACTED THE GND AND THE NOSE COWLING CAME TO REST AGAINST A SMALL PINE TREE. NO PROBS OTHER THAN ENG AND SKIN DAMAGE TO THE AIRPLANE. CHAIN OF EVENTS AND CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: THE AIR WAS VERY SMOOTH AND WE BOTH NOTED A TRASH FIRE'S SMOKE WAS RISING VERTICALLY NEAR OUR LOCATION. WIND DID NOT SEEM TO BE A FACTOR. IT WAS. THE PLT WAS DOING AN EXCELLENT JOB AND MY GUARD WAS DOWN AS COMPARED TO SOMEONE NOT SO PROFICIENT, SO WHEN THE SIT AROSE, HIS AND MY DECISION PROCESS WAS PROLONGED. ONCE THE DECISION TO LAND WAS MADE, I WAS MENTALLY COMMITTED TO IT. MY PERCEPTIONS WERE THAT THE APCH WAS AT THE PROPER SPD, GS FLAP CONFIGN AND ALIGNMENT FOR A NORMAL SAFE LNDG NOT UNTIL WE WERE DOWN CLOSE TO THE GND DID I NOTICE THE EXCESSIVE GND SPD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.