Narrative:

This event occurred while descending into rsw. I was flying with a fairly new captain who had recently transferred to dfw from lax. During the initial descent from cruise altitude, we started painting thunderstorm cells in the vicinity of tampa extending south. The line of cells was approximately 10-15 mi wide and extended from the coastline inland. We requested and were granted a deviation to the west for WX avoidance. We paralleled the WX as we proceeded south towards ft. Myers. The ride was smooth with only occasional very light chop. As we came abeam of the lee county VOR, the captain informed me that he was going to turn east and proceed direct to the airport. I voiced my extreme displeasure with his decision since the radar showed that a direct route would take us directly through a solid line of thunderstorms. I noted that all we had to do was continue south for another 10-15 mi and we would be able to circumnav the WX altogether. The WX was still visible to the eye even though it was just about dark. The captain became withdrawn, ignored my repeated requests that he turn back, and penetrated the WX at about 16000 ft MSL and approximately 320 KIAS. The turbulence was severe to extreme and lasted about 1 min during which we experienced an estimated plus or minus 2 G's. The autoplt stayed engaged during the entire penetration although it was not able, nor was the crew able to maintain vertical or directional control. As the aircraft emerged on the other side of the line at 10000 ft MSL it again became very smooth. The remainder of the flight went without incident. Upon landing it was learned that we had several passenger and a flight attendant with minor injuries. Many of the passenger were severely shaken. I feel the factors that contributed to this incident are as follows: captain had no experience flying in this part of the country and later stated that he did not expect the turbulence to be as bad as it was. Captain's total disregard for cockpit resource management principles. First officer voiced opposition to captain's decision in strongest terms, to avail. Captain was previously employed by an airline that had been acquired by our current employer. His previous airline had a reputation for being a 'loose operation.' the captain had the attitude that he still worked for his former employer. Possible corrective action: in this case the first officer was much more familiar with the type of WX system found in this region of the country and also more familiar with the type aircraft being flown. First officer repeatedly stated that captain's decision was not the prudent course of action, yet I was ignored. Our cockpit resource management training has taught us to take the most conservative alternative if any crew member is uncomfortable with a situation. This training must be reinforced and crew members that cannot conform should be removed from flying status. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: reporter stated that so far as he knew, the air carrier's legal department was investigating the incident because of some passenger complaints and law suits. Reporter appeared to be surprised that the report was so long in being received as he had sent it in soon after the event in mid august. The time/date stamp does not reflect that as being so. Reporter voiced his disappointment with the captain's attitude, of being totally unaware of any wrong doing. There had been a retired air force general on board who went up to the cockpit and verbally abused the captain on account of the event. It was so bad that the cabin attendant suggested that the first officer not go back into the cockpit. The aircraft was at the ramp at the time. The passenger getting off displayed varied emotions. Some were weeping, with others exclaiming great praise for the 'captain who got them through that awful WX' in one piece. First officer vowed that if anything else was to occur on a similar basis with this captain that he would turn the information over to the professional standards committee of the air carrier's union. Reporter suggested that the logbook reflect the level of turbulence encountered and the captain ignored this suggestion as well. Reporter also stated that the 'word' of this incident has gotten around the airline.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG SUFFERS SEVERE TURB IN A TSTM PENETRATION. INJURIES OCCUR.

Narrative: THIS EVENT OCCURRED WHILE DSNDING INTO RSW. I WAS FLYING WITH A FAIRLY NEW CAPT WHO HAD RECENTLY TRANSFERRED TO DFW FROM LAX. DURING THE INITIAL DSCNT FROM CRUISE ALT, WE STARTED PAINTING TSTM CELLS IN THE VICINITY OF TAMPA EXTENDING S. THE LINE OF CELLS WAS APPROX 10-15 MI WIDE AND EXTENDED FROM THE COASTLINE INLAND. WE REQUESTED AND WERE GRANTED A DEV TO THE W FOR WX AVOIDANCE. WE PARALLELED THE WX AS WE PROCEEDED S TOWARDS FT. MYERS. THE RIDE WAS SMOOTH WITH ONLY OCCASIONAL VERY LIGHT CHOP. AS WE CAME ABEAM OF THE LEE COUNTY VOR, THE CAPT INFORMED ME THAT HE WAS GOING TO TURN E AND PROCEED DIRECT TO THE ARPT. I VOICED MY EXTREME DISPLEASURE WITH HIS DECISION SINCE THE RADAR SHOWED THAT A DIRECT RTE WOULD TAKE US DIRECTLY THROUGH A SOLID LINE OF TSTMS. I NOTED THAT ALL WE HAD TO DO WAS CONTINUE S FOR ANOTHER 10-15 MI AND WE WOULD BE ABLE TO CIRCUMNAV THE WX ALTOGETHER. THE WX WAS STILL VISIBLE TO THE EYE EVEN THOUGH IT WAS JUST ABOUT DARK. THE CAPT BECAME WITHDRAWN, IGNORED MY REPEATED REQUESTS THAT HE TURN BACK, AND PENETRATED THE WX AT ABOUT 16000 FT MSL AND APPROX 320 KIAS. THE TURB WAS SEVERE TO EXTREME AND LASTED ABOUT 1 MIN DURING WHICH WE EXPERIENCED AN ESTIMATED PLUS OR MINUS 2 G'S. THE AUTOPLT STAYED ENGAGED DURING THE ENTIRE PENETRATION ALTHOUGH IT WAS NOT ABLE, NOR WAS THE CREW ABLE TO MAINTAIN VERT OR DIRECTIONAL CTL. AS THE ACFT EMERGED ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE LINE AT 10000 FT MSL IT AGAIN BECAME VERY SMOOTH. THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT WENT WITHOUT INCIDENT. UPON LNDG IT WAS LEARNED THAT WE HAD SEVERAL PAX AND A FLT ATTENDANT WITH MINOR INJURIES. MANY OF THE PAX WERE SEVERELY SHAKEN. I FEEL THE FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCIDENT ARE AS FOLLOWS: CAPT HAD NO EXPERIENCE FLYING IN THIS PART OF THE COUNTRY AND LATER STATED THAT HE DID NOT EXPECT THE TURB TO BE AS BAD AS IT WAS. CAPT'S TOTAL DISREGARD FOR COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT PRINCIPLES. FO VOICED OPPOSITION TO CAPT'S DECISION IN STRONGEST TERMS, TO AVAIL. CAPT WAS PREVIOUSLY EMPLOYED BY AN AIRLINE THAT HAD BEEN ACQUIRED BY OUR CURRENT EMPLOYER. HIS PREVIOUS AIRLINE HAD A REPUTATION FOR BEING A 'LOOSE OP.' THE CAPT HAD THE ATTITUDE THAT HE STILL WORKED FOR HIS FORMER EMPLOYER. POSSIBLE CORRECTIVE ACTION: IN THIS CASE THE FO WAS MUCH MORE FAMILIAR WITH THE TYPE OF WX SYS FOUND IN THIS REGION OF THE COUNTRY AND ALSO MORE FAMILIAR WITH THE TYPE ACFT BEING FLOWN. FO REPEATEDLY STATED THAT CAPT'S DECISION WAS NOT THE PRUDENT COURSE OF ACTION, YET I WAS IGNORED. OUR COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT TRAINING HAS TAUGHT US TO TAKE THE MOST CONSERVATIVE ALTERNATIVE IF ANY CREW MEMBER IS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH A SIT. THIS TRAINING MUST BE REINFORCED AND CREW MEMBERS THAT CANNOT CONFORM SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM FLYING STATUS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH REPORTER REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: RPTR STATED THAT SO FAR AS HE KNEW, THE ACR'S LEGAL DEPT WAS INVESTIGATING THE INCIDENT BECAUSE OF SOME PAX COMPLAINTS AND LAW SUITS. RPTR APPEARED TO BE SURPRISED THAT THE RPT WAS SO LONG IN BEING RECEIVED AS HE HAD SENT IT IN SOON AFTER THE EVENT IN MID AUGUST. THE TIME/DATE STAMP DOES NOT REFLECT THAT AS BEING SO. RPTR VOICED HIS DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THE CAPT'S ATTITUDE, OF BEING TOTALLY UNAWARE OF ANY WRONG DOING. THERE HAD BEEN A RETIRED AIR FORCE GENERAL ON BOARD WHO WENT UP TO THE COCKPIT AND VERBALLY ABUSED THE CAPT ON ACCOUNT OF THE EVENT. IT WAS SO BAD THAT THE CABIN ATTENDANT SUGGESTED THAT THE FO NOT GO BACK INTO THE COCKPIT. THE ACFT WAS AT THE RAMP AT THE TIME. THE PAX GETTING OFF DISPLAYED VARIED EMOTIONS. SOME WERE WEEPING, WITH OTHERS EXCLAIMING GREAT PRAISE FOR THE 'CAPT WHO GOT THEM THROUGH THAT AWFUL WX' IN ONE PIECE. FO VOWED THAT IF ANYTHING ELSE WAS TO OCCUR ON A SIMILAR BASIS WITH THIS CAPT THAT HE WOULD TURN THE INFO OVER TO THE PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS COMMITTEE OF THE ACR'S UNION. RPTR SUGGESTED THAT THE LOGBOOK REFLECT THE LEVEL OF TURB ENCOUNTERED AND THE CAPT IGNORED THIS SUGGESTION AS WELL. RPTR ALSO STATED THAT THE 'WORD' OF THIS INCIDENT HAS GOTTEN AROUND THE AIRLINE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.