Narrative:

On taxi out, status page showed class ii maintenance flight control message. We performed the sidestick priority check per company operations manual and it failed. We called maintenance control on the radio and consulted with them. After numerous circuit breaker resets, centralized fault display system procedures and tests, the message was cleared. We took off and pressed on. The question is, were we legal to depart without a maintenance entry in the logbook? The maintenance controller said yes, but the company operations manual seems to indicate differently. Although I do not feel safety was compromised, we are possibly at risk far-wise. The question is, with the availability of bite checks and excellent communications, how much trouble-shooting is the crew legal to do? At what point will safety be compromised? I do not trust maintenance control to be completely honest with us, due to the intense pressure from management for on-time departures here at air carrier. We often are pushed and coerced by supervisory people toward that end, even though that was not necessarily the case this time. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporting captain is his domicile's safety representative for the pilot's union and a fan of the ASRS. He is concerned that his company and his union have not yet taken a stand on how to handle 'class 2' maintenance gripes that show up on the status page in the aircraft. The cockpit operating manual suggests that a maintenance write-up be made with a mechanic's sign off. This works well at the gate, but when the aircraft is away from the gate, pilots and mechanics can become creative as in this case. Of course, if there had been an aci in the cockpit, the reporter would have gone to the gate and let the schedule slip.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR MLG PLT IN AN 'ELECTRIC AIRPLANE' FLEW AN ACFT AFTER THE FLC FIXED AN ITEM THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN FIXED BY A MECH.

Narrative: ON TAXI OUT, STATUS PAGE SHOWED CLASS II MAINT FLT CTL MESSAGE. WE PERFORMED THE SIDESTICK PRIORITY CHK PER COMPANY OPS MANUAL AND IT FAILED. WE CALLED MAINT CTL ON THE RADIO AND CONSULTED WITH THEM. AFTER NUMEROUS CIRCUIT BREAKER RESETS, CENTRALIZED FAULT DISPLAY SYS PROCS AND TESTS, THE MESSAGE WAS CLRED. WE TOOK OFF AND PRESSED ON. THE QUESTION IS, WERE WE LEGAL TO DEPART WITHOUT A MAINT ENTRY IN THE LOGBOOK? THE MAINT CTLR SAID YES, BUT THE COMPANY OPS MANUAL SEEMS TO INDICATE DIFFERENTLY. ALTHOUGH I DO NOT FEEL SAFETY WAS COMPROMISED, WE ARE POSSIBLY AT RISK FAR-WISE. THE QUESTION IS, WITH THE AVAILABILITY OF BITE CHKS AND EXCELLENT COMS, HOW MUCH TROUBLE-SHOOTING IS THE CREW LEGAL TO DO? AT WHAT POINT WILL SAFETY BE COMPROMISED? I DO NOT TRUST MAINT CTL TO BE COMPLETELY HONEST WITH US, DUE TO THE INTENSE PRESSURE FROM MGMNT FOR ON-TIME DEPS HERE AT ACR. WE OFTEN ARE PUSHED AND COERCED BY SUPERVISORY PEOPLE TOWARD THAT END, EVEN THOUGH THAT WAS NOT NECESSARILY THE CASE THIS TIME. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTING CAPT IS HIS DOMICILE'S SAFETY REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE PLT'S UNION AND A FAN OF THE ASRS. HE IS CONCERNED THAT HIS COMPANY AND HIS UNION HAVE NOT YET TAKEN A STAND ON HOW TO HANDLE 'CLASS 2' MAINT GRIPES THAT SHOW UP ON THE STATUS PAGE IN THE ACFT. THE COCKPIT OPERATING MANUAL SUGGESTS THAT A MAINT WRITE-UP BE MADE WITH A MECH'S SIGN OFF. THIS WORKS WELL AT THE GATE, BUT WHEN THE ACFT IS AWAY FROM THE GATE, PLTS AND MECHS CAN BECOME CREATIVE AS IN THIS CASE. OF COURSE, IF THERE HAD BEEN AN ACI IN THE COCKPIT, THE RPTR WOULD HAVE GONE TO THE GATE AND LET THE SCHEDULE SLIP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.